The Foreign Policy of Nationalism:

The Case of Serbia and Greece

Dimitris Keridis
Abstract

This is a study in foreign-policy formation and the politics of ethno-nationalism. Its subject is the interaction between domestic developments and the foreign behavior of states. It is a study situated at the crossroads of international relations and comparative politics that integrates much of the body of theory concerning international relations, nationalism and democracy. The analysis focuses on a non-material factor -nationalist ideology and culture - that is put in the service of material interests - political power. Its underlying belief is that nationalist policies, in political communities that have traditionally been defined in ethnic terms, were high-risk but well-calculated strategies on the part of political leaders aiming to consolidate power against rival elites in a period of a stressful political and economic transition.

In conditions of rapid change and rising uncertainty, political leaders and ruling elites have sought to bolster their legitimacy by appealing to nationalism. Two of the most visible examples of such a development have been Serbia since the mid-1980s and Greece in the early 1990s. In both Serbia and Greece there is a long tradition of ethno-nationalist and populist politics. Nationalism created a political context where the state interest was defined not in terms of the territorial security of the state as classical realism argues, nor of its economic well-being as liberalism might claim, but of the survival, physical and cultural, of the Serbian and Greek nation defined in ethno-cultural terms as a community of people of common descent and cultural traditions.
In sum, the governments of Serbia and Greece followed confrontational foreign policies that were perceived by neighbors and outsiders as aggressive and in defiance of established international norms. Serbia strove for a policy of "Greater Serbia" and territorial expansion. Greece tried to block the international recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This study explores the development of this policy and attempts to draw some broader conclusions for the political use of nationalism in post-Cold War conditions.
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Introduction

This is a study in foreign policy formation and the politics of ethno-nationalism. Its subject is the interaction between domestic developments and the foreign behavior of states. It is a study situated at the crossroads of international relations and comparative politics that integrates much of the body of theory concerning international relations, nationalism and democracy. The analysis focuses on a non-material factor nationalist ideology that is put in the service of material interests - political power. Its underlying belief is that nationalist policies, in political communities that have traditionally been defined in ethnic terms, were high-risk but well-calculated strategies on the part of political leaders aiming to consolidate power against rival elites in a period of a stressful political and economic transition.

1. At the end of the Cold War, two nations in Southeastern Europe, Serbia and Greece, became embroiled in conflicts with their neighbors. Having failed in its attempt to "recentralize" the Yugoslav federation, Serbia turned to an expansionary policy to create a Greater Serbia and incorporate all Yugoslav Serbs into a single state. Greece reacted strongly to the independence of Macedonia and attempted to force a change of name on the new republic as a precondition for its international recognition.

What preceded and accompanied these policies was a burst of nationalism defined in ethnic terms. Political elites in Serbia and Greece both stimulated and tapped into nationalist mobilization to acquire popularity, de-legitimize opponents and redefine the 'national interest' in ways not threatening for them. They pursued a domestically-oriented foreign policy with the aim of acquiring and maintaining power under conditions of rapid international change, economic distress and a transition towards more pluralist and less state-dependent socio-political structures.

In both Serbia and Greece many politicians from left and right rode the nationalist 'wave' but it was only two leaders who managed to articulate the nationalist agenda credibly enough

1 From now on the term «Macedonia», unless otherwise indicated, will be used in reference to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the term «Macedonian» to the Slav-Macedonian citizens of this state. Their use does not imply a political position in Greece’s dispute with FYROM.
to make it a powerful, in fact, the essential, component of a successful political strategy. These
two leaders were Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, and Andreas Papandreou, the
Prime Minister of Greece.

2. For all the differences between the two countries and the two leaders, Milosevic and
Papandreou shared some important common characteristics. They were not, generally,
nationalists by conviction, like, Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia.2 In fact, on several
occasions in the past Milosevic and Papandreou had denounced nationalism in general, and
specifically the causes they would later espouse. Thus, for example, Slobodan Milosevic, following
the publication of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in September
1986, commented that “the Memorandum...represents nothing else but the darkest nationalism. It
means the liquidation of the current socialist system of our country, that is, the disintegration after
which there is no survival for any nation or nationality. Tito's policy of brotherhood and
unity...is the only basis on which Yugoslavia's survival can be secured.”3 A few years later
Milosevic's policy followed the recommendations of the same Memorandum he had previously
denounced.

Similarly, Andreas Papandreou, talking to Mr. Williams, an official at the U.S. embassy
in Athens, referred to “Macedonia” as a tragic problem and accused the then prime minister,
Constantine Mitsotakis, of being captive to nationalism.4 Less than a year later, Papandreou,
having returned to power, “hardened” Greece's foreign policy. He terminated the UN-sponsored
negotiations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and imposed a
trade embargo on the latter.3

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2According to Warren Zimmermann: "Milosevic is a nationalist by vocation; for him
nationalism has been an instrument for winning and holding power. Tudjman, by contrast, is a
visceral ly emotional nationalist; he sees himself as the living embodiment of Croatia and all its
p 4.

3For a full English text see Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts: Answers to Criticisms (Belgrade: Vreme, 1995).

4Theodore Skylakakis, Sto Onoma tis Makedonias [In the Name of Macedonia] (Athens: Elliniki
Being nationalists out of convenience rather than conviction gave them a certain flexibility in adopting, adapting, adjusting and abandoning the nationalist agenda. After all, Milosevic, who had started a war for the defense of Croatia's Serbs, abandoned them to the wrath of the Croatian army in August 1995. Papandreou who denounced the 1993 Vance-Owen Plan for the resolution of the Macedonian dispute as treasonous, signed an almost identical Interim Agreement in September 1995. Much of the present study has to do with the continuous re-adjustment of political strategies and the effect this readjustment has had on state foreign policy.

Milosevic and Papandreou belong to a long tradition of populist leaders in Southeastern Europe. They recognized the political power of nationalism and knew how to make good use of it. They understood democracy as a direct appeal to the people and were not afraid to use popular mobilization as an effective political tool. Their respect for political institutions that channel and, at the same time, give meaningful expression to

5)ne assumes that Antonis Samaras, the foreign minister of Greece between 1990 and 1992, was also a nationalist of convenience. As late as 1989 Samaras had no problem calling the Muslims of Western Thrace "Turks" within his 'European,' human-rights-friendly agenda. (Skylakakis, p. 248).
popular participation in politics, was minimal. They took advantage of the unconsolidated nature of the new-born democracies and their institutions. They exploited a certain time window in the transition from authoritarian to more popular-based politics, and they used an authoritarian, nationalist political culture to establish their electoral supremacy.

During a period of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, populism, defined as the equation of democracy with majority rule, becomes a powerful political force. Political culture and political institutions have not yet developed the effective mechanisms to protect the rights of minorities and withstand the populist assaults of charismatic leaders. Often, such assaults are powerful enough to highjack the democratic transition altogether and replace the old authoritarianism with a new type that has the appearance but not the substance of democracy, a clear case being Serbia under Milosevic.

Being a populist in Southeastern Europe with its underdeveloped bourgeoisie, its fairly egalitarian social structure and its numerous open 'national questions' has meant, first and foremost, being a nationalist, opting for ethnic rather than class-oriented politics. Presiding over catch-all parries of the Left attempting to win large parliamentary majorities, Milosevic and Papandreou used the popular appeal of nationalism and its simple, emotional, flexible and familiar political message.

Nationalism makes no demands on developing party platforms first. It moves political cleavages from the center to the periphery of the political community. Thus, polarization is no longer between the rich and the poor, city and village, state and market,

\[^{7}\text{Since Ottoman times, Southeastern Europe, with the exception of Romania, has been dominated by a small land-owing peasantry.}\]

but between 'us' and 'them' -the external enemy. Such an all-encompassing nationalist message suited both Milosevic's and Papandreou's efforts to enlarge and consolidate their power base. Thanks to their skillful manipulation of a long nationalist tradition, they stole the thunder of threatening rivals, de-legitimized opponents by accusing them of treason, invoked alleged conspiracies in order to blame others for their policy failures and projected themselves not as partisan but rather as national leaders who were above 'petty' party politics.

To obtain votes, a nationalist message needs to be clear and reassuring. Thus, it has to avoid unnecessary threats and radical adventurism. The search for votes makes it turn away from militancy and look for the middle ground. It is better to define a defensive perimeter of "legitimate", "sacred" and "inalienable" national rights and promise to defend them than simply to go for a policy of expansion. A politically successful nationalist needs to appear defensive and reactive to external 'aggression' rather than offensively challenging the established order. He has to neutralize the opposition of the liberal-urban milieu, whatever that means in the Balkans. His is a two-front struggle: against both non-nationalists and ultra-nationalists. The former threaten to destroy the nationalist agenda; the latter would try to usurp it for their own benefit. Non-nationalists can be portrayed as ineffective, naive, even treasonous, ultra-nationalists are branded dangerous provocateurs. This was how Milosevic managed to repel the challenge of Vojislav Seselj, and Papandreou that of Antonis Samaras.

A populist discounts future costs for present gains. His time horizon is short-term. Although a supreme tactician, always ready to surprise his opponents and sacrifice substance for a spectacular albeit meaningless political gesture, he is no strategist and prefers ideological eclecticism. His is a policy of zigzags with no clear, long-term goals. Milosevic, for example, has been both a peace-breaker and a peace-maker, a socialist and
a liberal reformer. Papandreou was at one time a 'third road', Third World socialist and at another a European social-democrat. For all their visionary rhetoric, both Milosevic and Papandreou lacked a clear, long-term vision for their nations. On the contrary, they embodied, quite effectively, the contradictions of their nations in their search for an identity and a role in a rapidly changing world.

As is the case in all late-modernizing countries where capitalism, rationalism, and parliamentarianism are a foreign import rather than an indigenous development, Serbia and Greece have not escaped an often ferocious debate between elitist advocates of modernization and cultural Westernization and the ethno-centric, populist advocates of tradition and cultural distinctiveness who reject reform at home and integration abroad. Milosevic and Papandreou built their political profile around the latter rather than the former. This was not to be expected. After all they arrived in politics with impeccable technocratic credentials and a good understanding of international economics and the dynamics of late capitalism. Milosevic had been the president of a large Yugoslav bank and had developed frequent contacts with Western financiers. Papandreou was a renowned Harvard-educated Berkeley professor of economics who was hired by Greek conservatives in the 1960s to advise on ways of improving the performance of Greece's 'tiger' economy at the time.

However, in the 1980s Milosevic and Papandreou began to vocalize the fears and concerns of those segments of society most strongly opposed to economic liberalization and socio-political modernization. Their primary support came from the most state-dependent social groups —public servants, farmers and pensioners —and was strongest in

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the countryside and the small towns of Serbia and Greece. Their staunchest opponents were concentrated in the capitals of Belgrade and Athens. A "socialist" Serbian and Greek peasantry present an exact antithesis to conventional Western polarizations between a right-wing, conservative countryside and liberal-socialist, left-wing cities.

Milosevic and Papandreou coupled their foreign policy nationalism with an economic nationalism of protectionism. If "political alignments in most if not all countries are largely between defense and geostrategic-oriented interests within the economy (but also in perceptions of national identity), versus those who orient themselves toward trade and greater international openness," if "the real line of division in Greek politics is between the conservative populist forces on the one hand, which represent clientelistic politics, populism, and introversion, and modernizing European forces on the other" and if "Greek developments in both the economic and foreign-policy spheres largely depend on..."

9 According to Sabrina Petra Ramet "[Milosevic] had drawn the bulk of his support from Serbia's villages...[his policies] represented, thus, the revolt of the countryside against the city." "Balkan War," Foreign Affairs 71:4 (Fall 1992): p. 84. Cvijeto Job called the political significance of the countryside in Serbia, the tyranny of the palanka. For him Serbian nationalism cannot be understood without "recognizing the baleful role regressive provincialism plays in Yugoslavia. In his seminal and prescient book The Philosophy of a Provincial Town (1969), Radomir Konstantinovic explores the narrow-minded, chip-on-the-shoulder, anti-urban idealization of 'true fold values and culture,' the tyranny of local cultural establishments, and the idolatry of the national self. He sees the authoritarianism of Serbian palankas (small towns) as fertile soil for bigotry...The particular tragedy of Yugoslavia was that industrialization, modernization, and urbanization could not transcend the vindictive mores of the palanka The opposite happened. With the great migration from the countryside, life in the cities became increasingly dominated by a palanka mentality. Instead of the provinces becoming citified, the cities became countrified, in effect turning into bigger palankas in their cultural and political life." Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," Foreign Policy 92 (Fall 1993): pp. 66-67.

10 In national elections, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) of Milosevic and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) of Papandreou scored well below their national average in Belgrade and Athens.

the outcome of this confrontation," then Milosevic and Papandreou expressed and embodied the largely defensive, anti-European and populist pole of the confrontation. Their politics were usually sufficiently dressed up in left-wing rhetoric of 'caring for the poor', resisting the 'imperialist West' and upholding the 'national dignity' to hide their reactionary content. But their victory was the victory of the ethno-state tradition and, to a great extent, the defeat of the modernizing option.13

Before turning to this ethno-state tradition, one, at least, clarification is needed. Whereas Greece managed to develop a credible, modernizing, "European" alternative both without,14 but, increasingly, even within Papandreou's own party, PASOK, Serbia has not been so lucky. On the contrary, already by the 1970s the liberal, reformist alternative was defeated by Tito himself. The vacuum that was then created in Serbian politics was quickly filled by ambitious apparatchiks, the most successful of which has been Milosevic. Milan Panic, the Serbian-American tycoon and prime minister of Serbia-Montenegro for a time, could have embodied such an alternative, having achieved a good 34% of the vote in the Serbian presidential elections in 1992 against considerable odds. But he lacked both the

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However, after having consolidated their political hegemony based on the former, they successfully moved to express the modernizing demands of the urban middle classes, and attempted, thus, to monopolize the politics of their nations. Milosevic's and Papandreou's political genius consisted of their ability to blend and take advantage of both political traditions of modernization' and ethno-centricism.

In fact, the seven-year tenure in power of New Democracy between 1974 and 1981 was crucial in this regard. It proved that a reformed, modern, democratic, liberal, socially-minded and inclusive center-right was both possible and a viable political alternative. Its presence moderated PASOK's conduct considerably once in power. In addition, the New Democrats, not taking any chances, had firmly anchored Greece in the West by integrating the country back into NATO in 1980 and acceding to the European Community in 1981, while electing their patriarch, Constantine Karamanlis, to the Presidency of the Republic to make sure that the advancing PASOK socialists found it very difficult to change the basic orientations of the country.
organization and the stamina to persist. In 1996, the "Together" coalition of the Serbian opposition could have potentially emerged as such an alternative but it fell victim to the personal ambitions of its leaders and fragmented. In the meantime, Milosevic's main opponents have been the ultra-nationalist Vojislav Seselj and the unpredictable Vuk Draskovic, both alien to traditional European liberalism.

3. Milosevic and Papandreou did not, of course, operate in a historical vacuum, but rather within a specific set of circumstances and concurrent with arising opportunities which they made good use of. They took advantage of a strong and long nationalist tradition. At the source of the Balkan turmoil of the early 1990s lies an unreconstructed, virulently romantic, 19th-century nationalism that defines the "political community' in narrowly ethnic terms and enshrines the ethnos and its defense as the source of all political legitimacy.

Southeastern Europe remained largely untouched by the wave of post-World War II historical revisionism that overran other parts of Europe and effectively challenged a number of nationalist stereotypes that had poisoned inter-state relations in the past. Contrary to other parts of Europe, the Balkans developed powerful partisan movements against occupying German and Italian forces that effectively mixed nationalism with Marxism, much in the same way that post-war, Third-World, anti-colonial movements did a few years later. Both Milosevic's and Papandreou's socialists are the products of this fusion. Thus, nationalism was not discredited in Southeastern Europe the way it was in other parts of the continent, especially in Germany, where its defeat led to a relentless drive for European integration. In Southeastern Europe nationalism remained a powerful legitimizing force that post-war political elites in Yugoslavia, Greece and elsewhere continued to use in support of their rule.
The absence of critical intellectuals, a direct result of a historically weak civil society and the state's omnipotence in Southeastern Europe, has further contributed to the domination of education, the media and public discourse by a xenophobic and self-glorifying nationalism. Slightly paraphrasing George Orwell, he who controls the past controls the present. Nation-states have tried to control the past through the construction and dissemination of 'national' history. In 'national' history "others are consistently portrayed as chauvinistic aggressors, while one's own nation is heralded as an enlightened liberator."

Only within this broader framework of ideological use of the past as 'national history' in the service of political goals was it possible for Milosevic to persuade a majority of Serbs that the battle of Kosovo in 1389 is the defining turning point in their history with continuous relevance even at the end of the 20th century. Greeks resorted to Alexander the Great, who lived in the fourth century B.C., to explain their foreign policy towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s. In this attempt Greeks abandoned history and embraced "national" history defined by timelessness and spacelessness, i.e. the collapse of time and space, and the teleological reconstruction of the reputed past to legitimize present-day policies by the absurd attempt to project the contemporary meaning of the term "Greek", as it has developed over the last two centuries, to the very distant past.

It was not only the traditional nationalist schooling and nationalist-dominated political discourse of Serbs and Greeks that accounts for the "nationalist eruption" of the late 1980s and early 1990s. "With the death of Yugoslavia, they saw themselves as Serbs, who had been subsumed as 'Yugoslavs,' returning to history. Every day they were living

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and making history once more, and they could be seduced into doing so because they were led to believe that precisely such a return to history was also a return to glory."\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, the Greeks, fed up with twenty years of post-junta anti-nationalist rhetoric, in which allegiance to the flag and knowledge of the national anthem smacked of suspect conservatism, rediscovered with passion the value of the primordial bonds of the nation of Hellenes and mobilized against the external threat of alien Skopjens. It was the previous 'suppression' and the present disorientation that made the nationalist 'eruption' so violent.

4. This is not a study of ethnic conflict or international relations at the systemic level, although it makes reference to both. It is a study of foreign-policy formation and thus, it takes a consciously "reductionist" approach to international relations, focusing on the state and sub-state levels without ignoring the interaction between the state and the international system.\textsuperscript{17} The assumption is that different events and phenomena in international relations require different emphases on different units of analysis and different sources of explanation.

Furthermore, whereas the whole debate about levels of analysis has been largely confined to the political/military realm, this dissertation strives to integrate economic and social factors under the rubric of political culture and socio-economic change. It also attempts to draw links between international relations, international political economy, comparative politics and historical sociology, especially when references are made to the ethno-nationalist phenomenon in Southeastern Europe in general and in Serbia and Greece in particular, and where the analysis deals with the politics of transition to more liberal,


\textsuperscript{17}For this reason it is better to talk of "preference-based" approaches rather than domestic ones since the source of preferences may be transnational, as in theories of economic interdependence.
open and pluralist socio-economic structures. As opposed to the many current, popular accounts of recent developments in Southeastern Europe, this study describes and analyzes nationalist mobilization as part of wider political and social changes. It is the underlying premise of this dissertation that only in this way can policy choices begin to make sense.

Both attempts—a return to the state level and an integrative approach to international relations—are tuned to the theoretical developments that have followed the advance of economic globalization and the end of the Cold War, when concerns about polarity dominated the internationalist debate. The demise of the era of national economies when politics still dictated economics has led to the broadening of the meaning of security and to the need for the integrated study of the political, economic, military and societal sectors of the subject state-units.

This dissertation focuses on competing domestic leaders and elites—not ethnic groups or the international system—and their interaction with domestic constituencies and the international environment. It presupposes the existence of a state authority, endowed with an ability to govern (structure), that becomes a point of contention and the prize in the competition of elites. Such an authority needs to be responsive to popular demands and external pressures (interaction capacity), for the interaction itself (among elites, the peoples and foreign powers) to take place.

Nationalism's homogenizing capacity creates a common space, a marketplace of values, ideas and meanings with a minimum commonality, a political community out of fragmented, isolated and incoherent particularisms that makes political participation on a large scale both meaningful and possible. Broadly speaking "nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken
up the lives of the majority...of the population- It means the generalized diffusion of a school-mediated academy-supervised idiom...It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures."\(^{18}\) This dissertation takes this imposition/diffusion/establishment as a historical given and is not concerned with the hows and the if-nots of what has taken place. But the dissertation is well aware of the historicity of the nationalist phenomenon and its close connection with modernity.

Nationalism has been both a mass and an elite political phenomenon. It has managed, as only communism did briefly in the past, to integrate mass and elite politics. In fact, nationalism, as indicated above, created mass politics. The massive mobilizations of the American and the French revolution took place under its banner.

In oligarchic, closed political systems where the great majority of the population is not politically active, nationalism's popular appeal is of no particular use to calculative leaders. It is only when mass politics already exist or are desired that such leaders resort to the populist power of nationalism. It is only with the opening of the political system, an opening that Serbia experienced in the late 1980s and Greece in the mid-1970s, that nationalism becomes a useful political tool According to Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder "historical and contemporary evidence strongly suggests that rising nationalism often goes hand in hand with rising democracy. It is no accident that the end of the Cold War brought both a wave of democratization and a revival of nationalist sentiment in the former communist states."\(^{19}\) Mansfield and Snyder accept that democratization often leads

to nationalist revivals. In a sense, it is a cost that young democracies have to pay. Often it is too high a cost.²⁰

During a democratic transition towards a more open, pluralist and participatory political system, the role of political leadership and its choices are hard to overestimate. Transitions axe par excellence periods of institutional destruction and creation. While the norms and institutions of the ancien regime weaken and the new structures have not yet been consolidated, leaders play an important role since they, like switchmen at railway junctions, can redirect, for better or worse, the train of powerful historical change.

In the late 1980s, Milosevic used Serbian nationalism to highjack a nascent democratic transition and replace the collapsing communist political and economic structures with an illiberal, personal regime with all the trappings of Western democracy (i.e. periodic elections) but without its substance. Milosevic and his Socialist Party is the only one in Eastern Europe to have overseen both the collapse of communism and the birth of a post-communist, quasi-democratic system. Papandreou operated within a much more institutionalized political system. But he also used nationalism to win and stay in power.

5. This dissertation first and foremost tries to systematically re-tell a story. This is the story of the recent rise of nationalist politics and politicians in Serbia and Greece. It follows the remarkable rise of Milosevic to power in the second half of the 1980s and Papandreou's surprising come-back in the early 1990s. The study then attempts to theorize on this phenomenon and draw some broader conclusions.

²°Mansfield and Snyder view the relationship between democratization and nationalism as uni-directional, from the former to the latter. Often it runs both ways: rising nationalism led in the past and can lead in the future to the democratization of societies.
This dissertation aims to explore (a) the causes of nationalist mobilization, (b) its effects on the foreign policy of states and the advantages and constraints it confers on policymakers, and (c) the responses it invites from outsiders. It is a study on the interaction of domestic developments, foreign policy and the international environment.

Since nationalist mobilization does not occur in a vacuum but within a preexisting ethno-national background, such an exploration is advanced through: a) a bottom up, step-by-step analysis of the developmental trajectory of Balkan nationalism in general and Serbian and Greek nationalisms in particular, and the study of how and why political participation and legitimacy came to be defined in ethno-nationalist terms; b) through a description of the international and domestic environment in the early 1990s; and c) through an analysis of the political agendas of competing elites and the interaction of various conflicting interests in the formation of foreign policy.

Finally, the dissertation points to the question: when do political elites resort to conflicting ethnic definitions of national interest? Why are some definitions more contested than others? When and how do such definitions come to dominate the policies of the state? What are the goals of this contentious behavior?²¹

6. The study is organized around seven main chapters. The first chapter deals with methodological questions; the second chapter exposes popular and scholarly perceptions of the Balkans; the third chapter should be read as a general introduction to Balkan nationalism; the fourth chapter analyzes nationalism as a pervasive political culture in
Greece and Serbia; the fifth chapter lays out the basic argument and model of the study; the sixth and seventh chapters narrate the course of nationalist mobilization in Serbia and Greece respectively, followed by a comparative conclusion and an appendix with biographical and statistical information.

Chapter One: Methodology

/. International Relations and Comparative Politics - The Level of Analysis Problem
and Foreign Policy

Ever since the publication of Kenneth N. Waltz's classic Man, the State and War in 1959, the debate over levels of analysis has dominated international-relations theory. Waltz located the causes of war at three levels: human nature, the nature of states and the nature of the international system. The 'level of analysis problem' is about how to identify and treat different locations where sources of explanation for observed phenomena can be found.

The issue emerged within the broader behavioral movement and general systems theory of the 1950s, when social scientists tried to introduce the methodology and rigor of the natural sciences into the study of social phenomena.¹ Waltz's isolation of the international system itself as a location of explanation in its own right also served to increase the distinctiveness of international relations as a field, an appealing collateral for international relations scholars.

The debate over levels of analysis is informed by the broader epistemological debate between the two primary approaches to understanding social events: atomistic, i.e. the fragmentation of a subject into its component parts, and holistic, i.e. the study of the whole which is assumed to be more than the sum of its parts.²

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Since then, the debate has focused on identifying various levels of analysis (individual-bureaucracy-state-region-international system) and how they relate to each other. A major turning point was Waltz's Theory of International Politics in 1979, a seminal work on the system and its structure at the international level. He focussed on system level theory in order to explain why different units behave similarly, relegating all other explanations to what he coined "reductionism." He was quickly criticized on the basis that, since he had defined structure in nighty restrictive terms, he could not avoid pushing a vast array of causes and effects down to the unit level. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued "making the unit level the dumping ground for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory."

The debate has enriched the study of international relations and is far from over. What is the primary unit-of-analysis/actor and how it relates to various levels remains at the very center of any international relations study.

Classical realist theory holds that the key international actors are nation-states, that states have equal legal sovereignty but gradations of capability, that states are unitary actors, that domestic politics can be separated from foreign policy, and that states are rational actors aimed at maximizing the national interest. According to Hans J.

3The response is powerfully articulated in Robert Keohane, ed , Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)

^"Structure includes only what is required to show how the units of the system are positioned or arranged. Everything else is omitted," Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 82.


Morgenthau political leaders "think and act in terms of interest defined as power."\(^7\) In his view, international politics is a process in which national interests are accommodated or resolved on the basis of diplomacy or war.\(^8\) Where nations interact strategically with one another in an essentially anarchic, high-risk environment, differences among countries do not matter much. Kenneth Waltz's structural realism elevates the structure of the international system, defined as the distribution of capabilities among the units, as the independent variable. He defines states as "unitary actors."\(^9\)

Critics have long questioned the nature of national interest, power, capabilities and the unitary character of states. Thirty years ago, Raymond Aron offered a devastating attack against the vagueness of the term "national interest" and argued that to invoke it post facto bestows no power in predicting behavior "...whatever the diplomacy of a state may be, nothing prevents one saying after the fact that it was dictated by considerations of 'national interest', as long as 'national interest' has not been strictly defined. Indeed, the so-called theory of 'national interest' either suggests something as undeniable as it is vague—that each actor thinks first of itself—or else tries to oppose itself to other pseudo-theories, for example that the foreign policy of states is dictated by political ideology or moral principles. Each of these pseudo-theories means something only in connection with the other To say that the Soviet Union conducts its foreign affairs on the basis of its 'national interest' means that it is not guided exclusively by its ambition to spread Communism. Such a proposition is undeniable, but to conclude from it that the rulers of a non-Communist Russia would have had the same diplomatic policy...is simply absurd. The purpose of the empirical study of international relations consists precisely in determining

\(^{\text{8}}\)Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 71.  
\(^{\text{9}}\)Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 93-101.
the historical perceptions that control the behaviour of collective actors and the decisions of the rulers of these actors." More broadly, as it is argued in the following pages, 'interest' is culturally constructed, and no social action takes place outside the context or structures of meaning. Thus, the determination of what constitutes the 'national interest' of each particular state at each particular time is not a given but the very product of political processes and the interplay of political values at the domestic level.

An equally important criticism is that "an analysis of preferences is analytically prior to variation in environmental constraints. The reason for the priority of preferences is simple: preferences dictate which systemic theories are appropriate to explain interstate strategic interaction. A simple 'Dahlian' example from the study of a core realist concept, power, makes this clear: we cannot know whether 'A influenced B to do something' (power) unless we know 'what B would otherwise do' (preferences)." It is at this point of preference analysis that the study of nationalism as a powerful political ideology in the present international system of nation-states becomes important from the perspective of international relations. An analysis of the preferences and, ultimately, the interests of international actors inevitably leads us to domestic developments and thus, to an attempt to explain international affairs, at least partially, through the study of comparative politics.

It is not only realists who reject comparative politics. Institutionalism, often viewed as a polar opposite of realism in paradigmatic debates, is also "systemic." Both realism and institutionalism assume unitary rational states with fixed preferences and attribute the patterns of outcome to variations in the political structure of the international

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system—for realists the structure of capabilities for institutionalists the structure of information. However, the importance of variation in the preferences states bring to strategic interaction implies that comparative politics—variation in those preferences—does matter.\textsuperscript{12}

The most celebrated preference-based theory in contemporary international relations is republican liberalism and democratic peace theory, which Bruce Russett terms "the closest thing we have to a law in international relations." It points to domestic regimes to explain foreign behavior by linking democracy to peace.\textsuperscript{13} Such an emphasis on domestic regimes and state preferences is also to be found in studies of decision-making starting with Graham Allison's treatise on the Cuban Missile Crisis,\textsuperscript{14} Jack Snyder's work on imperialism and Helen Milner's study on tariff policy. Lisa Martin has explored the role of executives and legislatures in foreign policy-making using theories drawn from the study of the U.S. Congress. James Fearon has shown that deterrence must be understood as a selection process that separates governments with varying preferences; an analysis of those preferences is thus a precondition for understanding the outbreak of war. Studies of the conduct of war and the design of foreign aid programs by Jeffrey Legro and David Lumsdaine illustrate the importance of domestic ideas and values. Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy have reconceived international institutions as mechanisms for the muster of domestic political support.\textsuperscript{15} All these scholars criticize Morgenthau who

\textsuperscript{12}For an excellent account on both see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
\textsuperscript{13}For a good review of the democratic peace theory see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds.. Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).
\textsuperscript{14}Peter Gourevitch, "On the Interaction of Comparative and International Politics, APSA-CP Newsletter 7:2 (Summer 1996): p. 16.
\textsuperscript{15}Moravcsik, "From the Outside In: International Relations and the 'Obsolescence' of Comparative Politics," p. 18.
believed a concern for the motives of statesmen to be a fallacious way to understand foreign policy.16

The proposed dissertation rests upon the following theoretical assumptions. States are the primary but not the only international actors. They possess legal equality but different capabilities as well as preferences. The definition of national interests is not pre-given but mutable and negotiable among various domestic constituencies within a certain political culture. States might appear unitary on an official level but they are not black boxes. Their policy responses to outside stimuli are only the product of the balance of competing domestic interests and external pressures. Domestic and international politics are increasingly interpenetrable and their strict separation has become problematic.

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism and growing economic globalization have further advanced the 'domestication' of foreign policy. Increased popular participation at home and economic competition abroad have made ruling elites and governments more prone to pressures from within and without. At the same time and in certain, not always welcoming, ways, individual governments' autonomy has increased with the delinking of local problems from Cold War, East-West competition, and with the strategic retreat of one of the Cold War superpowers and the resurgence of isolationism in the other

2. Nationalism

Despite the flourishing study of nationalism since the early 1980s, the relevant literature still suffers from six major problems: imprecise definitions, functionalism,

materialism and rational choice, essentialism, exceptionalism and the lack of comparative analysis.

Nationalism is notoriously difficult to assess because it has myriad faces. Having reviewed what he terms the nationalist, the communications, the Marxist, the psychological and the functional approaches to nationalism, John Breuilly points out that "nationalism cannot be linked to any particular type of cultural attribute or social arrangement; or to any particular structure of communications; or to any particular class interest; or to any particular economic relationship; or to any particular psychological state or need; or to any particular social function or objective."17

For him the problem is that the term "nationalism" is used too widely and covers too many and different kinds of things. It is used to refer to ideas, sentiments and politics. In the proposed study the term is restricted to politics and political rhetoric. After all, there tends to only be an interest in nationalist ideas or sentiments in so far as they are taken up in political movements and interaction.

For Ivo Banac, "nationalism is always an ideology, not a sense of identity (national consciousness) or a political movement (national-liberation movement)."18 In this study nationalism is taken to refer primarily to a political ideology. This ideology is based on a pre-existing sense of identity. This identity was developed through the gradual popular dissemination of a 'high culture', with a standardized linguistic idiom and a homogeneous 'national' memory, through powerful social agents such as the modern, centralized school

systems. Because of its ability to invoke directly, immediately and explicitly the identity of people, i.e., the way people perceive themselves and relate to one another, nationalism is an ideology of formidable power in popular mobilization.

If, broadly speaking, realism refers to the capabilities of states and their distribution in the international system and liberalism is interested in state preferences and their formation, then one could argue that nationalism refers to both capabilities and preferences. This often creates confusion. In the long run, nationalism creates communities and mobilizes resources in the service of or to the detriment of a given state, depending on the level, i.e., state, sub-state or supra-state, on which a particular nationalism 'operates.' Thus, nationalism strengthens nation-states, such as Napoleonic France, and weakens multi-ethnic empires, such as Austria-Hungary or Ottoman Turkey. In the short term, nationalism conditions preferences, influences choices and determines policy. It is this short-term aspect that is the focus of this dissertation.

More precisely, the present study explores the particular kind of governmental nationalism used in foreign policy or domestically against minorities. To regard all policies of self-interest undertaken by national governments as nationalist would be to empty the term of any specific meaning and therein lies the danger of confusing nationalism with realism.

What is the relationship between realism's 'national interest' and a nationalist foreign policy? The latter claims to serve the former but this is not actually always the case. The determination of 'national interest' is the product of political negotiation. As it
has been argued already, the 'national interest' is not an immobile yardstick against which foreign policy is to be judged. On the contrary, it shifts, often quickly and suddenly.  

It is precisely this dual direction of 'nationalist foreign policy' that should be clarified from the beginning. Nationalist ideology operates both internally in determining the 'national interest' and externally in attempting to serve it. A nationalist ideology is ostensibly a policy that aims to protecting the 'nation', defined in ethnic terms as a cultural-historic community, from outsiders. It blurs all cleavages within the nation and draws a line of confrontation between 'us' and 'them', 'them' referring to threatening neighbors both within and without the state. In this sense, nationalism equates the political community with the ethnic community and argues that political legitimacy derives from ethnicity. The study deals with how nationalism defined in these terms shapes the 'national interest' and national policy.

Functionalism accounts for causes by examining outcomes. The historical origin and development of nationalism is derived from an interpretation of its purported utility. This is also an instrumentalist and teleological perspective that views the rise of nationalism and nationalist policy as predetermined and automatic responses to a variety of exogenous forces usually related to modernization. If it is argued that nationalism functions to maintain social solidarity or to promote wholesale modernization, the problem is that solidarity or modernization are such large terms that it is difficult to know how one can connect anything as specific as nationalism to them. In addition, there are a multitude

would be a mistake to exaggerate the national interest's subjectivity and relativity. Time is important. In the short run, the national interest can shift only within a certain range of options. Certain policy options, i.e. giving up territory voluntarily, are against the national interest no matter how the latter is defined.

of functions which it is suggested nationalism can serve. For some, nationalism helps in the process of modernization,\textsuperscript{21} for others, it helps maintain traditional identities.\textsuperscript{22} For some it is a function of class interest while for others it is the function of a need for identity.

This contradiction holds particularly true in the recent case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Was this disintegration a product of modernity, of a long historical process of replacing the multi-ethnic Ottoman and Habsburg empires with ethically homogeneous nation-states? Or was this disintegration the result of the re-affirmation of traditional ethnic identities over state loyalty (i.e. Yugoslavism) and the victory of the 'atavistic' politics of identity over the politics of interest and economic rationality? The response to the question is crucial — as it is argued later on — in determining if the destruction of Yugoslavia was unavoidable and, maybe, welcomed. Functionalism ignores choices, alternative possibilities, conflicts, and their consequences, and hence, overlooks actors, their preferences and strategies.

It is precisely these choices that are at the center of the present study, especially since nationalism here refers to ideology at the hands of unscrupulous leaders. Political outcomes are not predetermined, but are rather the product of the negotiation of the conflicting preferences of competing actors. In studying such a negotiation, there is always the danger of overstressing the determinism of materialism and the rationality of rational choice. If humans are captive to their class and ethnic status or if they calculate before they act—and if they do so on the basis of their "real" interests—the question that

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immediately arises is what are these interests and who determines them? What is the role of ideological factors and political culture and how great is their autonomy vis-a-vis economic structures and material interests. And what then is the role of rational choice, which conceives of all individuals and institutions in a political system as acting efficiently to maximize their interests, most often defined in economic terms?

Today, it is generally accepted that political culture and accumulated social capital is crucial in shaping political behaviors. Political culture has a certain autonomy vis-a-vis both economic/class structures and individuals' rational choice in that it influences the form of those structures and the "rationality" of the choice.

Challenges to political culture theory have taken place primarily on two levels and have emerged from two intellectual camps. One challenge emerged in the 1960s as radical scholars polemicized against political culture theory. These scholars, many of them Marxist or neo-Marxist, argued that the dominant political culture in any society was a necessary reflection of the relationships between the ruling and subordinate classes. Political culture theory, in particular, was challenged on the grounds that political and social attitudes were reflections of class and/or ethnic status or else were the 'false consciousness" implanted by such institutions as schools, universities and media.”

"Also another challenge to political culture theory emerged with the ascension of rational choice models...By the late 1960s models based on rational choice and game theoretic approaches had become a dominant mode of social analysis. This emergence of

23 See the works of Sidney Verba and, more recently, Robert Putnam on this.
'rational choice', 'public choice*', and 'positive political theory'\(^*\) challenged the very premise of political culture theory. From within this perspective, examining political culture amounted to little more than a superfluous exercise. It was widely held that sufficient explanatory power would be generated by assuming self-interested, short-run rationality.\(^{25}\)

It is important to acknowledge that beliefs and ideas like nationalism are not simply an insignificant mask for interest, as "pure materialists" might have it, but they have an autonomy of their own in defining interests and determining actions.

For example, in the recent war in Yugoslavia, Serbian aggression was not simply fueled by a desire for territorial aggrandizement. The Yugoslav-turned-Serbian army left Slovenia, most of Croatia and, certainly, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia without putting up a serious fight. But on the contrary, it fought quite ferociously in Croatian Krajina and Bosnia. The project of "Greater Serbia" was supported and conditioned by a number of ideological-nationalist underpinnings. It would be wrong to underestimate the autonomy of these ideological elements, no matter how much they may often be used as a cover by calculating leaders. Similarly, as calculating as leaders such as Milosevic and Papandreou might have been in manipulating nationalism to serve their own political goals, they were by no means outsiders to a certain tradition of, and upbringing in, ethno-nationalist politics.

The question is part of the perennial debate in social sciences between materialism and idealism. A middle ground should be acknowledged. Human beings have values but

just as equally are purposive calculators. Humans are both material and cultural beings with material and ideal needs and interests. Matter and ideas interpenetrate and dialectically influence each other.

Even when such distinctions between matter and ideas and their relationship are clearly acknowledged the danger remains of seeing nationalism as an ideology in highly intellectualist terms. To concentrate exclusively on ideas in this sense, however, is a mistake. Nationalism, just like religion (i.e. Christianity) in pre-modern times, made people otherwise marginalized into a community. To paraphrase Durkheim, nationalism is "society worshipping itself." Community matters quite as much as doctrine to most believers.26

Benedict Anderson has very helpfully characterized nationalism as a process of "imagining communities"—that is, he realizes that the novelty of nationalism is its ability to make us feel that we share a destiny with people whom we have never met.27 The image of imagining helps us understand how previously isolated actors realize that they form a community, and accordingly that they share an interest. The social construction of identities as the basis of community formation is necessarily prior to more obvious concepts of interest: a "we" needs to be established before its interests can be articulated28, and even then, interests will be articulated, to a great extent, only in accordance with established identities All in all foreign policy analysis and international relations theory more generally, need to take the process of identity formation very seriously.

As has been explained above, this dissertation focuses on nationalism as an ideology in the short term, when a community of 'believers', with their own distinct identity, is already a historical given. But awareness of the historicity and the artificiality—in the sense of its being a product of social construction—of community-building and identity formation is important.

Another problem of the literature is its essentialism. Two related assumptions are made. First, ethno-nationalism always exists in a crystallized fashion as a primordial, that is, naturally strong and dominant, collective sentiment. Second, primordial identities are assumed to emerge inevitably in the realm of politics, usually through a vehement eruption. Ethnicity does not necessarily structure politics even in ethnically divided societies. Moreover, identities often overlap and are jointly shared with outsiders. The process of cleavage and identity formation is linked to mobilization and, in turn, to the choices and decisions about mobilization made by political actors. Political actors are important in shaping cleavages, identities, and politics. This action leads to the politicization of certain cleavages and the concomitant politicization of certain identities, in certain ways, places and periods and not in others. Hence, a theory of the foreign policy of nationalism will have to account for the construction of an ethnically-based political identity and the exclusion of other identities. It would also have to specify, for example, how Serbs and Greeks reach the equivalent of what Ira Katznelson has identified as the formation of a group sharing dispositions that "map the terrain of lived experience and define the boundaries between the probable and improbable" and 'the realization of collective action through movements and organizations.'

In the late 1980s, a Christian Orthodox, Serbo-Croatian speaking native of Split could feel to be a genuine European, a Yugoslav, a Serb and a Dalmatian at the same time. A few years later as a refugee in Kotor down the coast, he was solely a Serb having gone through a complex process that suppressed other identities and left the Serbian one to dominate.

Serbian nationalist ideology in the hands of capable elites and through popular mobilization was crucial in this selection process. This selection was particularly pronounced in the Serbian case as opposed to the Greek where community and identity have been better consolidated. The weakness of Serbian "community" and Identity", the product itself of the voluntary abandonment of the Serbian nation-state and the Serbs return, in the sense of historical regression, from a uni-ethnic to a multi-ethnic state after 1918, helps explain the aggressiveness of the Serbian nationalist ideology. Much of its ideological 'firepower' was targeted not against neighboring communities but against competing identities within the Serbian community itself.

Contrary to most of the literature, the proposed study is comparative and attempts to draw broader conclusions from the comparison. Often the great majority of works in the external manifestations of nationalism are case studies. Their authors routinely claim that their object of study is unique. The lack of comparative perspective is a major source of flawed insights.

Thus, it has often been assumed that Milosevic's tight control of the Serbian media helped him manipulate Serbian nationalism and stimulate popular support for his program.

Such an assumption presupposes a passive audience that can easily be brainwashed from the top, and ignores the potential counter-reactions caused by state propaganda and the declining credibility of the state-controlled media. A comparison with Greece helps to illustrate the point. Despite the wealth of independent media outlets, the Greek people received an equally uniform account of events regarding Macedonia. Such an account enjoyed the additional credibility of taking place within a free and democratic media culture. In fact, the Macedonization of Greek politics in the early 1990s was preceded by a media revolution that broke the state monopoly in broadcasting and created a booming and under-regulated market of privately-controlled media outlets. To put it in more general terms, the Macedonization was preceded by the broadening of the foreign policy community, with the emergence of powerful private media oligopolies, local governments and other societal agents, such as the Church, demanding influence in foreign-policy formation. Despite such a broadening, a critical public debate on Macedonia never occurred. Its absence and the uniformity of information offered to the public is the product of more than the government's control of the media.

3. Democracy

Modern political theory has developed two general definitions of democracy: a minimalist and a maximalist one. The former focuses on the process, the electoral process in particular, and argues that a political system is democratic as long as the top political decision-makers are popularly elected through periodic free, fair and competitive elections. On the contrary, the maximalist definition of democracy imposes higher standards accepting elections as a necessary precondition for democracy but considers elections alone far from sufficient in creating a mature, well-developed democracy. Maximalists turn to the growth of civil society and a certain liberal political culture that makes the democratic debate meaningful and establishes 'the civic community'. As
depicted in Tocqueville's classic interpretation of American democracy and other accounts of civic virtue, the civic community is marked by an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, and by a social fabric of trust and cooperation. Thus, although all democracies are based on frequent free, fair and competitive elections, for maximalists, all democracies are not the same. Maximalists introduce notions of the "deepening", "widening", and "maturing" of democracy to describe its further development from a lower to a higher quality after its consolidation.

The distinction between the two definitions of democracy is echoed in the debate over culture and institutions, specifically, political culture and political institutions, and their dialectic relationship. For minimalists, the establishment of democratic institutions, i.e. a democratically elected legislature and executive, is enough to constitute a democracy. For them, it is the institutions that count the most and crafting democracy is not only desirable, but possible with no regard for cultural preconditions.

There is no doubt that institutions structure and socialize certain patterns of behavior and shape political actors' identities, power and strategies. But institutions have inertia and 'robustness' and embody historical trajectories and turning points. Institution-building is difficult and it is more than a paper exercise in constitution-drafting. As Arturo Israel has observed, it is easier to build a road than to build an organization to maintain that road. Individuals may 'choose' their institutions, but they do not choose them under circumstances of their own making.

But even after and beyond choosing these institutions, culture then shapes them in ways beyond the intentions of their designers and in ways that are hard to predict in

advance. Culture or, as Robert Putnam has recently put it, the century-long accumulated social capital\textsuperscript{31} is what fills the Institutional structures\textsuperscript{31} and determines how they work and in what direction they develop. Whereas constitutional engineering seems by comparison simple in complexity and brief in duration, the development of a democratic political culture is the hard part of democratization because it involves a long and treacherous process of socializing behavior and disseminating the pluralist values of tolerance and choice.

Keeping in mind the debate between minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy and the dialectic relationship between culture and institutions, it is now time to elaborate on the three broad approaches to the meaning of democracy. The first, associated with the minimalist definition described above, is both anti-institutional and anti-cultural. Traceable to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and dangerously simple in concept, it claims that democracy is majority rule. Reducing democracy to majority rule is dangerous both because it suggests that, at some basic level, "anything goes," provided only that one can rally a majority of votes in favor of some particular referendum, which is then equated with the volonte generate, and because it glosses over the fact that issues are almost always framed and spotlighted by specific actors and institutions that already have power.\textsuperscript{32}

For the purposes of this study, such a majority-focused democracy will be equated with populism. Populism, in other words, is an illiberal political practice based on the omnipotence of a majority and the marginalization of a minority. For populism, such a


majority does not have to come about through an election necessarily but can manifest itself in a street demonstration. Often this is enough to legitimize action. For populists the 'game of democracy' is simple. They have no patience for institutions, procedures or a culture of tolerance. Their mandate comes directly from the people, unmitigated by 'disturbing' or 'obstructing' institutional intermediaries.

Anti-populist concerns led the founders of the American republic to sanction the indirect election of the president through an electoral college and to establish a powerful senate. The most important 'anti-populist' step, however, was taken with the acceptance, by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1803, of the judicial review of laws (what Europeans call the "control of the constitutionality of laws") in direct opposition to the ideology of the "general will," putting a brake on the powers of the majority and 'liberalizing' American democracy from possible abuses of power. It was then accepted that in a genuine democracy unelected bodies, such as the Supreme Court, have a significant role to play in protecting minorities against the tyranny of the popular majority.

This led to a second approach to democracy, championed by James Madison and John Stuart Mill, that is more protective of both permanent and shifting minorities, and that views democracy in terms of choice balanced by toleration. Reminiscent of the maximalist definition of democracy, this approach treasures the autonomy of the individual and strives to protect him from abuse even 'democratic' abuse. It sanctions the establishment of institutions that regulate and give meaning to popular participation in politics and counter-balance each other against abuses of power. But most important of all, this approach understands democracy as a matter of political culture that bestows individuals and minorities with inalienable rights.
Finally, a third approach to democracy has, as its starting point, contempt for the very idea that fundamental principles of state might be subjected to popular approval and democratic debate. This approach leads to the denial of democracy and its replacement with an eternal 'truth* that an 'aristocracy' of some ideologues claims to possess and wants to impose on the rest of society. In the past, such ideologues, illiberal in denying choice and toleration, and undemocratic in their disregard of majority rule, have been found both on the far right (fascism, nazism, reactionary conservatism) and the far left (communism).

All these interrelated distinctions are useful conceptual tools for the understanding of what happened in Serbia and Greece in the early 1990s. Serbia under communism lived through an illiberal and undemocratic regime that proclaimed and imposed a Manrist-Titoist truth on the whole of society. Internal pressures and international changes in the late 1980s forced the Yugoslav communists to renounce their monopoly on power and opened the political scene to new and conflicting political visions in defiance of the communist orthodoxy. However, due to a number of cultural and historical reasons, democracy was understood as majority rule only.

Milosevic used the Serbs' democratic awakening to mobilize his supporters against his rivals in Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro. He defeated his party opponents because he alone had no fear of igniting and using popular mobilization in support of his political goals. Between 1987 and 1990 Milosevic skillfully manipulated what was initially a form of street-democracy or democracy-by-demonstration.

At the time, some observers and politicians cautioned that Milosevic's populist tactics of mass demonstrations accentuated elitism rather than democracy. A Slovenian journalist observed in this regard that the crowds "want to have their say immediately and at any price and not in an organized way through political institutions, or in a soundly argued struggle of opinion. It is characteristic of this phenomenon that the political elite rules over the crowds of people and that the crowds accept this elite as their own and leave everything in its hands: thus what is involved is a big step backwards in the development of democracy."\(^{34}\)

Many Serbs, however, defended Milosevic's street democracy (ulicna demokratija): "Street democracy, when it is engaged in by the working class and when it is for socialism and self-management, is constructive class struggle. It subverts bureaucracy, and makes possible the shattering of the 'fossilized' institutions of the system...Those in the leadership or outside it, who are against this form of class struggle in fact are on the other side of the barricades—they belong to the bureaucracy, the contra-class."\(^{35}\)

Milosevic's plebiscitarian-style democracy could not outweigh the continued restraints on political pluralism. In 1990 he was forced to accept multi-party, multi-candidate elections. Thanks to his use of nationalism and the state apparatus he controlled, Milosevic won the elections easily and claimed Serbian democracy consolidated. He referred both his domestic opponents and foreign critics of his authoritarianism to the elections results. Elections enhanced Milosevic's legitimacy. They enabled him to claim

\(^{34}\)Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-Eastern Europe [henceforth referred to as FBIS-EEU], November 25, 1988, p. 40.

that he was no longer an unelected party apparatchik, but the popular, democratically elected leader of Serbia.

However, the truth is that the Serbian polity passed from one-truth communist dictatorship to a populist ethno-democracy; that is, an illiberal democracy where majorities are repressive, and minorities have few rights, remain politically marginalized, and have no hope of coming to power. The public media, the judiciary, the police and the secret service are not impartial, apolitical state agents but extensions of the Socialist Party of Serbia and Milosevic himself. Public funds are regularly used to bribe the electorate and powerful positions in state conglomerates are dispersed to political friends in return for their political support, irrespective of their suitability for the job. All in all, the network of party-state contacts inherited from the communist era was adapted to multi-party politics and crudely refined to win or, better maybe, 'steal', one election after another after 1990.

Greece escaped communist oppression in 1949. But the parliamentary system that was established after the Second World War accepted popular sovereignty only to the degree that it did not contradict the conservatives' anti-communist, nationally-minded (ethnikfqrosyni) 'truth', whose defense was entrusted to extra-parliamentary agents such as the palace, the army and the secret service. After two years of crisis when it became apparent that this 'truth' could no longer be defended by quasi-parliamentary means, Greece's "guided democracy" collapsed in 1967 and was replaced by outright military rule. Seven years later, a much livelier, inclusive and liberal parliamentarism was established

Since 1974 the young democracy has often deviated towards a form of populist majority rule. The arrival of the socialists to power in 1981 after an electoral landslide, initiated a period of extreme political polarization that reached its peak in the election
campaign of 1985, when party competition was transformed into what a maverick socialist called the "collision of two worlds." The unorthodox election of the President of the Republic in 1985 and the PASOK-backed constitutional amendments of 1986 put in doubt the rights of parliamentary minorities and their ability to check the power of the majority.

The populist assault of the 1980s was a byproduct of increased popular participation in politics. The Hellenic Republic resisted populism successfully and the gradual education of a new generation of political leaders, prone to moderation, dialogue and consensus-seeking, signaled a 'maturing' of Greek democracy. This maturation was characterized by more intra-party democracy, more ideological convergence and less polarization across the political spectrum, a declining interest in politics and a preference for a kind of 'managerial' rather than 'existential' politics.

Such a maturing process was temporarily halted by the advent of the Macedonian issue to the forefront of Greek politics between 1991 and 1995, but the system proved resilient again. Between 1996 and 1997 it produced a modern, moderate and technocratic new political leadership in both the socialist and the conservative party that has effectively put the 'populist ghosts' to rest.

In sum, although Greek democracy did not avoid the populist trap for a while in the mid-1980s and in the early 1990s, it learned its lesson and matured amidst failures and successes and is today stronger than ever. On the contrary, the Serbian democratic transition was hijacked by a ruthless demagogue, Milosevic, and his allies, who established instead a corrupt, populist and oppressive political system that may enjoy the minimalist trappings of democracy, i.e. elections, but is far from a genuine, liberal, rule-of-law, Western-style democracy.
4. Comparisons and Case Studies

The "focused comparison" comparative case study approach designed by Alexander George and Richard Smoke is utilized. The case study is the preferred method of examining recent nationalist mobilizations since it "is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."

Case studies can facilitate a broad consideration of the numerous variables and competing theories on foreign policy formation.

The focused comparison method involves applying a set of questions or hypotheses to two or more cases studies in order to allow for systematic identification of generalizations and differences and to advance theory development by producing results which are comparable and replicable. The sources for each study consist of an examination of primary and secondary sources, original documents, interviews and direct observations. The comparative analysis allows for change over time, for the evolution of strategy and policy. This dissertation analyzes nationalist mobilizations in the selected cases and compares objectives and implementation (circumstances and results) among them in order to develop a basic conceptual framework for examining nationalism's effects on a state's foreign and domestic policy and the responses of others to that policy.

Two case studies have been selected: Serbia in the period between 1986 and 1995 and Greece in the period between late 1991 and early 1995. The two cases share a

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Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, California:
significant enough number of similarities and differences to make the comparison meaningful. Some references to Croatia and Bulgaria in the same period have also been used as a way of contrasting alternative strategies and highlighting similarities and differences.

Although there is a chapter exclusively devoted to the comparative exposition of nationalist mobilization in Serbia and Greece, comparative references to both are the basis of the whole study from the beginning to the end. Wherever an argument is advanced, an effort was made to provide at least one reference to actual reality in its support.

The selection of Serbia and Greece serves an additional purpose. The academic study of Serbia has traditionally been part of the broader fields of Slavic or East European Studies. On the contrary, Greece has been part of West European area studies. Actually the study of the Balkans has traditionally been broken in two or, even three, if Turkey is considered part of Middle Eastern studies, regional subfields. This compartmentalization of the Balkans has made comparisons across subfields rare. Linguistic barriers and differences in the training and methodology of regional experts, makes a North-South comparison in the Balkans difficult. If with the end of the Cold War, the Balkans have re-emerged as a distinct socio-political region, it is the ambition of this dissertation to help reconceptualize the 'academic division' of Europe and the creation of a new, distinct subfield of Balkan area studies.

Chapter Two: The Balkan Predicament

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe offered hope for a 'new world order' based on liberal democracy, the market economy and international cooperation. However, this optimistic vision was quickly challenged by the growth of ethnic and religious tensions, political fragmentation and the emergence of nationalism and Islam as powerful political forces. The growth of nationalism resulted in the break-up of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and produced a profound change in the international system. In Southeastern Europe the resurgence of nationalism erupted into ethnic violence.

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3 Nationalism should not only be credited with political fragmentation but also with political unification as in the case of Vietnam during the Cold War and Germany after.
The 'new world order' has been defined, to a great extent, by the contending forces of economic unification and political fragmentation. Globalization and the politics of interest have been supplemented by secessionist demands and the politics of identity. It was primarily the pressure of these forces, coupled with the choices made and the policies pursued by local leaders, that led to the violent collapse of the Socialist Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991.

Though the end of the Cold War and globalization created, from a Western perspective, a new world order of expanding economic opportunities and reduced security threats that confirmed Western values and policies, in Southeastern Europe, in contrast, these shifts created insecurities and conflicts. In particular, the two states of the region, Yugoslavia and Greece, that had been allied one way or another with the West during the Cold War, found their international position doubly undermined. First, because the end of the Cold War reduced their geo-strategic significance for the West at a time of increased economic competition from abroad and, secondly, because the emergence of 'Central Europe' redirected Western resources away from the Southeast towards the Visegrad countries. The redrawing of the European political map after the Cold War and the construction of a Balkanist discourse on the supposedly backward, tribal and un-European nature of the region, threatened to peripheralize the Southeast. As was poignantly remarked in the British press, Greece, "from being one of us since the [Cold] War, has become one of them [the Balkans] With the collapse of the Soviet empire in eastern and central Europe, Greece's usefulness [to the West]...has disappeared."

^The Visegrad countries include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In December 1991, they formed a regional organization in the Hungarian city of Visegrad.
^See Adam Nicolson, "A Fall from Cultural Grace," The Spectator (London), November 12, 1993.
As vulnerable frontier states, forming vital parts of the U.S.-sponsored policy of containment against Soviet expansionism, Yugoslavia and Greece had benefited greatly from the West's financial and diplomatic support during the Cold War. With its end, however, the West retreated to a policy of benign neglect.

Yugoslavia was the least fortunate. Whereas in the past it was perceived as a bold experiment in market socialism, whose impressive economic growth rate and living standards were among the highest in eastern Europe, and had successfully concluded an association agreement with the European Community, it found itself after 1989 behind Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in political and economic reforms and was downgraded in Europe's priority list of prospective members.

In fact, the re-division of Europe into alternative socio-cultural and, potentially, political spheres of an advanced Central Europe and a backward Balkan 'other', cut across

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7 Under American tutelage, the three states signed an anti-Soviet military pact in 1953. Although Titoist Yugoslavia pioneered a policy of non-alignment whereas Greece and Turkey were active members of the Western bloc, all three had preferential access to Western capital, goods, labor markets and diplomatic support. All three countries had concluded association agreements with the European Community and Greece became a full member in 1981. Until the mid-1970s these three countries supplied Germany with the majority of its immigrant workers. By the late 1980s large ethnic communities from all three countries were to be found in many West German cities. Although, due to the Southern Balkans' importance to U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and Turkey's growing significance in regional affairs, the United States did reconfirm its commitment to the security and stability of Greece and Turkey following the end of the Cold War, and developed new ties with Albania, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia-The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 177-178.

Yugoslavia itself. An early tangible example of this division was the formation of the regional organization of Alpe-Adria that included Italian, Austrian and Hungarian provinces, the German state of Bavaria and the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia. On the eve of Yugoslavia's disintegration, Slovenian nationalist leader and future Minister of Defense, Janez Jansa, declared, full of contempt for a Serbia and Yugoslavia, that "there is no known case in history where the less developed part of a state would have commanded the more developed part." This division led Croatia and Slovenia to believe that they could join Europe faster on their own rather than as part of the Yugoslav federation, and thus, reinforced their secessionist drive. As Slovenian

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.. June 5, 1990, p. 83.

*2 The Croat and Slovene leadership did everything they could on their part, especially after 1990, to exploit this new division of Europe for their own advantage. They portrayed themselves as genuine democrats and free-market reformers as opposed to Belgrade's communist dictators, ignoring the abuses of human rights, the signs of political repression by elected governments (Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 152), and reluctance toward economic reforms that was the case in Croatia. Such violations led the Badinter Commission of the European Community to advise against the international recognition of Croatia in January 1992, and more recently forced the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to warn Zagreb that Croatia's integration in Europe is at risk because of the government's authoritarian policies. Already in 1992, Mate Babic, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia responsible for the economy, admitted that "Serbia had got further down the road to privatization than Croatia," Glenny, p. 63. For a full exposition of Croatian authoritarianism see Lenard J Cohen, "Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, pp. 69-121. All these did not deter Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, from insisting that "the Yugoslav experience showed that cultural and geopolitical divides and constraints turned out to be decisive...The current fault-line overlaps with those of the Roman empire (Theodosian line) between Rome, Byzantium, and Islam, as well as with the border between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires," Unfinished Peace. Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Berlin: Aspen Institute and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 16.
Foreign Minister Dimitrije Rupel put it bluntly. "We do not want the Serbs to represent Slovenia in Europe. We simply do not want to enter Europe via Belgrade."\(^1\)

The division of Yugoslavia between, on the one hand, Central European Slovenes and Croats 'blessed' with an Austro-Hungarian historical legacy, a Catholic religion and an advanced and 'rational' political culture, and, on the other hand, Balkan Serbs 'condemned' to an Ottoman-Byzantine historical legacy, a Christian Orthodox religion, a backward, tribal social organization and a primitive and 'irrational' political culture, gave Serbs "further evidence for their suspicions that there was a revival of the World War II Axis alliance and German revanchism against them, exacerbating fears, strengthening the very bases of Milosevic's appeal to the Serb population..."\(^1\)

George Kennan, comparing the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 with the Yugoslav wars of 1991-1995, declared confidently that "nationalism, as it manifested itself on the field of battle, drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past...And so it remains today. What we are up against is the sad fact that developments of those earlier ages, not only those of the Turkish domination but of earlier ones as well, had the effect of thrusting into the southeastern reaches of the European continent a salient of non-European civilization which has continued to the present day to preserve many of its non-European characteristics."\(^1\)

Kennan's moral outrage and contempt for the Balkan savagery of 1912-13 seems ironic given the butcheries of the two World Wars that followed.

\(^1\)FBIS-EEU. June 22, 1990, p.68.  
\(^\text{^Woodward. Balkan Tragedy, p. 156.}
Kennan represents only one example of a foreign policy pundit's contempt for the Balkans. Equally if not more influential in sustaining the sensationalist discourse on the uneuropeanness of the Balkans has been the Western press' coverage of the region. A good example is Greece. Between 1991 and 1995 the Western press covered Greece extensively. During this period, the Greek newspaper most often quoted in these reports was Stohos (Target). Stohos' front page and editorials were used as evidence of Greece's intransigent nationalism. This wouldn't matter much if (a) Stohos were not a completely marginal publication—with a circulation of 1,000 copies a day, most Greeks have never read it—and (b) Stohos' virulent xenophobia were not far out of the mainstream of Greek political discourse, its editorials having the political influence that a Montana militia's newsletter has on U.S. politics.

For foreign correspondents in pursuit of sensationalist stories these points did not matter much. I found myself reading Stohos' articles in Western journals such as the Financial Times and the Economist. Most Greeks like myself learned of Stohos via its Western recycling. None of the respectable Greek newspapers (i.e. To Vima, I Kathimerini, Elefterotypia etc) with a combined circulation 500 times larger than Stohos \ was ever quoted in the Western press Was such a coincidence a deliberate policy to misrepresent Greece? Whatever the intention was, the result was to reduce a complex Greek reality into mindless, simplistic stereotypes. Pictures of priests and demonstrating religious fanatics filled Western reports But religious zealotry is only one of the many faces of Greece and not a very representative one. No pictures of high tech, industrious Greece were ever produced. The implication was well-understood: Greece is a country of nationalist and sentimental non-Europeans. This study takes a consciously strong stance in directly challenging a number of popular ideas about Greece, Serbia and their unfortunate region. The study strives to overcome established misperceptions of the popular press,
often reproduced by expert-pundits in semi-academic journals such as the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy.

The vague discourse on the tribal, backward and un-European nature of the Balkans is an easy way out of an intellectual and political challenge of the first order and cannot satisfy the demands of serious social science analysis unless it moves from labels and stereotypes into the specifics of what is un-European about the Balkans and what contributes to ethnic violence.

It should be made clear from the outset that this dissertation builds on the insights of studies that—contrary to the misconceptions, simplifications and reductionism of the 'Orientalist' discourse that seeks to 'essentialize' Southeastern Europe, as popular as they may be in parts of the academia, the media and the policy-making community—rely on rational choices within a particular socio-political and conceptual environment to provide explanations of the nationalist mobilization in former Yugoslavia and Greece.

"Violence...is the result of purposeful and strategic policies rather than irrational acts of the masses...[its] main causes [are] not ancient hatreds, but rather the purposeful actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict, selectively dragging on history in order to portray it as historically inevitable." Slobodan Milosevic broke two

16For an excellent comparative study of "Orientalism" and "Balkanism" see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). The Bulgarian-bom historian traces the origins of a so-called "Balkanist" discourse that first appeared around the First World War to the present day. Todorova juxtaposes contemporary ideas of Central Europe and the Balkans. According to her, from a site of what had been an emancipatory idea-a protest against Soviet totalitarianism in the writings of Jeno Szucs, Czeslaw Milosz and Milan Kundera-Central Europe became, in the works of Havel, Michnik and Konrad, the testing ground for the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of Europe in the works of Havel, Michnik and Konrad,

17V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,"
of Tito's golden rules — he used a nationalist issue [Kosovo] in order to win a political struggle within the Communist Party in Belgrade, and he aroused mass opinion to back him on the same nationalist issue in Serbia.\textsuperscript{18} Two things are of great importance here: the leaders' choice and why this choice was effective in popular mobilization.

According to Paschalis Khromilides "all...arguments in favour of the existence of a shared Balkan 'mentality' are bound to turn into sociological metaphysics unless they provide convincing answers to the question as to what is specifically Balkan about it,"\textsuperscript{19} and "to insist upon talking about a diachronic uniformity called [the] 'Balkan mentality' is no more than an unverifiable historical legend, and it can turn into a perverse mythology as well."\textsuperscript{20}

By moving away from the metaphysics of Balkan 'exceptionalism' and into the physics of politics, a primary ambition of this study is to re-connect recent Balkan developments, primarily the rise of ethno-nationalist politics in Yugoslavia and Greece,\textsuperscript{21} to broader pan-European and global developments. As Susan Woodward points out, "it would do much better if the Yugoslav crisis ceased to be explained in terms of Balkan ghosts, ancient Balkan enmities, primordial Balkan cultural patterns and proverbial Balkan turmoil, and instead was approached with the same rational criteria that the West reserves for itself: issues of self-determination versus inviolable status quo, citizenship and minority

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid, pp. 186-187.
\textsuperscript{21}The same could be said about the rise of political Islam in Turkey.
rights, problems of ethnic and religious autonomy, the prospects and limits of secession, et al.\(^{22}\)

It should not go unnoticed that the rise of nationalism was a general phenomenon following the end of the Cold War and was not confined to 'Balkan' Serbia and Greece. As Greece quarreled with Macedonia so did Italy with Slovenia. Italy went as far as to block Slovenia's cooperation with the European Union because of the renewed question of Italian properties in Slovenia confiscated after the Second World War. Similarly, upon gaining power, the anti-communist 'liberals' of DEMOS in Slovenia quickly abolished all special laws protecting the republic's ethnic minorities (primarily Italians, Hungarians, and Austrians),\(^{23}\) revealing its more nationalistic than liberal orientation.

Is there a distinct Balkan cultural and political space? Does it make sense to talk of a specific "Balkan mentality"? The question is not theoretical but has serious political repercussions, as witnessed in the debate over Western intervention in Bosnia. If Bosnia is part of a tribal, atavistic Europe, the argument was that there was not much outsiders could do to help. The West should wait for the conflict to burn itself out, as was claimed.

If there is a Balkan predicament, for this study it is the product of the belated modernization and nationalization of Balkan society.\(^{24}\) The displacement of the Pax Owomamca by a nation-state system in a region of profound ethno-religious diversity was bound to create tensions and often lead to war. The politicization of ethnicity, however, was not an indigenous Balkan practice but was imported from Western Europe. The

\(^{22}\) Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 186.
present tensions are the product of the interplay of the demographic legacies of the past, aborted democratizations, global economic and political developments, and the conscious choices and strategies of political leaders and elites. The underlying belief of the whole project is that these tensions are not sui generis to the Balkans but hold relevance to the world at large.

2 This is Todorova's central thesis in Imagining the Balkans, p. 13.
Chapter Three: Nationalism in the Balkans

As was mentioned before, nationalist mobilization in Southeastern Europe has often been attributed to (a) ancient hatreds and (b) irrational leaders.¹ Such explanations underestimate the complexity of domestic developments and the influence of external factors in the Balkans in the late 1980s; they serve politicians and scholars. For Western leaders, they are an excuse for a policy of containment, benign neglect² and non-involvement.³ For local nationalists they help instigate fear and mobilize popular support for their nationalist program. For scholars, Balkan 'exceptionalism' makes theory revision and new theory-building unnecessary. However, the popular 'primordial' explanations obstruct the serious analysis of the ethno-nationalist phenomenon and fail to acknowledge the social construction of ethnic identities and the role of political elites and economic factors in ethno-nationalist mobilization and conflict. Often, as mentioned above, they

¹, for example, Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbor A Story of War (New York: Knopf Press, 1996).
²The late French President Francois Mitterrand stated that the inability of the European Union to stop the war in the former Yugoslavia was at least partially the result of intractable "ancestral hatreds...(in the) tribal Europe (of the Balkans)," Le Monde (Paris), July 10, 1993
³Thus, responding to the question "What is to be done?" George Kennan concluded, in his introduction to the reprinting of the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the Balkan Wars (1912-13) in 1993, that "no one—no particular country and no group of countries—wants, or should be expected, to occupy the entire distracted Balkan region, to subdue its excited peoples, and to hold them in order until they calm down and begin to look at their problems in a more orderly way."

Ivo Banac interpreted this declaration of Balkan un-Europeanness as the basis for the politics of noninvolvement. He commented on Kennan that, "in fact, his essay, which recommends noninvolvement, would be of no particular interest were it not for his candid opinion on the apartness of the Balkans from the European civilization. That is no small matter and, though hidden under wraps of cultural taboos, probably is the chief reason for Western aloofness and indifference to the area itself and to any action or involvement in it." Ivo Banac, "Misreading the Balkans," Foreign Policy 93 (Winter 1993-1994): p. 181.
serve a political purpose in re-dividing Europe along the lines of an advanced West and a backward East.  

Historically, nationalism has been a strong force in the Balkans. According to George Kennan, again, the strongest motivating factor for the Balkan wars of 1912-13 "was ... aggressive nationalism." For Aleksa Djilas "among the various national groups of Yugoslavia, as among those of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism has been the most powerful ideology since the middle of the nineteenth century. It has no rival either in mobilizing power or in its capacity to inspire self-sacrifice."  

Nationalism in the Balkans developed within a specific socio-economic background with a particular historical legacy and under the influence of certain policy choices that decisively influenced its trajectory. What follows is a framework of reference for Balkan nationalism in general, and Serbian and Greek nationalism in particular. Such a framework is both descriptive and analytical in Unking the nationalist phenomenon with historical processes. This section is necessary in order to provide some general

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4See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs, pp. 29-30. More recently, Huntington has favored not just the expansion of NATO into Central Europe but its contraction as well, ejecting Greece and Turkey, to make it a truly "Western" institution along the lines of his proposed civilization^ paradigm. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, pp. 26-42, where he suggests the establishment of a new Euro-Atlantic security system whose border would include "...the Petrine Europe of the Holy Roman Empire." Also, Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 7: "...the Cold War and the false division of Europe were over. A different, more historically grounded division of Europe was about to open up, I knew. Instead of democratic Western Europe and a Communist Eastern Europe, there would now be Europe and the Balkans... It struck me just how far away from the story (of Western Europe), in both time and space the Balkans were."  

5Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs 72 3 (Summer 1993 V p. 92.
information before proceeding with the details of the theoretical model and the case studies under consideration.

Many of the insights of an earlier generation of historians and political sociologists into the 'modernization' paradigm—scholars who were all too ready to theorize in terms of essentializing contrasts of the 'West' and the 'Orient'-have recently come under ferocious attack by post-modernist theorists, who point to a shared discourse and interests between the Balkan and the European worlds, based on a complex of common traditions of the Euro-Mediterranean space and the Abrahamic religions. What are the similarities, what are the differences and where the emphasis should be put is very much part of the contemporary debate on the Europeanness or otherness of the Balkans. One should not underestimate the political goals, implicit or explicit, that lie behind the modernist (of stressing the differences) or the post-modernist/revisionist (that pays more attention to the similarities) project.

/. The Ottoman Legacy

The starkest revision refers to the evaluation of a legacy that lies at the heart of every Balkan nationalism: the Ottoman Every contemporary Balkan nationalism, including Turkish, has been constructed in opposition to the Ottoman imperium. Contrary to a Jewish history that may lend itself to images of the Ottoman empire as a pluralist Utopia because of its religious tolerance, all Balkan nationalisms, with the exception of

Albanian, have tended to portray the Ottoman rule as an unqualified yoke\textsuperscript{7} and an unmitigated historical disaster, in Rebecca West's famous words "the Turks ruined the Balkans, with a ruin so great that it has not yet been repaired."\textsuperscript{8} When people talk of the Balkan "particularity" they refer, first and foremost, to the region's Ottoman past.

Traditional European and Balkan national historiography has conceptualized the Ottoman system as an "anti-Europe"—in BraudeFs terms, especially in the sphere of politics: freedom vs. despotism, the rule of law vs. tyranny, and free property vs. state ownership.\textsuperscript{9} More recently, however, the porosity of the boundaries between the eastern Mediterranean world and Europe that escaped students of oriental politics from Machiavelli to Max Weber and from Fernand Braudel to Bernard Lewis, has been greatly emphasized. Historians such as Cemal Kafadar have pointed out the emergence of a rule of law, free peasantry and autonomous public spaces of a kind of a proto-civil society\textsuperscript{10} that refutes the claims of the arbitrariness and Asiatic despotism of Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid, p. 624.
\textsuperscript{9}For a full treatise of the subject see in particular Cemal Kafadar, "The Ottomans and Europe," pp. 613-625.
\textsuperscript{10}Kafadar, for instance, makes an interesting comparison between Jurgen Habermas' 18th century salons in France as public spaces of an emerging public sphere, an argument developed in Habermas' doctoral dissertation and subsequently published in his seminal The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989), and the invention and spread of coffeehouses in the Ottoman empire beginning in the mid- 16th century, that played a role similar to the French salons.
The Ottoman legacy poses the question of continuity or break. For traditional nationalist Serbian and Greek historiography, it was a religiously, socially, institutionally, and even racially alien imposition on autochthonous Christian medieval societies. Both historiographies were shaped in the century of the national idea and under the strong influence of the then dominant trends of romanticism and positivism. The Ottoman era is portrayed as "the saddest and darkest period" in the nation's history, the historiographical counterpart of Western Europe's "Dark Ages" before the advent of historical revisionism.

Such a negative view of the Ottoman era is not unique to Serbian and Greek national historiography but it is common in the national historiography of all Balkan Christians. As late as 1994, a Bulgarian historian, Bojidar Dimitrov, continued to offer a virulent, unreconstructed anti-Ottoman, ethnically self-glorifying view of his country's past:

"The fall of the medieval Bulgarian states under Ottoman rule interrupted the Bulgarian people's natural development within the framework of European civilization. To the Bulgarians that was not just a temporary loss of their state independence as it was in the case of other European peoples which had had this bitter experience at different stages of their history. In the course of centuries the Bulgarians were forced to live under a state and political system that was substantially different from and distinctly alien to the European civilization which had evolved on the basis of Christianity and the Christian economic, social and cultural patterns. The intrusive nature of Islamism and its intolerance to anything that was not part of it, resulted in the continued confrontation between the Ottoman empire and Christian Europe in the 15th-18th centuries. That fact drew an iron curtain between the Bulgarian people on the one side, and Europe and the free Slav countries on the other. In other words, Bulgaria was separated from the progressive trends of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment as well as from the nascent modern bourgeois world. Bulgarians were pushed into a direction of development which had nothing in common with their


seven-century history until thai, deeply cfirvrfi** with the natural course of European political, economic and cultural development.

The Turkish conquerors ruthlessly destroyed all Bulgarian state and religious structures. The natural political leaders of the people in the Middle Ages, i.e. the boyars and the higher clergy, vanished from sight. That deprived the Bulgarians of both the possibility for self-organization and any chance of having foreign political allies for centuries on end.

The place allotted to the Bulgarian people in the Ottoman feudal political system entitled it to no legal, religious, national, even biological rights as Bulgarian Christians. They had all been reduced to the category of the so called rayah (meaning a 'flock', attributed to the non-Muslim subjects of the empire).”

Thus, it is no surprise that the national struggles of the 19th century for the creation of the Serbian and Greek nation-states, have been portrayed as the "rebirth" and "revival" of an independent national existence that was cut short by the Ottoman conquest. The intervening five centuries of Ottoman rule were an "anomaly" for the historical continuity of Serbdom and Hellenism, but nothing more. For the leaders of the new nation-states, "Europeanization", "Westernization" and "modernization" meant, first and foremost, the "de-Ottomanization" of their social and physical environment and their 'return' to the European mainstream.

Despite the inclusiveness of the Ottoman state that allowed ethnic Serbs to reach high office and Greeks to attain the status of a commercial, religious and intellectual elite in the empire, both Serb and Greek historiography continue to view the Ottoman period as alien and state no claim to its legacy, which is left to Turkey to monopolize. Such an attitude bred a discourse of self-victimization, self-justification and self-glorification. Serbs and Greeks were 'unfortunate' to be subjugated by Asian-Muslim 'nomads'. For all their

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16 Antonis Liakos, Lecture at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, December 12, 1996.
contemporary failures they can conveniently blame the Ottomans. They are simply the victims of history. Being history's objects rather than subjects, they share no responsibility for their misfortunes or, even, their mistreatment of others.

There is the opposite approach, still marginal in the Balkans, that stresses the continuity from the Byzantine period and that, in its extreme, trivializes the Ottoman phenomenon, as is epitomized by Iorga's grand œuvre Byzance apres Bysance.\(^\text{18}\) Such an approach is popular in contemporary Western political discourse when it comes to the Balkan region and is expressed in statements on the similarity between the centralized absolutism of the Byzantines and the Ottomans alike.

Broadly speaking, in the treatment of the Ottoman era, Balkan national historiography is confronted with a great contradiction. The standard perception of the Ottoman conquest as a radical break with the past and as an alien, non-European rule, place the successor states of the Ottoman empire even further away from mainstream Europe. In a sense, the more 'barbarous' Ottoman rule was, the less 'European' the Balkans are today. This is why there have recently been some Balkan voices in defense of the Ottomans. This is an effort to downplay the alien nature of Ottoman rule and point to its commonalities, if possible, with what is thought of as 'European civilization.' In Ottoman historiography the debate on a common Euro-Ottoman space is centered around the issue of the Ottoman land system (the timar) and questions on the nature of Ottoman feudalism, the power of the center and the periphery, the rule of law and the arbitrariness of Ottoman rule, and the existence and the degree of autonomy of civil society.

\(^{18}\)Nicqlae Iorga, Byzance apres Byzance (Bucharest, Romania: Institut d' Etudes Byzantines, 1935).
A balanced view between the two extremes should accept that the Ottomans utilized the institutions and structures of the Byzantine-Roman order whenever this was helpful to their imperial project. However, the political unification of Southeastern

1. Professor Halil Berktay of Bogacizi University has summarized this middle-of-the-road view (already developed by celebrated Ottoman historians such as Halil Inalcik), arguing in his Harvard lectures in the fall of 1997 that the Ottoman empire "was the product of the successive westward displacements of various groups or blocs of Turkish/Turcoman tribes from the 11th century onwards. The Ottoman was one of the many states born out of that movement, and marked by the overiordship of what was, at least originally, an Islamicized Turkish warrior nobility, with, at its center, the war leadership of the House of Othman, which stamped the name of its eponymous founder on what emerged as a state from the turmoil of a second Anatolian 'dark ages,' spanning roughly between 1240-1350. This success was largely attributed to its origins as a semi-tribal marcher principality on the Seljukids' northwestern borderlands with Byzantium. Hence, the Ottoman state rapidly jumped into a burst of expansion in the Balkans, with territorial expansion forcing the pace for state-formation, which entailed, among other things, the successful amalgamation of the various Balkan and Byzantine land regimes, with their entire peasantry incorporated into and redefined as the Ottoman reqya, and at least large sections of their ruling classes, too, co-opting into the Ottoman military class. Its vast territory inevitably meant an enormous diversity of conditions and circumstances, entailing immense problems of control, the power resources that it came to dispose thus imbibed various traditions (Iranian, Hkhanid, Byzantine etc), so that it came to benefit from a rich legacy of accumulated experience and statecraft; hence it also continuously practiced 'class-formation through the state,' i.e. recycling, and playing with the composition of, the ruling elite; as part of that process, concentrating juridical rights in the hands of central appointees (=royal courts), and through them using justice, too, to constrain (holders of) landed right; and in the transitional late-medieval/early-early-modern centuries that came to constitute its niche and heyday, thus disposing not only of some liquidity for a 'salaried' component of the army and the state, but also able to equip particularly that component with firearms, too, from at least the 1440s onwards. The Ottoman state was able to impose a comparatively highly regularized system of surplus-extraction through military fiefs on the subject peasantry in its Rumelian and Anatolian heartlands, and it was also able to brake and (at least) delay, for two centuries or more, the de-centralization (privatization and hereditization) tendencies inherent in all such systems of fief-distribution, thereby coming closest, as the late Ernest Gellner put it, to solving the Ibn Khalidun dilemma of a dynastic state bom out of tribal origin, of how to suppress those origins, of how to cut the umbilical cord linking it to its original founding nobility and its ethos. Which is why and how it came to enjoy such longevity and durability as the last and most successful of all Islamic or Turco-Islamic states originating in pre-modern times. Those qualities (of longevity and durability) also hold the key to its 'mode of transformation' from the IT* century, onwards: a very drawn-out process, involving a combination of territorial retreat with increasing penetration by European capitalism. Hence, it spawned a series of
Europe brought about by the Ottoman conquest after two centuries of political fragmentation following the Fourth Crusade, did signify a new beginning for the region. Similarly, the five centuries of Ottoman rule and coexistence could not but leave a lasting imprint on Serbian and Greek society. However, if there is a historical break, this occurred in the 19th century. It is the nation-building projects and the defeat of the Ottoman reformist efforts at non-ethnic modernization (Tanzimat) after 1839 that mark a radical departure from the centuries-long political and social practices of the Serbs, the Greeks and the rest of the Balkan people.

2. The Modernity of Nationalism

As already mentioned before, the argument on the modernity of nationalism informs the debate on the nature of the recent Yugoslav conflicts. If the creation of nation-nationalisms and nation-states on its retreating margins, among its non-Islamic, non-Turkish former components, while simultaneously undergoing not colonial but semi-colonial peripheralization/incorporation in its successively reduced heartlands. Reactive Turkish nationalism—arising in the 'hothouse' of the surviving empire which underwent top-down authoritarian modernization and westernization in the 19th century—was eventually left holding the bag and waged a war of last resort (both precocious and quick in later Third World terms) to prevent the partitioning and colonization of the Anatolian heartland, and ended up by redefining that remaining space as the Republic of Turkey."

20 In 1839 the first systematic effort to construct an Ottoman citizenry of equal rights and duties irrespective of religious affiliation was initiated with the proclamation of Tanzimat, i.e. reform movement, and was carried through with the first Ottoman constitution in 1876 and the 1908 Young Turk revolution. The Tanzimat project, however, was defeated by the growing assertiveness of Christian minority nationalisms within the Ottoman empire and it finally collapsed with the powerful emergence of modern Turkish nationalism.

states is an inescapable process of modernity then the dissolution of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia is the completion of a modernization process that started with the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Ottoman and Habsburg empires. In a sense, the recent wars in Croatia and Bosnia are but the belated conclusion of the wars of Ottoman and Habsburg succession. Thus, "Western leaders defined (the Yugoslav conflict) as anachronistic, an unpleasant reminder of old ethnic and religious conflicts that modern Europe had left behind..."\(^24\)

For Maria Todorova, "the process of 'Europeanization,' 'Westernization,' or 'modernization' of the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries included the spread of rationalism and secularization, the intensification of commercial activities and industrialization, the formation of a bourgeoisie and other new social groups in the economic and social sphere, and above all, the triumph of the bureaucratic nation-state."\(^33\) From this point of view the Balkans were becoming European by shedding the last residue


\(^\dagger\)Ironically enough, nowhere was the triumph of the bureaucratic nation-state and Western rationalism more complete than in Kemalist Turkey itself, "Generals and Politics." The Economist. July 19*, 1997, p. 23.
of an imperial legacy, widely considered an anomaly at the time, and by assuming and emulating the homogeneous European nation-state as the normative form of social organization. It may well be that what we are witnessing today, wrongly attributed to some Balkan essence, is the ultimate Europeanization of the Balkans. If the Balkans are, as I think they are, tantamount to their Ottoman [imperial] legacy, this is an advanced state of the end of the Balkans.”26

Contrary to the other great Muslim empire, Iran, which maintained its integrity of territory and identity during the era of nation-states, the Ottoman empire dissolved into more than twenty nation-states.27 The re-fragmentation of the Balkan political space and the abandonment of the imperial for the national principle in state formation and organization was boosted by the emergence of a trade elite, the increasing contacts with Western Europe, Napoleonic turmoil and the weakness of the central Ottoman authorities. Serbia and Greece were nationalism's pioneers in the Ottoman world and they are the first two nation-states to emerge out of the Ottoman empire. Both enjoyed some considerable historical advantages over the other Balkan people.

3. The Serbian and Greek Advantage — State Traditions and Elite Politics

A great paradox of Balkan nation-formation has been that for all its belated start when compared to Western Europe (but not to Central), the ethnic origins of most Balkan people can be traced as far back as the late Medieval Ages. Between the beginning of the 13th until the middle of the 15th century, many ethnic groups embarked on state building in a process that resembled similar developments in France and Britain28 but that was

Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p. 13. 27 Kafadar, "The Ottomans and Europe," p. 624. 28 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p. 182.
interrupted by the Ottoman conquest and the unification of the Balkans, resurrecting the imperial principle that a weakened Byzantium could no longer enforce after 1204 AD.

In both Serbia and Greece, a historical state tradition, inherited by late medieval, pre-Ottoman society, remained strong and continuously nourished in the popular imagination through epic poetry and folk songs. Serbs looked back to the glories of the Nemanjic empire of the 14th century and Greeks cherished the idea of a resurrected Byzantium. Both had an identifiable historical turning point that focused popular imagination and demanded redemption: the Serbs' defeat in Kosovo in 1389 and the Greeks' loss of Constantinople in 1453. Both the defeated Serb Prince Lazar and the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI became popular legends.

Faced with a choice between a heavenly and an earthly kingdom, Lazar opted for the empire of heaven and the nobler ideals of truth and justice he represents in anticipation of the resurrection of the state. "What it tells the Serbs is 'we are going to make a state again.' Just as Jesus is 'coming back' so is Lazar." Similarly, "Greek hopes [to secure freedom] were sustained by a corpus of prophetic beliefs...These promised eventual liberation from the yoke of the Ottomans through divine providence rather than human action. One such, the legend of the Marmaromenos Vasilias (the 'Emperor turned into Marble'), held that Constantine Palaiologos, as he was about to be struck down by a Turk, had been seized by an angel and taken to a cave near the Khrysoporta [the 'Golden Gate'], one of the gates of Constantinople, and turned into marble. There he awaited the day

29 Bulgarians had also a strong state tradition to be proud of inherited from their medieval empire. But they suffered from a number of disadvantages including the lack of a cultural and trade elite, their limited contacts with the West and their proximity to the Ottoman center, that delayed their national awakening.
when the angel would return to arouse him, whereupon he would expel the Turks to their reputed birthplace, the Kokkini Milia (Tied Apple Tree'), in central Asia.\textsuperscript{31}

However, whereas no Greek politician after 1922 made the fall of Constantinople his rallying cry, Slobodan Milosevic, at the end of the twentieth century, proclaimed the battle of Kosovo as the centerpiece of Serbdom. "In all of European history it is impossible to find any comparison with the effect of Kosovo on the Serbian national psyche."\textsuperscript{32}

Dija Garasanin, the first politician of independent Serbia to articulate a national ideology, the drafter of the famous Nacertaniye, a document which laid out Serbia's long-term foreign policy objectives in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, declared that contemporary Serbs are "the true heirs of our great forefathers, and they are engaged in nothing new but the restoration of their ancient homeland. Our present will not be without a tie with our past, but it will bring into being a connected, coherent, and congruous whole, and for this Serbdom, its nationality and its political existence as a state, stands under the protection of sacred historic rights. Our aspiration cannot be accused of being something new, unfounded, out of revolution and rebellion, but everyone must admit that it is politically necessary, that it is founded upon the distant past, and that it has its root in the past political and national life of the Serbs, a root which is only bringing forth new branches and beginning to flourish anew."\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{31}Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 19
\bibitem{32}Judah, The Serbs, p. 30.
\end{thebibliography}
Emphasizing the present's continuity with a distant but glorious past was thought to grant legitimacy to contemporary territorial claims. In 1913, in a triumphant spirit following the Greek victories in the Balkan wars, Crown Prince Constantine assumed the title Constantine XII rather than Constantine I, upon his ascendance to the Greek throne, to demonstrate that he was the direct heir and successor of Constantine XI Palaiologos, the last emperor of Byzantium.

For all the help this strong state tradition, remembered and invented at the same time, gave the Serbs and the Greeks in formulating their national programs in the early 19th century, it made their irredentism hostage of historic rights that collided directly with the demographic realities of the territory under dispute. This was especially true for Kosovo and all of 'old Serbia,' the heart of the Serbs' medieval kingdom, where Serbs were a minority by the late Ottoman era, and Macedonia, a Byzantine heartland and Alexander the Great's place of origin, where Greeks had become a minority by the time of the Balkan wars in 1912-13.

In addition to their old state traditions and the consequent historic rights these were believed to confer, Serbs and Greeks enjoyed a number of other advantages vis-a-vis their neighbors that put them ahead in modern nation-building. Under the Ottomans, the Serbs and especially the Greeks retained some quasi-autonomous institutions of their own that kept the memory of independent statehood alive and provided some experience in self-government. The Serbs retained their patriarchate in Pec, first established by Stefan Dusan in 1346 and revived under the Ottomans in 1557. This was the first of the new autocephalous Orthodox churches that broke away from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Under the latter's pressure the Ottoman government dissolved it and the Ottoman Serbs were brought back to the Greek-controlled Patriarchate in 1776. Austrian Serbs, however, established an Orthodox metropolitan province at Sremski Karlovci in
southern Hungary in 1737 which in 1766 became the independent Serbian Orthodox Slav Oriental Church.  

The Greeks were, of course, much more fortunate than the Serbs. Upon the conquest of Constantinople; the Ottomans elevated the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the status of the political representative of the empire's Christians under the millet system that organized the Ottoman state along religious (rather than ethnic) communities. Over the years, the Greeks came to fill important jobs in the Ottoman administration, retaining their religious and thus, ethnic identity, without having to succumb to Islamization in order to serve the sultan as was previously the case.

In addition to institutions, whole regions enjoyed considerable autonomy since both the Serbian and the Greek lands were located far and away from the Ottoman center. Most of the time such regions were too poor and too isolated for the Ottoman authorities to invest the military resources to bring them under their direct control. Montenegro led an independent existence. In 1516 it was transformed into a theocratic state ruled by Orthodox bishops (vladikas) elected by local assemblies. Similarly the Peloponese had its own elected assembly of notables, the Peloponesian Senate, that the local pasha consulted in the administration of the province.

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35 For example, in the 18th century Phanariotes, Greek aristocrats from the Phanar district of Istanbul, were appointed governors of Moldavia and Wallachia in what is present-day Romania, Charles Jellavich and Barbara Jellavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States. 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), p. 10.
36 * "Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, p. 69.
Parts of both nations were under the control of European powers. Vojvodina, southern Hungary and Krajina had compact Serb populations under Habsburg authority. Crete remained Venetian as late as 1669 and the seven Ionian islands in western Greece largely escaped Ottoman rule as Venetian possessions until the Napoleonic conquests, when, under French tutelage, the Ionian Republic was established, the first Greek state of modern times. In addition, the Greeks had an extensive diaspora of vibrant commercial colonies in Western Europe. All these provided Serbs and Greeks a valuable window to the West and a connection to the latter's political and economic developments.

Finally, although they remained overwhelmingly agricultural, both the Serbs and the Greeks had developed a commercial bourgeoisie by the end of the 18th century, centered around the pig trade with the Habsburgs and the maritime trade of the Eastern Mediterranean respectively.

The state tradition of the late Middle Ages kept alive in the popular imagination, the existence of powerful autonomous ecclesiastical-political institutions, the self-government of certain regions and the European control of others, the expansion of trade, the emergence of a commercial elite and of a network of economic, political and intellectual transactions with the rest of Europe, put the Serbs and, particularly, the Greeks, far ahead in nation-building when compared with the rest of the Balkan peoples.

These developments challenge the dominant paradigm of 'historical suspension' in regard to the Ottoman period, and compel the acceptance of the thesis of nationalism's modernity, with a caveat that would acknowledge the existence of strong ethnic identities and long historical continuities prior to the emergence of the nationalist phenomenon in the late 18th century. Thus, the five centuries of Ottoman rule, far from being the freezing of the history of Serbs and Greeks in anticipation of their national redemption in the 19th
century, were a rich and important historical experience that conditioned and accelerated the construction of ethnic identities. These identities were later politicized and acquired a nationalist program for the creation of independent nation-states, the dominant state paradigm in Europe at the time.

The radical politicization of ethnicity took different forms in each nation and changed over time. Paschalis Khromilides notes that "the specific constraints that acted as brakes on political radicalism among the Northern Balkan nations were absent among the Greeks. In contrast to the Serbs, who were reached by the Enlightenment through their diaspora in the Habsburg empire and therefore absorbed its tempered German version, the Greeks through their mercantile activities and their diaspora in northern Italy and Western Europe were exposed to the intensely politicized conceptual modes of the French Enlightenment."^38

Ivo Banac offers another distinction between what he calls "East Central European" and "Eastern Balkan" nationalism in his effort to formulate a typology of Balkan national ideologies. For Banac, "Balkan nationalism has never been unique or original; it has merely reflected European trends." "National ideology of the East Central European type revolved around Western Europe, while that of the Eastern Balkan type deviated in the direction of Europe's non-Western periphery, centered primarily on Russia."^39

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Although he produces no evidence to support either claim, he makes a valuable point: in the Orthodox Balkans, the Ottoman conquest destroyed the Christian landed elite, and native leadership was vested in the Orthodox Church. "Orthodox prelates substituted for the gentry, performing its tasks in national culture and historical memory." On the contrary, in East Central Europe, including Banac's native land of Croatia, a landed aristocracy retained its privileges which, however undemocratic, represented an obstacle to autocracy. Thus, both Hungary and Croatia under the Habsburgs, preserved their diets (i.e. parliaments). The historical agent of nationalism was different in the two cases and thus conditioned the ethos of nationalism as h developed. In the Balkans small land owners led by intellectuals revoked against the Ottoman and the Church authority. Secularization led to the nationalization of the Church and its subjugation to the state, weakening the church's integrity and universalist message, and its significance as an autonomous institution of civil society. In East Central Europe gentry corporatism turned to linguistic nationalism to preserve its privileges. The Church was never an issue in its case. Only later, when the gentry as a distinct social class was destroyed by the communists, did the Roman Catholic Church developed a nationalist agenda as was the case in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s.

Having established these particular distinctions, let us now turn to the most celebrated one of all: civic versus ethnic nationalism.

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40 Ibid., p. 109.
41 Ibid., pp. 107-121.
4. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

For Aleksa Djilas "the essence [of Balkan nationalism] is a pseudo-romantic and mythologizing ethnocentrism, whose corollary is the demand for ethnic homogeneity within a centralized and militarily powerful state."^43

East European nationalism in general, and Balkan nationalism in particular, developed in a multi-ethnic, non-industrial, non-urban, low literacy, low social mobility, peasant-dominated environment. Theorists have distinguished between the civic-minded, inclusive, assimilationist, state-centered and liberal nationalism of France as crystallized in the Revolution of 1789 and the exclusive, organic, ethno-cultural, communitarian, anti-individualistic, socially conservative and authoritarian nationalism of Prussian-led Germany following liberalism's defeat in 1848.43

"If the French understanding of nationhood has been state-centered and assimilationist, the German understanding has been Folk-centered and differentialist(...) This pre-political German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community—as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft. Nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact."^44

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To put it in historical perspective "while nationalism in Western Europe corresponded to changing social, economic, and political realities, it spread to Central and Eastern Europe long before a corresponding social and economic transformation [...] The new ideas encountered, in the different countries, a great diversity of institutional and social conditions, bequeathed by the past, and were shaped and modified by them. Their different interpretation produced different types of nationalism—one based upon liberal middle-class concepts and pointing to a consummation in a democratic world society, the other based upon irrational and pre-enlightened concepts tending towards exclusiveness."[Eastern Europeans] identified [nationalism] with a strangely conceived 'freedom'[from foreign rule] which had little in common with the Western concepts of individual liberty.46

According to Kohn, a voluntaristic type of nationalism, which regarded the nation as a rational association of common laws in a given territory, was the product of aspirant middle classes; by contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, and later in Asia, an organic, mystical and often authoritarian form of nationalism emerged which, in the absence of a strong middle class, was forged and led by intellectuals.47 Similar distinctions have been established by Peter Sugar48 and Eric Hobsbawm.49

The sharp distinction between a Western and an East European type of nationalism has recently come under attack. The civicness of, say, French nationalism is not accepted as a historic given but as a continuous battle for defining Frenchness, as witnessed in the pains Western Europeans have in integrating their immigrant populations, especially when it comes to Muslims (the Magrebhiens in France and the Turks in Germany).

Nevertheless, both the aim of nationalism in its eastern variant, i.e., emancipation from foreign rule rather than genuine democracy at home, and its basis, i.e., an organic community of blood rather than the free association of individuals around common values and ideals, are manifestly present in Slobodan Milosevic's political agenda. For Milosevic and his supporters, priority was given to the unification of the Serbian ethnic community and its protection from alien rule rather than the democratization of Serbian society.

Writers have pointed out that "the contrast in cultural profiles between Eastern Europe and Western Europe is both dramatic and essential to comparative analysis. Whereas most countries of Western Europe are relatively culturally homogeneous uninnational states, those in Eastern Europe were culturally and ethnically heterogeneous multinational states."  

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50 Stanley Hoffmann, "Thoughts on the French Nation Today." Daedalus 122:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 63-79.
52 For the biographies of political leaders and the profiles of the main parties of Serbia and Greece, together with election results and other relevant information, please see the Appendix.
It is this heterogeneity, particularly exacerbated in the contact zones of Macedonia, Bosnia, Dobrudzha, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Transylvania, Cyprus, Thrace and Istanbul itself, coupled with the state's traditional weakness in this part of the world as a result of belated and feeble modernization, that accounts for the essentially defensive nature of Balkan nationalism. Nationalisms lacking self-confidence in their assimilationist ability, retract to the hard core of blood, kinship and ethnicity to delineate the line between 'us' and 'them.'

This defensiveness becomes clear when one considers the few moments in history when the small Balkan states felt secure and confident enough to espouse a more open, assertive and aggressive non-ethnic nationalism. Such a moment was the immediate aftermath of the First World War, when the victorious Serbian and Greek nation-states expanded the definition of Serbdom and Hellenism from blood and kinship to a broader 'ethno-cultural community to support their territorial claims in an age of national self-determination. The conquest of the disputed territories was no longer enough; their populations had to be proven Serb and Greek in national consciousness and if this was impossible, at least South-Slavic and Hellenic in culture.

Despite its initial strong reservations, Serbia shed its 'small' nationalism for the grandeur of Yugoslavia which Belgrade believed to be a new Serbian empire. This belief led to policies of Serbianization in Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia, and caused the often violent reaction of the ethnic groups under attack. In 1918, triumphant and heroic Serbia abandoned the narrowly defined Serb ethno-nationalism and embraced the Croat-born idea of South Slav unity or Yugoslavism, portraying itself as the liberator of its fellow Slav brothers, embarking on the building of what was conceived as an expanded Serbian kingdom.
Greece, aiming at the acquisition of Southern Albania, moved away from a blood-based, 'German' definition of Greek identity to a more culture-based, Trench' idea of Greekness. Athens had to accept the feet that many Southern Albanians were ethnically non-Greek but claimed that they were hellenicatty accuhurated enough to be considered part of the Greek nation. Greek representatives in the Paris peace conference devised an elaborate distinction between the 'private' Albanian language these people spoke at home and the 'public' Greek language they used at school, in church, in trade and in court. For Athens, their participation in the high Greek culture through the Greek language and the Christian Orthodox religion was sufficient evidence of their Greekness, although, as far as ethnicity and national consciousness were concerned, most Southern Albanians thought otherwise.

The important point here is that in 1918 Belgrade and Athens argued for the inclusion of non-ethnic Serbs and Greeks in the Serbian and Greek nation. Assimilation presupposes a willingness not only to be assimilated, that most of the time was not there, but also a willingness to assimilate. Not all Serbs and Greeks possessed such a willingness.

In his masterfully written Stillborn Republic** George Mavrogordatos presents the competing Venizelist and royalist vision of post-war Greece in 1918. Prime Minister Venizelos' drive to grab as much territory as possible for victorious Greece in the Paris peace conference produced considerable opposition in the Peloponese, the so-called Old Greece composed of the lands of the original Greek kingdom of 1832. Royalists remained skeptical of the 1920 Sevres treaty that created the "Megali Idea," Great Greece of the

two continents and the five seas. They were reluctant to espouse the new order that conferred on them a much reduced status in the enlarged Greece, threatened their privileges and their traditional way of life. When Venizelos landed the Greek army in Smyrna/Izmir in 1919, they ferociously opposed the war effort and logged for the "calmness," assurance and ethnically, culturally and socially homogeneous pre-1912 Greece. For all of Venizelos' diplomatic triumphs, they managed to defeat him in the 1920 elections. Venizelos and his modernizing-liberal-nationalist supporters grossly underestimated the insecurities that their expansionist-assimilationist plans created in the majority of Old Greece's electorate.

It is a grave mistake to reduce the post-independence history of Serbia and Greece, and the other Balkan nations for that matter, to a persistent drive for territorial expansion. In fact, much of their expansion took place amidst profound soul-searching. Not all Serbs or Greeks were in favor of such an expansion. Irredentism was mostly supported by outside, 'unredeemed' Serbs and Greeks. Ioannis Kolettis, the Greek Garasanin and the first formulator of the "Megali Idea" in the 1840s, came from still Ottoman Epirus. Many Peloponesians, secure in their independence and concerned with their well-being, had no interest in foreign adventurism. They often questioned the Greekness of the new Northern and Eastern Greeks. Their quasi-colonialist attitudes towards the newly liberated Greeks and the later Asia Minor refugees of the 1920s caused deep-rooted resentment and created a psychological cleavage that still persists between Old and New Greece.

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55The Great Greece of "nineteenth-century Greek nationalists was supposed to resurrect a rundown version of the Byzantine Empire on the two coasts of the Aegean. It was to span across two continents, Europe and Asia, and five seas, the Ionian-Adriatic to the West, the Mediterranean to the South, the Aegean in the center, and the Marmara and the Black Sea to the Northeast.
A similar tension arose in the recent Yugoslav wars. Many Serbs in Serbia, especially those of a partisan-Trtoist tradition, had great difficulty supporting the out-of-Drina Bosnian Serbs of the chetnik-Mihailovic-royalist tradition. Milosevic was aware of this division and used it initially to ask for "national unity" and later to isolate Bosnian Serbs and neutralize their politically threatening leaders.

According to Lenard Cohen "though the citizens of Serbia sympathized with the difficulties faced by the Krajisnici [Serbs of the diasporic communities within the Bosnian and Croatian Krajinas] and took pride in the latter's reputation as tough fighters, they also generally viewed their ethnic brethren from the Krajinas as less sophisticated, less cultured, and a less moderate branch of the Serbian family. Indeed, most Krajisnici exhibited attitudes corresponding to an entirely different Serbian political subculture—the patriarchal, heroic, and highly nationalistic tradition of the mountainous and rural Dinaric zone—that contrasted with the putatively more civilized or moderate political subcultures of the Serbs east of the river Drina. The latter positive features were especially associated with the Serbs of Vojvodina and urban Belgrade, but were also often attributed to Serbian citizens—the so-called Srbijanci—living in central and southern Serbia. As a Serbian opposition journalist frequently and facetiously liked to tell foreign reporters, the warfare in Bosnia was not essentially an ethnic conflict, but rather a question of altitude,' that is, a struggle engineered by the Serbian highlanders of Bosnia and Croatia. For a majority of citizens in Serbia, those Serbian frontiersmen or highlanders had more in common with their neighboring ethnic groups—Croats and Muslims from the Dinaric zone—than they did with the population of Serbia."56

Such cases where particular sub-groups departed from or were opposed to the main line irredentism of their societies should not be seen as insignificant aberrations. They should lead us to further question the simplifications that inform many analyses of Balkan nationalism. The intensity of Balkan nationalisms should be attributed not to the war-prone mentality of the Balkan people. Rather, it is the result of problems of unconsolidated and weak nation-states and social identities in crisis. This nervousness about identity accounts for the unique preoccupation with ethno-genesis in the Balkans which in the case of Bosnian Muslims and the Macedonians has taken hysterical proportions.

In no other part of Europe was the ethnic background more heterogeneous, the civil society more feeble, the pre-industrial patterns of production more dominant and foreign rule more alien, imperial and anti-modern than in Southeastern Europe. Thus, nationalism in the Balkans put emphasis on birth rights and, occasionally, culture over citizenship, on the community over individual rights, on liberation from foreign rule over democratic reforms, the strength of state over that of civil society and the market. Balkan nationalisms' authoritarian, xenophobic and, often, aggressive developmental trajectory is, thus, explained by its narrow social base, the dominance of intellectuals and state bureaucrats over the bourgeoisie, along with the states' functional failures and a consequent need to use nationalism as a last resort for bolstering their legitimacy.

main carrier of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is the intelligentsia. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment reached those parts of Europe only in diluted form and was never fully accepted by the relatively small, educated middle classes. In addition, the main employer of the intelligentsia was the state—as it still is today. Finally, the absence of deeply rooted liberal democratic institutions allowed little room for the development of a genuinely pluralist political culture. All these factors combined to make the intelligentsia less liberal and rationalist than it was in the West, and always ready to sacrifice its liberal democratic aspirations at the altar of "national interest." Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," p. 92.
This in turn gave rise in the 19th century to the greatest Balkan paradox of all: the weaker the state, the more grandiose its nationalist aspirations. Pitifully poor and underpopulated Balkan states nourished imperial ambitions of one sort or another. Where resources were lacking, ambition was abundant. Pragmatic politicians were sidestepped, over and over again, by populist opponents. Domestic modernization suffered enormously by foreign, and usually disastrous, adventures. Between 1830 and 1912, Greece expanded three times (acquiring the Ionian islands in 1864, Thessaly 1881 and Crete—more or less—in 1898) but only because of foreign diplomatic intervention and never thanks to its strength of arms. When war was tried, Greece suffered defeat from Turkey in 1897, just as Serbia had twelve years earlier at the hands of Bulgaria.

5. Mature vs. Aggressive Nationalism

Powerful arguments have been made in support of nationalism's mutability, for all its adherents' convictions of its unalterability. Misha Glenny has pointed out an interesting process of maturing whereby initially aggressive and irredentist nationalisms grow more accommodating as they are forced to operate within the constraints of the real world and as economic and other considerations redefine the national interest in non-ethnic, non-aggressive ways. For instance, during the last two centuries Greek

60such a redefinition should be distinguished from what was previously described as the non-adventurist defensiveness of Peloponnesians and in-of-Drina Serbs. Their occasional reluctance to espouse irredentism had more to do with their proud local particularism, arrogance vis-a-vis their out-of-border compatriots and a narrow definition of ethno-
nationalism has dropped its Megali Idea revisionism and structurally transformed itself in favor of a status quo, pragmatic and increasingly Euro-centric idea of the nation and its place in the world.

On the contrary, much of Macedonian nationalism's revisionism, that considered the territory of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as only the nucleus—a 'Piedmont'—of an eventually greater entity which would include the 'unredeemed' Macedonian territories under Bulgarian and Greek rule (or "occupation" for VMRO's ultra-nationalists), should be attributed to its belated emergence in the inter-war and postwar period. In the 1990s, irredentist claims did not disappear and were included in VMRO's electoral platform and party program, under which the party won 37 out of 120 seats in 1990, in the first free elections. The robustness of Macedonian revisionism was further demonstrated by the provocative selection of the Star of Vergina, found in the tomb of Philip II, the father of Alexander the Great, in present-day Greek Macedonia, as the national flag of the new republic.

In every new Balkan state 50 years after its creation—the current age of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a distinct state entity—irredentism has been a key characteristic. But whereas irredentism was 'legitimate' in the 19th century, it is highly destabilizing in the late 20th century and the international community has grown increasingly more hostile to it.

Generally speaking, one might say that, (a) there are nationalisms with various degrees of revisionist and, thus, conflictual potential; and, (b) the process of maturing is not necessarily progressively linear in time, but that reversals often occur.

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national identity rather than with a greater post-modern, ethnically-tolerant, civic-minded political vision.
A content nationalism is both a matter of objective reality and choice. The absence of unredeemed co-nationals in neighboring countries leaves no room for irredentism. Thus, the elimination of Greek communities outside mainland Greece, with the exception of a small Greek minority in southern Albania, has rendered any Greek irredentist program meaningless.

"Reality" itself is often contested: while for Athens there is no Slav Macedonian minority in Greek Macedonia, for Skopje there is a Macedonian community of 200,000 people in northern Greece. Even after the existence of a minority has been acknowledged, its size can often be contested as is the case of the Greek minority in Albania that reaches 250,000 peoples according to Athens* estimates, but less than 50,000 according to Tirana's.

Apart from the reality of the existence (or non-existence) of ethnically-kin communities outside the state borders, there is always room for choice. For example, upon assuming power, Kemal Ataturk denounced Turkey's interest in Turkish populations lying outside the republic's borders.61

In the past, the gap between old imperial glories, grandiose revivalist ambitions and a miserable reality of poverty and corruption could not be missed by zealous nationalists. The lack of functional legitimacy on the part of state performance reinforced

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6"This was possible as long as domestic popular opinion remained politically marginalized. The opening of the political system to mass politics in the 1950s created pressures Turkish leaders could no longer afford to ignore. For the first time, they expressed an active interest in the fate of Turks in Cyprus and later in Greece and Bulgaria. By the early 1990s Turkey had gone as far as to project itself as the protector of all Balkan Muslims irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, as in the case of the Muslim Slavs in Bosnia.
the need for a nationalist justification of the new nation-states. If Serbia and Greece were unable to improve the standards of living of their citizens and inspire some loyalty thanks to their present achievements, they could, at least, be legitimized as the fulfillment of the centuries-old national inspirations of their majority nations.

Improving economic prospects can increase the state's functional legitimacy and peoples' self-confidence and redirect their reformist drive to the modernization of their polity rather than territorial expansion. Such a vision has been articulated from time to time. For example, Prime Minister Harflaos Trikoupis of Greece in the 1880s opposed adventurism abroad and promoted a large-scale infrastructural build-up at home. Serbia and Greece face similar choices today. Articulating a similar vision, the Alternate Foreign Minister of Greece has said that "Greece is grappling with the problem of redefining its own priorities and its role in the region; revamping its own financial and political structures; and, at a deeper level, redefining its identity in the multicultural settings of Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean."62

6. Victimization. Conspiracies and Historical Nihilism

All new Balkan nation-states have been weak and clients of foreign powers. They achieved their independence thanks to the direct military and political intervention of the great powers of Europe. It was the Navarino naval battle in 1827, when the combined English, French and Russian fleets sank the Ottoman-Egyptian naval armada that ensured the Sublime Porte's acceptance of Greek independence. It was the Russian military victory.

against the Ottomans in 1878 that enlarged Serbia and granted it its full independence. For decades, Austro-Hungary and Russia openly intervened in internal Serbian politics and England took a similar interest in Greek affairs.

The vulnerability of post-independent Serbia and Greece to foreign intervention is indisputable. This vulnerability gave rise to a xenophobia and a proclivity to blame Serbian and Greek misfortune on outsiders' unprincipled power games. In Southeastern Europe, alleged conspiracies have been an important part of the local political culture. They found fertile ground in a distorted, 'whitewashed' nationalist historiography and an underdeveloped, immature and populist political culture that blames others for domestic failures and refuses to face responsibility for one's own mistakes and wrongdoings. They all add up to a culture of victimization where Serbs and Greeks are the perennial victims of the 'dark forces' of history, and must contend with a hostile outside world.

'The Serbs, more than any other nation of the former Yugoslavia, are fully convinced that history has treated them unfairly. They feel that because they had the largest casualties in the two World Wars they deserve special credit for the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 and for its resurrection in 1945. Yet instead of being grateful, their non-Serbian fellow Yugoslavs have conspired against them from the beginning, undermining Yugoslav unity, often at the Serbs' expense...This nihilistic view, that history has never rewarded the Serbs for their noble idealism, but instead has punished them with

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63 At the same congress, Bulgaria became an autonomous principality. In 1912, Albania was established as an independent state thanks to the intervention of Austro-Hungary and Italy.

^Independent Greece was placed under the protection of the powers of England, Russia and France, its kings and constitution chosen by them and its republican aspirations effectively frustrated by restoration Europe. Serbia, although alone among all Balkan nations^ in having its own indigenous royal dynasty—the competing Karadjordjevic and Obrenovic—did not escape the pressures of Vienna and Moscow.
humiliation and suffering, has been combined with the conviction that international factors in the contemporary world have also conspired to deprive the Serbs of their legitimate rights. As Dobrica Cosic, the prominent Serb intellectual and former president of Yugoslavia, has claimed "the Serbs have won all the wars and lost all peace."

Both the displacement of responsibility and self-victimization have a long tradition. The Serbs lost in Kosovo in 1389, not because of their military inferiority, but because of their leader's choice in favor of the kingdom of heaven and the treachery of some Vuk Brankovic. Such myths have been used to explain the fall of the medieval state, and they have been replicated in modern times. Throughout the war of 1991-1995 few Serbs ever ascribed a defeat to losing a battle fair and square. With monotonous regularity losses were always put down to secret deals and treachery.

It is equally difficult for Serbs to acknowledge their wrongdoings in modern times. "Hardly a trace of that side of the Balkan wars [the Serb atrocities against Albanians, Bulgarians and Turks in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913] can be found in Serbian histories, in textbooks for elementary and high schools, or even on reading lists at universities. Those texts present the role of Serbia and its armies in both Balkan wars as exclusively noble and humane. If they are accused of inflicting suffering, Serbs merely reply that they are just and virtuous avengers of far worse popular suffering at the hands of others-Albanians, Bulgarians, and Turks. This culture carefully preserves the myth of Serbs as innately the most magnanimous of peoples, straightforward and hospitable, naive and brave, and perpetually the victims of Albanians, Croats, and many others. To question any part of the Serbian nation's history, admitting that its people ever committed less-than-

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66 Judah, The Serbs, p. 36.
sterling deeds, is considered unacceptable, even treasonous. Such an admission is said to jeopardize the nation's standing versus others, erode its claims to greatness, and expose it to the ever ready enemy's exploitation.\footnote[68]{Ibid, p. 62.}

Such an attitude is particularly true when it comes to the Serb atrocities against Croats and Muslims in the recent wars. Most Serbs would first deny that atrocities actually took place, and then they would claim that most were committed by Croats and Muslims themselves, like the Sarajevo bombings, to solicit Western support and that in any case, these things happen in war and they themselves suffered more than their fair share of losses. Thus, "the Serbs are profoundly convinced that they are more sinned against than sinning."\footnote[69]{Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993): p. 19.}

Only within this framework was it possible for Slobodan Milosevic to claim in all seriousness that: "Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others...they have liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves."\footnote[70]{Judah, The Serbs, p. 164.}

Similarly, for the Greek national imagination the fall of Constantinople was not a historical inevitability but the result of an unguarded small gate (kekroporta) in the city's walls through which the Turkish forces entered. It seems to escape Greeks that by 1453 Byzantine power was confined to a small area around Constantinople and that the city itself was significantly depopulated. Asia Minor (and parts of the Balkans) had been
largely Turkified in a four-century process that had started with the Byzantine military defeat in Manakert in 1071.\textsuperscript{71}

Present-day Greeks are taught that the civil war of 1946-1949 was the product of British intervention, that the 1967 coup d'etat was a CIA conspiracy and that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was the result of Turkish militarism, American imperialism and Greek treachery. The majority of Greeks does not acknowledge the responsibilities of the communist and the republican leaderships in polarizing Greek society to the point where the civil war was made inevitable. The collapse of parliamentarianism in 1967, an event that had been predicted and anticipated many months, even years, in advance, is still loaded with the polemics and denunciations of partisan politics in search of convenient scapegoats.\textsuperscript{72}

But the Cyprus case, that touches a nerve in modern Greek nationalism as probably no other, is even more instructive of this culture of self-victimisation and blaming others, and deserves some further attention. In the late 1980s, the then socialist government of Andreas Papandreou decided to honor an old electoral pledge to "open the Cyprus file." Such a file never physically existed. Rather it referred to a thorough parliamentary investigation of the events surrounding the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974.\textsuperscript{73} Even the least cynical of Greeks could not have foreseen the farcical conclusion of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Spyros Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh Through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
\item Interview with Anna Fragoudaki and Thalia Dragona, Professors of Sociology at the University of Athens, and Greek Coordinators of the international research study of the Krober Foundation entitled "Youth and History," Elefterotypia (Athens), July 8, 1997. According to the study, Greek students are among the most nationalist in Europe, Elefterotypia. July 7, 1997.
\item Papandreou himself had no interest in historical truth but hoped to make some political capital by proving, once and for all, what many leftists still believe in Greece: that
\end{thebibliography}
the investigation, where everything was blamed on the 'usual suspects,' the colonels and the CIA, the portrayal of whom as solely responsible for the tragedy carried no political cost.

The responsibility of Greeks and Greek-Cypriots in violating the London-Zurich agreements, in abolishing the Cypriot constitution of 1960 and in ghettoizing the Turkish-Cypriots in 1964, long before the colonels' coup, was never acknowledged. For Greeks the Cypriot problem starts in 1974 and the bloodshed and inter-communal strife of the previous ten years are conveniently forgotten. But the truth is that a UN peacekeeping force was already dispatched in 1964 to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority from the wrath of Greek-Cypriot nationalists. In this sad series of events, many of the icons of contemporary Greek 'republican' history, such as Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, are seriously implicated. Instead of acknowledging the complexities of the Cyprus drama, most Greeks learn a reductionist, oversimplified and utterly distorted story of good and bad guys with one aim in mind: to solely blame others for a historical calamity that was brought on Greeks, to a great extent, by their own foolish adventurism.\(^{74}\)

Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so.\(^{75}\) As Ernest Renan famously put it, "getting its history wrong is part of being a nation."\(^{76}\) Thus, "all nations

\(^{74}\) Turkey, where nationalism is part of the official Kemalist ideology and there is a long tradition of suppression of academic freedom and freedom of speech, offers an equally, if not more, distorted interpretation of the Cyprus problem, only that the focus in the Turkish version, is on the period prior rather than after 1974 and the bad guys are Greek-Cypriot extremists and the Greek junta and the good guys are the 'liberating' Turkish army.

\(^{75}\) Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. p. 12.
have their self-serving myths. But the public life in many countries permits the challenge of those myths, though not always with impunity or effect. But [in the Balkans] the pervasive culture of ethnocentric myths [went] unchallenged even by intellectuals. In reality, far from challenging conventional wisdom, it is often intellectuals themselves who indulge in pseudo-scientific studies to validate nationalist myths.

Even in countries like Greece, with a fairly long democratic political tradition that goes back to the revolutionary constitutions of the 1820s, nationalist myths have gone unchallenged and still dominate the public space in scholarship, education, literature and journalism. The Macedonian Question of the early 1990s is only the most recent example of this. It is impossible to analyze the latter without a full understanding of the national mythologizing that has taken place on both sides in the dispute. In fact, the present Macedonian saga has at its heart the question of Macedonian ethno-genesis and the clash of Greek, Macedonian and Bulgarian national historiography for the appropriation of the past, and consequently the present, of the historic region of Macedonia.

This is how Ioannis Touratsoglou in 1995 described the situation in Macedonia on the eve of the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 in a good example of nationalist historiography:

"In the second half of the 19th century, the international conjunctures tended to favour the other peoples of the Balkan peninsula and international diplomacy adopted a hostile stance towards Greek affairs. With the nationalist movements of Bulgaria rivaling the Turkish rulers in their anti-Greek attitudes, Macedonia, the apple of strife of the southern Balkans, strove to preserve its Greek integrity by building schools and founding educational societies; it countered Slav expansionism with the historical reality and the Orthodoxy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and mobilized yet again its armed hopes and the youth of Free Greece. The Macedonian Struggle was in preparation. From the ill-fated year of 1875, from inauspicious 1897, despite the genocide and the hecatombs of victims, the marshes of Yanitsa, the mountain peaks of Grevena, the forested

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76 Ernest Renan, Ou'est que c'est une nation? (Paris: Conference fake en Sorbonne le 11 Mars 1882), pp. 7-8.
77 Cvijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," p. 64.
ravines of Fiorina were transformed into pages on which, at the turn of the 20th century, men like Pavlos Melas,..., wrote the name of Macedonian regeneration in their blood. In an empire on its way to collapse, despite the Young Turks' movement for renewal, and in opposition to a heavily armed, irrevocably hostile Bulgaria, wim Serbia as an unreliable ally, Hellenism countered with the rights of the nation and, on the 26th of October 1912, raised the flag of the cross in the capital of Macedonia, Thessaloniki. Behind it lay 500 years of slavery that had not succeeded in creating slaves. Half a millennium of torture, persecution, T'irdw, plotting, disappointment and falsification of history donned once more die blue and white and, with the sword of justice, opened the road to the modern age. The age of the Balkan epic and progress.78

This is the kind of history young Greeks learn at school and read in the media. No wonder then that any visitor to Greece in the years between 1992 and 1995 could not fail to come across signs, posters and individuals who passionately proclaimed Macedonia to have been Greek for the last 3,000 years. This is simply a lie. At the turn of the century, Macedonia had many Greek communities but Greeks were a minority, albeit a strong one, in a sea of Turks, Jews and, mainly, Slavs. The present-day capital of Greek Macedonia, Greece's second largest city, and the present center stage of Greece's Macedonian politics, Thessaloniki, had a 70% Jewish majority at the time of the Greek army's arrival in 1912. If anything, turn-of-the-century Thessaloniki was a Jewish city, for all the discomfort this causes to Greek nationalists.79

The vulnerable and weak Serbian and Greek nation-states have traditionally been very chauvinistic. In a recent research of youth attitudes and opinions, young Greeks came first as the most 'nationalist' in Europe.80 When the government-sponsored "Youth Parliament" was convened in Athens, many older moderate Greek politicians and

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79Interestingly, Thessaloniki played an important role in every nationalist movement in the Southern Balkans except the Greek, that was dominated by southern or Old Greece. Kemal Ataturk and the Young Turks originated in this city, Slav Macedonianism was born there and Jewish labor Zionism had deep roots in Thessaloniki.
journalists were deeply shocked by the nationalist preaching of the young generation of Greeks. But this should not have come as a surprise to anyone with a minimal experience of Greek schooling. History books are full of accounts that demonize Greece's neighbors and glorify Greeks.

This is why international relations expert Theodore Couloumbis recommends, in addition to confidence building measures, "that the states in the [Balkan] region, embark on the much-needed task of mutual and balanced prejudice reduction, whether such prejudice is manifested in hostile press commentaries, textbooks, literature, theater, movies, sports, or other forms of social and cultural expression. Universities, think-tanks, business and labor associations, and other non-governmental organizations can contribute immensely through carefully conceived mutual engagement and cooperation projects." 82

Without such a reconceptualization of the national past, any decrease of tensions cannot acquire the depth of a true entente. The Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement, i.e. the reconciliation of two historical enemies who fought four wars in the first half of this century, although commendable and extremely beneficial to the stability of the region, remains a matter of high politics and has not permeated Greek or Bulgarian society. In no way has it acquired the depth of the Franco-German friendship with its booming network of cross-border economic, cultural and political exchanges. For detente to become entente it is necessary to redefine national identities and the perceptions of one's self and the

other. In fact, it would require that local nationalisms abandon their ethno-centricism, xenophobia and historical grievances and embrace a positive, liberal, civic-minded, Europe-oriented national vision. This is what Germany, and France to a lesser extent, did following Nazism's defeat in 1945. Such a redefinition was the precondition for the contemporary Franco-German friendship that remains the foundation of European integration and much of Europe's stability.

7. Nationalism and Democracy

The relationship between nationalism and democracy is a long one and can be traced back to the American and French Revolutions. Nationalism created a political community that is the natural precondition for the exercise of democracy while the defense of popular self-government against external enemies reinforced the process of nation-building. This mutually beneficial relationship lasted until 1848, when the failure of German liberal nationalists to achieve the unification of Germany opened the way for Prussian-led conservative nationalism, which radically distinguished between the nation and the demos and sought to sacrifice the latter for the benefit of the former. Bismarck's success made his conservative nationalism and authoritarianism the dominant paradigm in Europe and particularly popular among East Europeans, including Ottoman Turks, where the nation-state formation process was far from complete.

While the excesses of nazism-fascism discredited this illiberal nationalism in Germany and much of Western Europe after 1945, in communist Eastern Europe, nationalism was used by party elites to gain legitimacy and substitute for or forestall democratization. 83

83Banac, "Nationalism in Southeastern Europe," p. 117.
For example, after the suppression of the Prague Spring in August 1968, Czechoslovakia's federalization, that recognized Slovakia's distinct ethnic identity and political status, remained the only survivor of Alexander Dubcek's legacy, and was further institutionalized. Confronted with liberal demands in Croatia in 1971 and in Serbia in 1972, Tito decentralized, and destabilized, as was argued later on, the Yugoslav federation in 1974. These were examples of what might be called bureaucratic nationalism. Under conditions of crisis socialism in the 1970s and 1980s, old national ideologies were reproduced and collectivism lost its class component and became nationalized. The repression of Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania and Albanians in Yugoslavia in the 1980s illustrates the point.

The use of nationalism to defeat Westernizing liberal reformers in Serbia with the purges of 1972, put Serbia on the road of reaction to Tito's bureaucratic decentralization and led to a resurgence of Serbian ethno-nationalism. What followed was a transition to post-communism in 1990, when socialism disappeared but authoritarian collectivism remained and triumphed in elections with the help of nationalism.

Time and again, Milosevic defeated the opposition's demands for more democracy by appealing to Serbian nationalism and the external 'enemy'. The irony was that the first Serb to die in political terror since his rise to power was murdered by Serbian police working in the name of President Milosevic during the civic disturbances that erupted in Belgrade in March of 1991. Milosevic, who rose to power pledging to protect Serbs throughout Yugoslavia, did not hesitate to allow the murder of fellow Serbs to protect bis

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84 Ibid, pp. 117-118.  
85 Ibid, p. 119.
regime. So went his priorities. Interestingly, however, the demonstrators, when confronted
with the security forces "took up the cry 'Go to Kosovo' and 'Go to Pakrac', for what offended
many of these young Serbs most was not the violence of the state but the fact that the Serb state
would perpetrate violence not on Albanians or Croats but on Serbs."*

Most Serbs have still not realized that the systematic violation of the most basic rights of
ethnic Albanians has turned Kosovo into a cancer that poisons the Serbian body politic and
prevents the consolidation of Serbian democracy, a price both Serbs and Albanians pay alike.
The political marginalization of 20% of the electorate dramatically affects the quality and depth of
contemporary Serbian democracy to the detriment of all citizens of Serbia.

In his parliamentary speech during the March 1991 disturbances, Milosevic declared
that "Serbia and the Serbian people are faced with one of the greatest evils of their history: the
challenge of disunity and internal conflict. This evil, which has more than once caused so much
damage and claimed so many victims, more than once sapped our strength, has always come hand
in hand with those who would take away our freedom and dignity. All who love Serbia dare not
ignore this fact, especially at a time when we are confronted by the vampiroid, fascistoid forces of
the Ustashes, Albanian secessionists and

86Although not directly responsible for the death of demonstrators, Milosevic refused the political
responsibility resulting from police's heavy handiness and offered political cover to his inferiors.
, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 47.

similar phenomenon is the inability of Turkish democratization to move from the
transition to the consolidation phase due, to a large extent, to the Kurdish problem.
all other forces in the anti-Serbian coalition which threaten the people's rights and freedoms."89

By evoking the need for unity, Milosevic strove to silence the opposition to his rule. By exaggerating, even creating, an external enemy, he asked for a unified national front under his leadership. And by appealing to peoples' rights and freedoms, he appeared as the defender of democracy, but a democracy where dissent, opposition and non-Serbs have no place.

Although he was the actual threat to Serbian unity and democracy, the argument worked. As reported by Misha Glenny, an eyewitness to the March 1991 events, "most people recognized the President's argument that the Terazije parliament [the demonstrators' assembly] was facilitating the plans of the Ustashes and Albanian terrorists, for the whitewash it was."90 During the war in that erupted in Croatia the summer of 1991 and in Bosnia in the spring of 1992, Milosevic used the need for unity to openly censor and even close the few media outlets not yet under his control, like the B92 radio station and the New Borba daily.91

The need for unity is best epitomized in the celebrated motto "only unity saves the Serbs." This quasi-totalitarian cry was evoked many times in Serbia during the Yugoslav turmoil and was to hamper the political dialogue that is the lifeblood of democracy. It took a Serb in Croatia, Milorad Pupovac, the moderate social democrat leader, to declare the obvious: 'This decisive democratic demand must not and cannot be stopped...by the blindness which claims that Serbs are only democratic if they are together and gathered

89 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 57
90 Ibid.
91 Needless to say, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia has followed similar tactics.
around one leader and a single policy. Therefore we cannot agree with those representatives of the Serbs outside Serbia who...blindly following the national monolith and the politics of one national leader, continue to support the policies of Slobodan Milosevic."92

In Greece a parliamentary practice has emerged according to which certain foreign policy issues are designated 'national' (ethnika themata) and are, supposedly, above the strains of the ordinary partisan debate. 'National issues' include Greek-Turkish relations and since 1991, the Macedonian problem. But in the absence of a clear definition of what a 'national issue' is, the list can increase and decrease at political leaders' convenience.93

When an issue becomes 'national', it is removed from partisan competition and politicians and journalists are encouraged to handle it with "extra care," "caution," "seriousness" and "without demagoguery."94 What this all adds up to is a fear of dissension and disunity when it comes to facing the external 'enemy'. Greek leaders overemphasize the need for unity as the precondition for a successful foreign policy95 and downplay the equally important need for adequately debating policy in a democracy. %

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92Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 58.
93 For example, for many moderate Greeks, including the President of the Republic, Constantine Karamanlis, the state of the country's public finances and the near bankruptcy of the treasury, were the number one 'national issue' for Greece in the early 1990s.
94As it was explained to me by many senior Greek politicians, including Prime Minister Simitis and opposition leader Kostas Karamanlis.
95 When it comes to foreign policy and defense the opposition is ready to abandon its prerogatives. Thus, the defense budget is unanimously approved by the parliament with no control in the name of a ill-conceived 'national unity,' with the end result of defense being probably the least productive and efficient area of the Greek public sector.
96Following the imposition of the Greek embargo on Macedonia on February 16, 1994, opposition leader Miltiadis Evert declared that "New Democracy is a national party and has the obligation to support a united national foreign policy of the country," Athens News Agency. February 17, 1994. A similar statement was made the following day after
In a country where courts have found it their duty to define the ethnic affiliation of Greek citizens, "national discourse becomes absolute when it does not tolerate disagreements nor challenges. Whoever disagrees with the dominant policy runs the risk-as happened with the issue of the recognition of Skopje-of going to prison if he (or she) is an 'unknown' student, or of being publicly accused as a traitor if he (or she) is a 'well-known' person."\textsuperscript{97}

Paradoxically, under the general rubric of a maturing Greek democracy of decreasing polarization and increasing consensus, the tendency for less debate and more uniformity has grown dangerously stronger. What Greece needs is more public debate, more parliamentary scrutiny, and more dissension to challenge some of the established nationalist rigidities of foreign policy and take a fresh look at the country's external relations.

If the recently resurgent Macedonian question was a test for the maturity, respect for human rights and civicness of Greek democracy, the result was disappointing. Greece proved unable to overcome an ethno-centric tradition that (a) claims and systematically tries to confirm, the ethnic homogeneity of contemporary Greece and denies the existence of any ethno-nationalist minority, and. (b) attempts to silence any dissent in the defense of Even's meeting with Papandreou. Evert said that "as a national party, New Democracy will preserve the unity of the national front," Athens News Agency. February 18, 1994. On the contrary, Constantine Mitsotakis disagreed, saying that the measures (i.e. the embargo) added additional tension to the highly volatile region and that "the measures are untimely and ineffective as they essentially strengthen [Kiro] Gligorov and further isolate Greece, whose role at this particular time should be directed towards the promotion of peace." Athens News Agency, February 17, 1994.

such minorities with legal prosecution and public harassment, demonizing researchers and human rights activists as foreign agents.

This attitude is directly linked to the idea that, all citizens of Greece must necessarily belong to the Greek nation defined in ethnic terms. But as William Pfaff states "the idea of the ethnic nation is a permanent provocation to war. It is an idea that makes spies and prospective insurgents of those who have the misfortune to live outside the shifting frontiers identified with their nationality, inviting their persecution by the people among whom they live..." Nationalistically-conscious Macedonians and Turks of Greece experience such mistreatment on a regular basis."

8. State Formation- Historic Rights versus National Self-Determination

Much of the past and present Balkan troubles stem from the absence of an agreed set of principles on resolving disputes. Given a proclivity to the territorialization of disputes and the continuous lack of trust in non-territorial solutions, such as federal or co-sociational power-sharing arrangements, as the recent Yugoslav wars demonstrated, minority problems are turned into border disputes. As Vladimir Gligorov famously asked: "Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?" Balkan conflicts have traditionally centered around border lines.

The delineation of state boundaries in Southeastern Europe has been based on two, often incompatible, principles: historic rights and self-determination. Historic rights based

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on the territorial zenith of the medieval Balkan states have often collided violently with the will of the local population.

In modern times, almost all Balkan nation-states managed to materialize the dream of a large state, corresponding to their past territorial zenith, including all irredenta, for a short period, to be shattered soon after Great Bulgaria (in 1878 and between 1941-44), Great Romania (1918-40), Great Serbia (Yugoslavia between 1918-41 and 1945-91), Great Greece (1919-22), Great Croatia (1941-44). This led to the emergence of the concept of 'lost fatherlands' (the frustrated irredenta) and resulted in a general fluidity of borders. The nostalgia over lost territory and the uncertainty of Balkan borders that have changed so often in the past, reinforces the defensiveness of Balkan nationalisms and goes a long way in explaining why majority nations have such a great difficulty even acknowledging the existence of minorities within their territory. Minorities are thought of as national security threats to be assimilated, expelled and generally repressed. Being themselves half the products of secessionism and half of irredentism, Balkan nations are convinced that minority group rights lead to autonomy and eventual independence.

This is what happened in Cyprus where the recognition of a distinct Turkish-Cypriot community opened the way for its eventual independence with the help of the Turkish army. Because of this danger, Turkey has great difficulty recognizing even the

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mere existence of a Kurdish minority. Authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia deny Albanians a number of cultural rights and object to the operation of an
Albanian university in Tetovo for fear of educating an Albanian nationalist elite that will not be
satisfied with anything less than outright independence:

This is particularly the case today with Kosovo, part of Old Serbia, but
overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Albanians. Kosovo was the cradle of the medieval empire
of the Nemanjic dynasty on the eve of the Ottoman conquest. Peć, the seat of the first Serbian
patriarchate, is located in Kosovo. But the province began to de-Serbianize in 1690, when many
Serb rebels fled for their lives from the advancing Ottomans, to be replaced by Albanian
pastoralists from the highlands. Helped by the Albanians' high birth rate, the Albanization of
Kosovo continued over the centuries and was not interrupted even after the province's
incorporation into Serbia proper in 1912. Belgrade's control of the province was never accepted
by the Albanian majority and is nowadays maintained only at the cost of great repression.

Kosovo epitomizes best the conflict between the principles of historic rights and self-
determination. It also proves the difficulty Balkan nations have had in dealing with their
minorities. Thus, the Serbian majority often confuses the Albanian minority's demands for
the respect of human rights with secessionism, while Albanians often conflate such demands with
sovereign rights.

A lot depends on definitions: for what to Serbs is an Albanian minority of Serbia, is for
Kosovars, an Albanian majority community that deserves much more expanded rights than a
minority might have been content with.
The same battle over definition occurred in Cyprus where the Turkish Cypriots, comprising 18% of the total population, were a minority for the Greek-Cypriot majority and Greece: a minority with rights but, a minority nevertheless. The same group was for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey a "community," a co-founder and co-ruler of the Republic of Cyprus, politically equal to the Greek Cypriots. Their view ultimately prevailed after the armed intervention of 1974 and was largely accepted by the Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios in 1977 and by President Kyprianou in 1979. However, the battle is far from over much of the present dispute over the future constitutional structure of the republic is based on the Turkish Cypriots' attempt to carry the principle of communitarian equality to its ultimate limit, i.e., equal representation in the federal bodies and separate majorities for decision-making at the federal level. Greek Cypriots claim that an arrangement which would equate their 80% of the population with that of 18% is unequal and undemocratic. For most of them, in Cyprus there is still a majority and a minority rather than two politically equal communities.

Greece attempted to seize control of its own "Kosovo" in 1919 by landing an expeditionary force in Smyrna/Izmir, but it had to abandon its "Great Idea" (Megali Idea) of a resurrected Byzantine empire across the Aegean when it was confronted with the opposition of the majority of the Anatolian population. The exchange of populations that followed buried once and for all the basis of Greek irredentism and transformed Greece into a largely homogeneous, status quo power. A similar process did not occur in Serbia where 'national questions' have remained open to the present day. Far from consolidating, the Serbian nation-state (1815-1918) was "liquidated" in Versailles and Serbia was merged with ethnically diverse lands. National rights and aspirations remained unreconciled with history and contemporary demographic and political realities.

9. Nation-Building in Southeastern Europe - Migration and Assimilation
All Balkan countries have resorted to migration and assimilation to resolve minority problems. Emigration was practiced extensively by the Ottomans. They not only tolerated ethnic diversity but they actively promoted it to mitigate local power struggles and safeguard imperial authority. During Ottoman-times, the Serbian nation was pushed northwards towards the pashalik of Belgrade, Vojvodina and Krajina. It is this migration that accounts for the stark incompatibility between Serbian historic rights and self-determination. By the late Ottoman era, the Serbs had become a minority in the territory of the old medieval Serbian kingdom, in the midst of an Albanian majority.  

The best known example of migration in the 20th century Balkans, is the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey following the crushing Greek defeat in 1922. Similar instances of what contemporaries might call "ethnic cleansing" occurred in the population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria, the expulsion of communist Slav-Macedonians from Greece after their defeat in the civil war in 1949, the emigration of the Greek community of Istanbul in the 1950s and 1960s and the mutual expulsion of Greek and Turkish Cypriots following the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974. In the recent wars in Croatia and Bosnia, population transfers were considerable, including mainly the expulsion of Muslims from Eastern Bosnia and Serbs from Krajina.

Assimilation has a mixed record of success and failure in the Balkans. There have been several relatively successful outcomes: the assimilation of the so-called Slavophones in Northern Greece and their integration into the Greek nation; the similar fete of the remaining Greek population of Eastern Rumelia on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, and so

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101 By a striking historical coincidence, early 19th century Attica (the area around Athens and the cradle of classical Hellas) was populated largely by Albanian-speaking Christians (Arvanites) who were, however, quickly hellenized after independence.
on. Still, one can indicate many more failures in which the unresolved minority issues persist. They comprise the existing and potential crisis points in the Balkans: Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Transylvania, Thrace, Cyprus.\textsuperscript{102}

Balkan nationalisms developed in three stages according to which 'In the first stage a group of 'awakened' intellectuals starts studying the language, culture, and history of a subjugated people. In the second stage, which corresponds to the heyday of national revivals, the scholars' ideas are transmitted by a group of 'patriots', that is the carriers of national ideologies, who take it upon themselves to convey national thought to the wider strata. In the last stage the national movement reaches its mass apogee.'\textsuperscript{103} With the establishment of the nation-state, assimilation,\textsuperscript{104} conducted by established nation-states against groups with more or less developed national consciousness, has been, first and foremost, a cultural process that has been promoted mainly through secularized, centralized and uniform educational systems as the most powerful agent of nationalism. As the 19\textsuperscript{th} century progressed, local identities and dialects were abandoned in favor of the newly constructed national identity and language, following the linguistic reforms of Koraes in Greece and Karadzic in Serbia.\textsuperscript{108} Because of the important historical role

\textsuperscript{*02}Todorova. Imagining the Balkans, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{102}\textsuperscript{1}Miroslav Hroch, as summarized in Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 28
\textsuperscript{103}A stumbling block in assimilation has been the cleavage between Christianity and Islam. Every failed assimilation has involved a religious division, between Orthodox Christianity and Islam in particular. Thus, Muslim Turks in Greece and Bulgaria, Christian Orthodox Greeks in Albania and Catholic Hungarians in Romania remained unassimilated and separate. The power of religion becomes apparent when one considers failures of integration involving members of the same ethnic group. These include the ethnically Bulgarian but Muslim Pomaks, the Slavic Bosnian Muslims, the Muslim Slav Torbesh in Macedonia, and so on. When religion is the same and ethnicity different assimilation was possible as in the case of Christian Albanians in Greece (Arvanites), Christian Turks from Cappadocia in Greece (Karaman), and the Muslim Greeks of Crete in Turkey.
\textsuperscript{104}Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 80. For an interesting comparison between Koraes\textsuperscript{1} and Karadzic's projects see also, Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment
schools have played in nation-building, they continue to remain under the direct control of the central government in what constitute two of the most rigid, state-controlled educational systems of the world. For this reason, much of minority activism in Serbia and Greece has been centered around the demands for autonomous, bilingual schooling.

Consequently, the showcase of Serbian repression in Kosovo is the closure of the Albanian-speaking university in its capital, Pristina. After its establishment in the late 1960s, the Pristina university developed into a hotbed of Albanian nationalism, grooming the leadership of Albanian assertiveness. This has been registered in neighboring Macedonia where authorities successfully opposed the opening of an Albanian university. Under pressure from and with the financial support of the European Union, Greece has embarked on some minor but encouraging reforms to strengthen multi-cultural education in Western Thrace and nation-wide.

10. In the preceding pages the effort was made to present the commonalities and particularities of Balkan nationalism, mainly vis-a-vis its West European counterpart. According to this analysis, Balkan nationalism developed within a unique historical and social space. Nation-building and state formation based on the national principle represented an abrupt historical break with and an unambiguous departure from the centuries-old imperial-religious Ottoman-Byzantine order. During the 19th century the Balkan people, spearheaded by Western-educated intellectuals gradually came to realize the backwardness and poverty of their societies and sought to take advantage of the declining power of the Ottoman state. Nation-building and state formation took place within the larger process of socio-economic modernization and cultural-political Westernization of Southeastern Europe. Such a process was neither easy nor painless,

Nationalism. Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1994).
given the extraordinary ethnic diversity and economic backwardness of the Balkan lands. Its interaction with local conditions, determined by history and policy choices, produced a variety of Balkan nationalist 'mutations'.

The politicization of ethnicity and the radical nationalization of Balkan politics during the 19th century, occurred at a different pace in different parts of the Balkans. In 1804 the Serbs were the first to rebel against the abuses of local, independent-minded Ottoman pashas. In 1821 the Greeks were the first to present a coherent nationalist program and establish a nation-state in the Ottoman world. The Serbian and Greek leadership role in the nation-building/state formation process is attributed to a number of unique advantages they enjoyed including a strong pre-Ottoman state tradition, a network of autonomous institutions and regions, an emerging bourgeoisie and a geographic location which put Serbs and Greeks far away from the Ottoman center but relatively close to Western Europe. Because their revolt was against an alien oppressor and took place during the flourishing of German Romanticism, Serbian and Greek nationalism came to treasure national unity against external threats rather than individual liberty against internal masters. For them, the nation, the ethnos and the state were no different. Citizens of Serbia and Greece had to be ethnically (in blood and/or cultural terms) and nationally (in political terms) Serbian and Greek.

Thus, communities and identities were defined in ethnic rather than political-state-civic terms. This exclusivist, xenophobic and non-civic definition of Serbian and Greek nationalism is largely explained by the insecurity of the weak and fragile new states. Often nationalism regressed into the assurance of blood and kinship. Only in the few moments of victory, was ethno-nationalism's definition expanded towards a more inclusive notion of culture. Culture, defined mainly by language or religion, is more inclusive than blood and descent because it leaves some room for individual choice and action. One may not be
born Serbian but by learning Serbian or converting to Orthodox Christianity, he can become Serbian.

Balkan nationalisms have matured over the years. However, Serbian nationalism experienced a historical regression in the 20th century because of the liquidation of the Serbian nation-state and the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918. Serious 'national questions' remained unresolved inside and around Serbia and came to the fore in a variety of forms in the 1980s, during the rapid decline of the reach of the Yugoslav center's power.

On the contrary, the Greek nation-state has consolidated itself and, with the exception of Cyprus, has resolved the vast majority of its 'national questions'. Through an extensive exchange of populations and a largely successful policy of assimilation and emigration, Greece has acquired homogeneity at home and abandoned irredentism abroad. Macedonia challenged the success of this consolidation process and posed some painful questions in regard to a unicultural Greek identity in a post-Cold War world. But the absence of 'unredeemed' populations and the constraints imposed by a maturing political culture, made sure that Macedonia did not explode into Greek-FYROM violence.

Despite the initial euphoria following the establishment of their modern independent states, both Serbs and Greeks grew to resent the continuous intervention of foreign powers in their internal affairs and the dislocations and failures of domestic modernization. This resentment gave rise to a culture of victimization and a conspiracy mentality that is still alive in Serbian and Greek political culture. It is dominated by a prevailing historical nihilism that turns Serbs and Greeks into objects rather than subjects of history. Instead of projecting a positive vision for the future, unscrupulous political leaders in pursuit of short-term political gains accentuated the traditional fears and sensibilities of populations. In addition, ethnicity offered a shelter, in periods of social and
economic dislocation, from the uncertainties of a rapidly changing and often threatening world.

But nationalism was not only used to mobilize the people against foreign, real or perceived, threats, but was primarily mobilized against domestic opponents. External crises were created and manipulated to delegitimize dissension at home in the name of the democratically suspect principle of national unity. In Serbia, the victim of such a policy has been not only the Albanian community in Kosovo, but Serbian democracy itself. Nationalism played a negative role in the consolidation and contributed to the populist quality of Greek democracy. Contrary to Serbia, Greece's firmer anchor in the political, economic and cultural structures of the democratic West enabled it to withstand the nationalist-populist assault with no major and irreversible losses.
Chapter Four: Political Participation and Ethno-Nationalism in Greece and Serbia

Nationalism has come to fill the political and ideological void left by the erosion of communism. But nationalism has traditionally been strong in the Balkans. It has had no rival in its ability for popular mobilization. The "deep freeze" theory of a resurrected nationalism that was suppressed by communism often fails to acknowledge the continuous presence of nationalism, even under communism, in the Balkans.

"In Central Europe, the three main crises of the post-World War II era (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980) posed the question of democracy, involved the society, and divided the ruling elite, but they acquired a 'national' dimension only when external suppression of the democratic goals became ominous. In the Balkans, on the other hand, the three main postwar crises all related to the autonomy of a national Communist Party machine vis-a-vis Moscow. Ethnic nationalism was explicitly used to legitimize the policy while internally, the totalitarian features of the system were reinforced. Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948, Enver Hoxha's Albania in 1961, and then Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania were three examples of earlier attempts of Balkan communist regimes using nationalism as a source of surrogate legitimacy."* The end result, of 'national communism' and of communists' attempt at appropriating nationalism, was the nationalization of communism and the aggravation of old ethno-nationalist problems.

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In Serbia and Greece, political participation and legitimation have traditionally been based on ethnicity. This has meant that people are members of the common ethnic community first and, only then, citizens of the same state. The organization of the state and the regulation of popular participation in government is based on the ethno-nationalist principle. Citizenship and the rights it confers vary according to ethnic affiliation. Members of the majority nation have full rights while unassimilated ethnic minorities are discriminated against.

/. The Greek Constitution and Citizenship Law

A brief overview of Greek constitutional and naturalization provisions, the treatment of minorities, and the extraterritorial concern for co-nationals abroad, should make clear the discriminatory supremacy of the ethnos in Greece's state policies.

The current Greek constitution of 1975 follows a long Balkan tradition and sanctions the idea of ethnic and kultur nation, one made up of people with a common descent, language, culture, history and traditions, rather than that of a civic nation where citizenship would be defined in terms of common political traditions, practices and ideals. National unity is based on a common past rather than a common future. Like many other European constitutions it provides for an official language, a state religion, and a number of various national declarations that presuppose ethnic homogeneity.

Thus, the constitution is proclaimed "in the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity," "All powers are derived from the People and the Nation" (article 1, par. 3), and "The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ" (article 3, par. 1).
If constitutions not only set the rules of the game but also capture the underlying spirit of the polity, then the 1975 Greek constitution sanctions an established religion to which most but not all Greeks adhere and avoids the clear separation of church from state.\(^3\) It explicitly distinguishes between the 'People' (laos) and the 'Nation' (ethnos) as the two sources of sovereignty. For the drafters of the constitution, whereas the 'People' is embodied in the electorate, the "Nation" extends both temporally and territorially beyond the borders of the contemporary Hellenic Republic to include the past and future generations of Hellenes and diaspora Greeks, to the exclusion of Greek citizens who do not have a Greek national consciousness. The 'Nation' appears to be both wider and narrower than the 'People'.\(^4\) It includes some persons who do not have Greek citizenship and excludes some who do.

In the past, sharp disagreements arose between the popularly-elected prime minister who was thought to represent the 'People', i.e., the electorate, and the king who fought, fiercely at times, for his right to represent the 'Nation' in all its temporal and spatial dimensions. Thus, what constitutes the 'Nation' and who was to represent it, remained contested, leading to frequent constitutional crises and systemic breakdowns.\(^5\) Despite this negative legacy, the constitutional legislators of 1975 inserted the relevant

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\(^5\) Because of its vagueness the 'Nation' is a term vulnerable to authoritarian abuse. The only source of legitimacy should be the 'People,' that is the electorate which consists of all adult Greek citizens minus those who have been deprived of their political rights due to a criminal conviction. In the past, Kings acknowledged the right of Prime Ministers to represent the people, but reserved for themselves the right to speak for the nation, especially when it came to matters of 'national' issues of foreign policy.
clause to the detriment of clarity and of a civic conception of political participation and popular legitimacy.

The citizenship laws and the naturalization policy of Greece are firmly based on the principle of Jus sanguinis rather than jus soli according to which citizenship is ascribed to children of those who are already citizens and ethnic Greeks of the diaspora. On the contrary, birth in the territory, even when coupled with prolonged residence, has no bearing on awarding citizenship. Second-generation immigrants can acquire Greek citizenship only through naturalization. Similarly to Germany, the Greek definition of the citizenry as a community of descent, restrictive toward non-Greek immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Greeks from Eastern Europe, reflects the pronounced ethnocultural inflection of Greek self-understanding.6

This difference became particularly pronounced after 1989 when Greece for the first time in its modern history received hundreds of thousands of ethnically alien immigrants as well as ethnic Greeks from Albania and the Soviet Union. Whereas approximately 150,000 Pontian Greeks of the Black Sea resident in present-day Georgia, Southern Russia and Central Asia were welcomed to the country and were automatically granted Greek citizenship, thousands of others who were unable to prove their Greek descent were denied entry visas and, naturally, citizenship. The difference in treatment is striking when it comes to Albanians and ethnic Greeks of Southern Albania (what Athens calls Northern Epirus). Although many of the latter could only utter a few words in Greek and their religiosity, after decades of living in the "first atheist state of the world," was much in doubt, they were welcomed as fellow Greeks while their former neighbors back in Albania, who had no 'Greek blood' to speak of, were systematically mistreated.

Ethnicity has been the criterion not only for becoming but also for remaining a Greek citizen. The Code of Citizenship and long-standing jurisprudence distinguish between those who belong to the nation (pmogeneis) and those who do not (allogeneis). According to a 1981 decision of the Council of State, the highest administrative court in Greece, an allogenis is a person who is born of non-ethnic Greek parents and has demonstrated a lack of national conscience, not having been assimilated to the Greek nation, which is composed of all those who are tied together by common historical traditions, aspirations and ideals. The decision proclaimed that participation in the Greek nation is not determined solely on the basis of ethnic origin, in the sense that non-ethnic Greeks may participate, provided they assimilate. But for the court, a Greek national conscience and a non-Greek ethnic identity are mutually exclusive.7

Until its abolition in 1998, section 19 of the Code of Citizenship allowed for the withdrawal of Greek citizenship from persons who did not belong to the nation and who had left the country with no intention of returning. This provision had often been used to deprive members of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace (and a few Slav Macedonians) of their Greek citizenship and to deny their entry back into the country. In distinguishing between Greek citizens on the basis of ethnic origin, the provision was attacked by human rights groups8 and had caused considerable embarrassment.

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Article 16 of the constitution considers the development of the national consciousness of pupils to be one of the principal aims of education.\(^9\) This wording creates confusion between national allegiance, i.e., loyalty to the Greek state, and ethnic identity and can be misinterpreted as requiring the educational system to aim at the creation of omogeneis, namely the elimination of ethnic diversity.\(^10\)

In general, Greece denies the existence of ethnic minorities in its territory and encourages the assimilation of persons of non-Greek ethnic background. The one notable exception is the recognition of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. But there, foreign policy considerations, specifically the obligations arising from the 1923 international treaty of Lausanne, rather than respect for the separate ethnic identity of the minority, appear to have caused the only significant question mark over the self-perception of the Greek state as the embodiment of the Greek nation.

Even in Thrace the Turkishness of the minority or parts of it is denied by the Greek political and juridical authorities, contrary to the claims of many minority leaders themselves. The Areios Pagos, the supreme civil and criminal court of Greece, which has been traditionally more conservative than the Council of State, upheld the dissolution of the Union of the Turkish Youth of Komotini in 1984 on the grounds that the use of the word "Turkish" created the impression that a youth association of foreign nationals operated on Greek soil. In another case, the Areios Pagos upheld the conviction of two minority candidates who had campaigned for the parliamentary elections of November 1989 on a ‘we are Turkish' platform, considering that, by using the word 'Turkish', the accused had intended to create dissension and hatred among the Muslim population of

\(^{9}\)See George Sotirellis, Religion and Education [in Greek] (Athens, Sideris, 1993). \(^{10}\)Stavros, "Citizenship and the Protection of Minorities," p. 120.
Thrace and make them enemies with the Christian population. Both decisions of the supreme court of Greece rest on the premise that one cannot be a Greek citizen and ethnic Turk at the same time.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1990, a 3\% (of the national vote) threshold was introduced into the electoral law by the incoming conservatives with the explicit goal of blocking the re-election of minority deputies to the Greek parliament on an independent platform. The provision was rightly attacked as unconstitutional since it denied local majorities of 50\% or more the right to send their representatives to parliament. The Council of State, however, upheld the provision in the name of avoiding political/party fragmentation, and failed to distinguish between the provision's effects on national versus minority parties. For the latter, such a threshold was and continues to be an effective ban of political participation. On the contrary, to avoid such a discrimination, the German electoral law that first created the 5\% threshold exempts the Danish minority of Schleswig-Holstein from it.

Similarly, in 1994, when, in place of their traditional appointment from the center, the direct election of local district governors was first introduced by the incoming socialists, the government decreed the merging of two districts with large Muslim populations with neighboring Christian (i.e. Greek) districts to avoid what, from Athens' point of view, seemed the embarrassing possibility of having an ethnic Turk as governor of a Greek district close to the Turkish border.

A citizenship and education policy whose principal aim is to protect and promote ethnic homogeneity, and a minority policy of denial, built exclusively around the sacred

\textsuperscript{a}Ibid, pp. 119-120.
concept of reciprocity with Turkey, might have been tolerated in the conditions of the Cold War and Yalta-divided Europe. After 1989, however, the situation changed dramatically. The international community and, more specifically, the Council of Europe has become more assertive in protecting minority rights in member-states. Consequently, the European Court of Human Rights has received a great number of applications of complaint from the Muslim-Turcophone minority, the Slavophones and others, referring to their treatment by the Greek state. For all its celebrated ethnic homogeneity, a direct result of emigration and assimilation as was analyzed above, Greece is far from a minority-free country and insisting otherwise invites suspicion and criticism. Insofar as language is concerned, there are Turcophones, Slavophones, Vlachs, Albanians, Pomaks, Gypsies and a small number of other minorities speaking a variety of languages.

If by minority we mean "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the state—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language," then, the presence of minorities existing in Greece today is easily discernible, mainly through their collective activities, their distinctive presence in some parts of the country, or even the presentation of their claims before public and other competent fora.

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14 This definition is given by the Capotorti Study, pursuant to the UN Sub-Commission of Minorities Resolution; F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic. Religious and Linguistic Minorities (New York: UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/ Revision 1, 1979).
Recently the European Community and the U.S. Department of State in its regular annual examination of the state of human rights worldwide, have confirmed this reality. The first State Department Report acknowledging the existence of Slav Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group in Greece came out in 1992 and caused an uproar. Greeks of every political persuasion saw the report as American mingling in Greek internal affairs and denounced what they saw as Washington's favoritism towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

What is not easily discernible are the exact numbers of members belonging to each minority group. This phenomenon is due to the fact that, unlike the 1951 census, more recent censuses have not addressed issues of national/ethnic origin, language and religion. Hence no official data have been presented concerning these categories by the usually most reliable source, the National Service of Statistics. It is known that the Greek population numbers today more than ten million Greek citizens, but we are left uninformed about their origin, language and religion.¹⁵

The simple way to find out the truth is, of course, to include questions on the religious, linguistic and ethnic preferences of Greek citizens in the next national census scheduled for the year 2001. This would presuppose the abandoning of any policy that discourages discussion on issues concerning ethnic, linguistic, or religious diversity in Greek society. Such a policy is the result of both historical security concerns, reconfirmed and accentuated by present-day tensions with Turkey, and, according to professor Rozakis, "the conservative social and professional orientations of the majority of Greeks

and their minimal exposure to alien cultures and different ways of life, due to the limited mobility and geographical isolation of the country."^16

The policy was first seriously challenged by the emergence of the Macedonian dispute in the early 1990s. For Greece, it was a priority to deny the presence of an ethnically alien, non-Greek minority in Greek Macedonia. As the then Prime Minister, Constantine Mitsotakis, explained, 'it is certain that such a minority has not existed in our country [Greece] since 1950."^17 Only insofar as the name "Macedonia" helped Skopje claim that such a minority existed, was the name itself an issue. In other words, Greece's insistence that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia not use the name "Macedonia" should be attributed to Athens' fears that an independent republic named "Macedonia", neighboring the Greek province of Macedonia, would invite speculation on the existence of ethnic (Slav) Macedonians in Greece.

Athens demanded that Skopje deny the existence of a (Slav) Macedonian minority in Greece. The demand seemed quite absurd, for it is not for state authorities to accept or deny the existence of a minority but for the people concerned. What if Skopje had acquiesced to the Greek demand, assured the world that there was no (Slav) Macedonian minority in Greece and the following day, 10,000 Greek citizens demonstrated their (Slav) Macedonianness in Thessaloniki, confirming what the State Department and others have claimed all along: that such a minority, albeit numerically very small, does actually exist? And what if, Skopje had abandoned the name "Macedonia" for, say, "Vardarstan," and then a number of Greek citizens demanded to be recognized as "Vardarians."?

^16 Ibid.
Greece is concerned with the well-being of ethnic Greeks abroad. Greece sent substantial aid to Greek communities in peril in Albania and the former Soviet Union, organized an evacuation mission for 2,000 Greeks torn Georgia during the civil war there in 1992-1993 and put together a massive housing and training program for the newly arrived Pontian Greeks of Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Private donors such as Yannis Latsis, the shipping tycoon, and the Church did similar work for Albanian Greeks.

The Greek state takes an active interest in Greeks who live abroad, nourishing their bonds with the homeland through educational and cultural programs and a specialized government agency, the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad, and the semi-official Foundation for Hellenic Culture. Through their offices abroad and the network of Greek embassies and consulates, the Greek state attempts to fulfill its role as the 'national center,' the caring 'mother' of diaspora Greeks, in direct replication of the way Israel perceives its role for world Jewry.18

PASOK, having grown strong first in the Greek communities of Western Europe and North America, took an active interest in projecting itself as the spokesman of the "forgotten" diaspora Greeks and the defender of their interests. In 1994 the new PASOK government established the Council of Greeks Abroad and the Parliament of the Diaspora Greeks, in an effort to coordinate the disparate agencies that work on diaspora-related issues and give Greeks abroad a forum for political participation in the motherland.

18 The concept of 'diaspora' is religious in origin and closely connected to the Jewish experience. The diaspora was God's punishment on his people. Jews were scattered around after the destruction of the second Temple of Jerusalem by the Romans and, similarly, the Greeks perceived themselves in diaspora after the fall of Constantinople. Thus, the future of the diaspora in religious terms is salvation and messianism and in political terms the resurrection of the lost national center and the re-unification of the fragmented body of the nation." Antonis Liakos, "Hellenism or Greek Nation," To Vima Weekly. Sunday March 2, 1997, p. B16.
Following an established tradition, PASOK's rhetoric, that has, as in so many other cases, spread across the political spectrum, claimed that above and beyond the Greek state there is Hellenism that transcends the Greek nation-state both in time and in space and encompasses the 15 million Greeks (Hellenes) who live around the world.

Equally important, the Greek armed forces extend their defensive shield and guarantee the physical security of Greeks in neighboring countries. The newly inaugurated Integrated Defense Area bestows the Greek army with the responsibility of safeguarding, in addition to Greek borders, the Greeks of Cyprus and those of Northern Epirus in Southern Albania.

An interesting distinction has also entered the political vocabulary between Helladites (Greeks from Greece) and Hellenes (from within and without Greece). According to professor Antonis Liakos "Greece as a modern state came into existence through a synthesis of the political and cultural dimensions of the nation...In recent years, however, there is a debate that tends to distinguish and juxtapose the two. It, thus, tends to downgrade the meaning of the Greek nation as the embodiment of a continuous political process, in Ernest Renan's term of the nation as a daily referendum, in favor of a concept of Hellenism composed of all those who share some common Greek cultural characteristics...Thus, Helladismos (Greece as a state) is belittled in favor of Hellenism [Greece as a cultural feet]...In this rhetoric there is an over-abundance of references to Hellenism and an absence of the Greek nation [as the Greek people], because the latter contains the concept of nation as a political process and a public space...The overemphasis on Hellenism has political consequences in downgrading the community of citizens who compromise and create the nation on a daily basis."
It would seem that, according to Liakos, Greece, far from turning from a nation-state to a state-nation based on common political processes and ideals, has regressed into an ethnocukural hard core. However, whereas such a regression in the early 1990s was temporary, reversible and powerfully counter-balanced by a liberal-civic counter-reaction in the Greek case, it spun out of control in Serbia with the collapse, first of ideological, and later of political Yugoslavism.

2. Before the Collapse - The Confederalization of Yugoslavia

The second, or Tito’s, Yugoslavia started as a federation of the Stalinist variety based on the principle of bratsvo i jedinstvo “brotherhood and unity” and ended up as a confederation of sovereign republics where political authority and participation was exclusively dependent on the nationalist principle and no effective mechanism existed for conflict resolution at the central level.

Tito and his victorious Partisans may have initially suppressed the competing nationalisms of the various ethnic groups comprising Yugoslavia in favor of the Yugoslavist ideal. But soon thereafter, he retreated to a policy of balancing them against each other as the way of re-stabilizing Yugoslavia around a new equilibrium.

In search of this new internal power equilibrium, Tito ‘federalized’ what used to be a Serb-led centralized and unitary state of the South Slavs. Rather than doing away with ethnicity, Tito actually sponsored the emergence of two new nationalisms that are at the

heart of the current Yugoslav crisis, the nationalism of Muslim Slavs and Macedonians. Their emergence curtailed Serbia's power in the federation and secured the loyalty of Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians to Yugoslavia and the political ideal of Yugoslavism to the very end, in a policy that proclaimed "a weak Serbia for a strong Yugoslavia."

Nation-building in Yugoslav Macedonia included a deliberate effort to de-Bulgarianize the local language, introducing the phonetic orthography characteristic of the Serbian and not of the Bulgarian language. Macedonia acquired an officially-sponsored national history which led to a permanent conflict with Bulgaria and Greece, as it 'appropriated' historical figures and entities which were traditionally part of the latter two peoples' histories, in its effort, in direct replication of other Balkan nationalisms, to acquire an invented state tradition with the accompanying historic rights and national glory. The conflict with Greece has centered around the Greekness or Macedonianness of Alexander the Great, and with Bulgaria around the ethnic nature of Samuel's medieval empire in the 10th century. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of Slavs, have been claimed by all three nation-states: Greece, Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Volumes of historical studies have been produced to prove one or the other's point.

From 1950 to 1962, Tito favored Yugoslavist unitarism as an ideological expression of his nationality policy. Nevertheless, his policy of amalgamating the South Slavic nationalities into a single Yugoslav supra-nation became one of the obstacles on the path to reform. Tito "changed this policy in 1962, sensing that unitarism undermined

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2The efforts of Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Macedonian President Gligorov to find a way out of the Serbo-Croat confrontation and preserve Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991 are well known. In December 1991 Izetbegovic pleaded in vain to German Foreign Minister Genscher not to proceed with the international recognition of Croatia.
national equality and helped the Serbian nationalist forces that were entrenched in the Serbian organization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). There followed a series of moves that restricted centralism and legitimized greater national liberties for the Croats, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Albanian minority in Kosovo. In fact, Tito's unstudied way of handling the national question led him in the 1960s and 1970s to espouse formal axiomatic constructions (rotating party and state presidency, exact proportionality in party and state organs by republic and province of origin, limited tenure in office) that transformed the Yugoslav national question from the prewar conflict of opposing national ideologies into the conflict over the structure and composition of the Yugoslav federation.\textsuperscript{22}

The demise in 1966 of Aleksandar Rankovic, Yugoslavia's vice-president, Tito's heir apparent, and a staunch Stalinist Serb centralizer, marked a definitive turning point in Yugoslav history and the beginning of a period of liberalism and real decentralization.\textsuperscript{23} The following years were marked by increasing nationalist assertiveness and ethnic disturbances in the perennially restless Kosovo In Croatia, a dynamic nationalist movement that challenged communist orthodoxy, the so-called 'Croatian Spring,' became threatening enough to communist authorities to invite a harsh crack down in 1971 that was followed by a similar suppression of Serb liberals in 1972. less violent but with lasting consequences.

According to Ivo Banac, "the removal of Perovic and Nikezic turned out to be the end of the high tide of Western influence [in Serbia]. They were unquestionably the most

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Westernized Serbian leadership since the beginning of the Serbian revolution in 1804. After 1972, Serbia started down the path of reaction against Tito's policy of bureaucratic decentralization, which was caricatured as anti-Serbian (weak Serbia=strong Yugoslavia)... In the process, the Serbian party leadership adopted a form of Serbian bureaucratic nationalism, turned against Yugoslavism in all but its Serbocentric variants, and became increasingly anti-Western and reactionary.  

"The roots of the Milosevic phenomenon are to be found in the purge of the early 1970s, when Marshal Josip Tito politically expelled all leading reform-minded communists in Serbia... By extinguishing all the creative forces within the League of Communists of Serbia, Tito had paved the way for someone like Milosevic to seize power. In a sense, Milosevic is a monument to Tito's policies."  

Repression was coupled with co-optation in search of yet a new equilibrium in order to stabilize Yugoslavia's domestic politics. In the long run this effort had the opposite result and instead of producing an efficient and legitimate polity, it created an unstable, inefficient and increasingly unpopular political system. With a long and proud experience in constitutional experimentation, as epitomized in the development of 'economic self-management', a new basic law was proclaimed in 1974—the world's longest, and definitely the most complex, cumbersome, and difficult to read—that shifted power from the federal authorities towards the six republics and the two, newly created, autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia. At the time, the constitutional re-arrangement was highly praised as bold and innovative constitutional engineering that effectively resolved the perennial conflict between centralizers and decentralizers.

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What was not noted at the time, but became increasingly apparent in the 1980s after Tito's death, was that the 1974 constitution effectively confederalized Yugoslavia by making the republics and the two autonomous provinces the center of all authority and the locus of legitimacy. In this new arrangement, the republics—which, apart from Bosnia, represented specific nations—and their political elites, were effectively made the intermediaries between the peoples and the top leadership, responsible for mediating disputes both with the federal center and among themselves.

From that time on until Yugoslavia's collapse, the eight locally based communist oligarchies resisted any form of reintegration. After 1974 this anti-Yugoslavism—witnessed in the dramatic increase of the number of people abandoning the 'Yugoslav' designation, preferring their ethnic affiliation in the national census—became a central tenet of their ideology. The first and primary victim of the nationalization of Yugoslav politics was the federal government. Only through an understanding of the republicanization and confederalization of Yugoslavia after 1974, based on a reinforced national principle, can the crisis and then the collapse of Yugoslavia be understood.

More important than the republics becoming responsible for most of domestic policy and much of international trade, was the fact that even the remaining authority of the center, such as national defense and monetary and fiscal policy (the federal budget), were no longer federal but inter-republican. This was the case because the central government and its institutions, such as the army or the central bank, were governed by collective bodies composed of republican representatives. These institutions could function only as long as the republican representatives in charge could reach an agreement. In the absence of consensus the federal authorities were paralyzed. No mechanism for
conflict resolution, the conciliation of differences and the arbitration of disputes, was provided by the 1974 constitution.

The Yugoslav center was doubly undermined. First, Yugoslavia was further federalized in the sense that more powers were transferred from the center to the republican periphery. Secondly, the Yugoslav center was 'collectivized' through a power-sharing co-sociational arrangement. The center lost its autonomy completely and became an amalgamation of republican representatives with quasi-veto authority over federal decision-making. It was this combination that rendered the center, in the absence of Tito's charisma, impotent.

Something similar occurred in Czechoslovakia which, after 1968, was federalized both territorially, in two parts (the Czech and the Slovak), and functionally, since the introduction of separate majorities in the federal bodies gave the Slovak representatives veto power. In the absence of communist totalitarianism, this double federalization led to the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. This was all the more remarkable if one considers that a majority of Czechs and Slovaks opposed their country's split, something which was certainly not the case in Yugoslavia in 1991. The Czechoslovak case illustrates best the power of constitutional structures and their ability to defy the will of the majority of the electorate and push developments towards a very specific direction in the presence of an uncompromising leadership.

Inability and impotence in conflict resolution and decision-making was accentuated as economic conditions deteriorated rapidly in the early 1980s. If the essence of democracy is managing conflict and reaching compromises peacefully, Yugoslavia was getting less and less democratic. But it was not becoming a centralized autocracy either,
since after Tito's death in 1980, decisions could no longer be imposed from the top. Rather, the situation was left to deteriorate on its own.

Like many other developing countries, Yugoslavia borrowed heavily in the 1970s to finance a growing trade deficit and a program of infrastructural investment of often dubious returns. Following the second oil crisis in 1979, the recession in the West and the rise of international interest rates, the Yugoslav federal authorities were confronted with a stagnant economy, a severe balance-of-payments crisis, rising inflation and unemployment. The economic crisis hit the least dynamic regions of the federation hardest and exacerbated tensions between the developed north and the underdeveloped south.

The crisis required painful decisions and swift action on the part of the federal authorities and put their policy-making authority to the test. However, because of the internal structure of power, the economic crisis quickly turned into a political and then a constitutional one. Federal institutions suffered from a paralysis imposed by the republics. In a time of crisis, the policy paralysis corroded the federation's legitimacy, reinforced the secessionist drive of Slovenia and the determination of Serbia to 'modernize,' that is re-centralize, the federation.26

Demands for democratization hit the Yugoslav federal authorities at the time of a 'governability' crisis. In The Federalist, No. 51, Madison warns that "in framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." At a time when Yugoslavia's federal government was increasingly unable to perform the first task, it was asked to do the second. For Samuel Huntington

"the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited." It was precisely the scarcity of legitimate authority that left Yugoslavia at the mercy of competing republican/nationalist elites and led to its violent death.

If 'Institutions are devices for achieving purposes, not just for achieving agreement" and if "we want government to do things, not just decide things" and if it is action, the ability of quick and effective action, that determines institutional success and failure, federal Yugoslavia by the end of the 1980s had reached a dead end where not only action but even agreement on a course of action had become impossible. The Yugoslav federation was asked to become responsive to popular demands and democratize at a time when it had lost the very basic ability to be effective. The federal government looked pathetically helpless while the republics launched media and economic warfare against each other, as a prelude to the actual hostilities that were to follow in a short while. Thus, for example, when in December 1989 Milosevic's Serbia imposed a boycott on Slovenian goods, the federal authorities did not intervene.

For a year between mid-1989 and mid-1990, the Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic successfully implemented a stabilization program that brought inflation down and gave hope for an economic recovery Markovic and his advisers thought their temporary success was enough to solve Yugoslavia's political problems. They

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underestimated the powers of republican leaders who were determined not to see Markovic and the federal government succeed.

By the summer of 1991 the federal government had not only ceased to function but had become largely irrelevant to political developments. The election of the Croat Stipe Mesic to the presidency of the collective presidency of Yugoslavia, an election that was previously blocked by Serbia and its allies in May 1991, was heralded as a great step forward in the resolution of the crisis and was thought to be an important part of the E.C.-brokered cease-fire agreement²⁹ of June 28, 1991. But the election had no effect on Yugoslav developments since the collective presidency had grown irrelevant during the preceding few weeks. When Markovic resigned some months later, in December 1991, few people even noticed. Throughout the previous months, Markovic, who was by far the most popular Yugoslav politician thanks to the success of his economic stabilization package in 1990, "cut a pathetic figure" and "was a figure of ridicule."³⁰ His high popularity ratings were no match for the power of republican leaders who were the real masters of the day.

No matter how much republican leaders disagreed on most issues, they were united in ensuring that federal authorities would not acquire any direct popular legitimacy that might threaten their own monopoly of representing the 'national interest.' "Slovenia (and increasingly Croatia) remained unalterably opposed to reforms that would make it possible to create a democratic system at the federal level and give to Markovic or another

²⁹The agreement that the EC. troika secured to end hostilities in Slovenia included two more points: the Slovenes and Croats would put their independence on hold for three months and the JNA would return to the barracks. See Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 160.
reform-oriented government the legitimacy of elections...Markovic and his supporters remained hopeful that federal elections scheduled for December 1990 would be held. In fact, there never was an all-Yugoslav vote.31

The fact that democratization proceeded on the republican level, with the first multi-party elections in all six republics in 1990, but was blocked on the federal level, reinforced the centrifugal forces within Yugoslavia by strengthening the power of republican elites that were now invested with popular legitimacy, and by making the federal center even more dependent on the republican periphery.

A striking, and often cited, contrast to what happened in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s is the Spanish transition to democracy in the late 1970s. As far as ethno-nationalist diversity and the authoritarian legacy are concerned, Spain had many similarities with Yugoslavia on the eve of the transition. In fact, the two most prosperous and industrious ethnic groups in Spain, the Basques and the Catalans, were oppressed by Franco and felt unjustly over-taxed to subsidize poor Andalusia, the same way that the Slovenes and the Croats resented the high taxes they paid to finance 'white elephants' in the southern republics of Yugoslavia. But whereas in Spain, on the insistence of its leaders and prudent managers of the transition, elections were held on the national level first and only later in the various regions, Yugoslavia did exactly the opposite, with the end result that federal elections never actually took place. After republican elections were held, Yugoslavia rapidly dissolved and there was no more federation to speak of.

"Elections, especially founding elections, help create agendas, actors, organizations, and, most importantly, legitimacy and power. In a country facing a

31 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, pp. 131-132.
stateness problem it makes a critical difference whether the first elections are statewide or regional. In Spain, a series of statewide elections preceded regional elections by several years. Just as importantly, the statewide parties campaigned very hard in areas where the potential for secession was greatest and the history of anti-system sentiment was most deeply rooted—the Catalan and Basque regions...Representative elites recruited through this statewide election then engaged in prolonged public and private negotiations over the constitution and over how to proceed on the stateness issue. Strengthened and legitimated by four statewide elections, the statewide government and parliament entered into negotiations with Basque and Catalan representatives over the devolution of power to new Basque and Catalan regional governments.

[...] We believe that if the first elections in Spain had been regional, rather than statewide, the incentives for the creation of statewide parties and a statewide agenda would have been greatly reduced. Consequently, the statewide parties and their affiliates would have received fewer votes; even when stateness issues are not salient, regional parties in Spain tend to poll 15-25 percent better in regional elections than they do in statewide elections. We also believe that if the first elections had been on the regional level, ethnic issues would have assumed a much more substantial and divisive role in the electoral campaign than they actually did and that the nationalist parties and their affiliates would have been more extreme.

This is precisely what happened in Yugoslavia. The first free elections took place at the republican level with the participation of mainly republican-national parties with a

republican-national rather than federal-Yugoslav agenda. The old Yugoslav League of Communists dissolved into its constituent parts and in Serbia the local League of Communist of Serbia was reborn as the Socialist Party of Serbia.

The only two parties to enter elections in Serbia as federal, Yugoslav parties with no republican or ethnic commitment was Ante Markovic's Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (ARFY) and the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (AYDI). Because of Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic's popularity in Yugoslavia and in Serbia, the pragmatic reformism of ARFY struck fear into the hearts of the nationalist leaders. ARFY was, however, politically neutralized by being portrayed as the party of the nationalities—Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Muslim South Slavs—who would inevitably flock to it as coalition partners in the event of electoral victory. In the December elections of 1990, ARFY pulled a miserable 1.48% and won 6 seats in the 250-member Skupstina. Had elections been held at the federal level first, ARFY would have fared much better while the other parties, like the victorious Socialists (46.08% of the vote), would have been forced to broaden their appeal and compromise their ultra-nationalist message.

Europeans insisted on referenda as a precondition to recognizing the break-away republics. But referenda at the republican level reinforced the secessionist drive and polarized the political debate to the benefit of uncompromising nationalists. Europeans failed to realize that genuine democracy is more than referenda, particularly when it comes to ethnically divided societies. In such societies referenda usually turn into a national census. This was what happened in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia where the abstention

rate in the republican referenda for independence was almost identical to the Serb (in the former two) and Albanian (in the latter republic) rate of the population. In such referenda the winner takes all and the loser, the ethnic minority, is left politically marginalized and anti-system. Instead of seeking compromises and inclusive alternatives to the ethno-nationalist principle, referenda legitimized the majorities’ domination of minorities with no regard for the latter's rights, through a populist understanding of democracy in which it is equated with majority rule.

In a democracy the political majority rules but the minority needs to be assured that it can also become a majority and come to power sometime in the future. Only when such electoral turn-overs are possible, is the democratic game fair and sensible. Otherwise, the majority, assured of its perennial rule, becomes authoritarian, and the frustrated minority moves outside the system in pursuit of extra-constitutional ways to achieve its goals. In an ethnically divided society, the ethnic minority is condemned to remain a political minority in perpetuity. No ethnic minority is willing to accept such status if it can avoid it. In 1991, Yugoslavia's republican leaders deliberately downplayed the danger involved in marginalizing minorities, contributing to an explosion of violence on a scale not seen in Europe since 1945.

After 1974, there was no institutional basis for Yugoslavism in Yugoslavia. The country was only kept together thanks to informal mechanisms. When these mechanisms disappeared or were challenged by ambitious republican leaders, the center's decision-making authority disappeared as well. The most important of these mechanisms were Tito himself and his charisma. During his reign, Tito was the final arbiter in inter-Yugoslav disputes. His death in 1980 deprived Yugoslavia of a very important, albeit undemocratic, mechanism of conflict resolution of last resort. What followed Tito was a series of weak
and gray politicians until the arrival of Slobodan Milosevic who, in his efforts to become the first strong man after Tito, polarized the Yugoslavs.

A number of informal arrangements tried to fill the vacuum created by Tito's departure. One such arrangement was the automatic rotation of the position of the president of the collective presidency, the supreme decision-making body of the federation. The rotation of republican and provincial leaders worked well until May 1991, when it was challenged by the Serbs and their allies. A vote was called and Stipe Mesic's accession was blocked, effectively depriving the country of a head of state and a commander of the armed forces.

Even the mere withdrawal of one republican representative could block the workings of the presidency. This actually happened when Borisav Jovic, Serbia's representative and President of Yugoslavia in March 1991, resigned from the presidency. The Yugoslav constitution simply had no provision for dealing with either eventuality, i.e., the non-election or the resignation of the president of the collective presidency, and the country was left without a head of state.

In sum, with the 1974 constitution, the federal institutions had lost their autonomy, and after 1980, they had increasingly been penetrated by republican elites and interests. At the end, they proved unable to rise above competing regional leaders in support of an all Yugoslav national interest. Such an interest existed only as the lowest common denominator of the largely conflicting policy preferences of the republics. By the late 1980s, the federal bodies had been reduced to a mere battleground where polemical republican leaders played out their differences.
Many still believed that ultimately two institutions, the Yugoslav League of Communists and the federal army, would keep Yugoslavia together. But both institutions had been 'republicanized' as well and had simply become additional tools in the hands of the republics against the federal center and against each other. First, the Yugoslav League of Communists had developed into autonomous republican and provincial organizations with their own central committees, leaders and policy agenda. Thus, the Slovenian League of Communists put forward proposals for the radical 'pluralization' of Yugoslavia that ignited the resistance of the other Leagues. There was still a federal party, the Yugoslav League, but delegations to its congresses were sent by the republics where effective authority resided and delegates were not directly elected by the people. When Slovenia's Communists walked out of the 14th Party Congress in January 1990, the Yugoslav League collapsed. The works of the unfinished congress were postponed indefinitely and were never resumed.

Secondly, there was the comparable 'republicanization' of the Yugoslav defense forces as well, composed of the federal army (YPA) and the territorial defense forces (TDF). The latter were a uniquely Yugoslav institution that grew out of the Partisan tradition of the Second World War and aimed at ensuring an organized popular resistance.

34"At the federal level a standing army, air force, and navy (the Yugoslav People's Army, YPA) were deployed with technologically advanced weaponry capable of mounting direct resistance against a conventional invasion...An all-people's civilian militia (the territorial defense forces, TDF) designed to present a systematically organized, prolonged, guerrilla resistance to any invader, was under the control of republics and localities...No high school or university graduate could receive a diploma without passing the obligatory four-year course in premilitary training...Although operational control of the armed forces belonged to the general staff of the YPA and the Ministry of Defense in Belgrade, the emphasis in defense doctrine and policy priority between the YPA and the TDF shifted periodically depending on assessments of external developments and the most likely security threat. The system of military command and control was substantially decentralized...Moreover, the internal security and intelligence apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior included a separated armed militia." Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 26-27.
against any foreign invader. The ease with which Yugoslavs could get hold of the TDF's readily available firearms undoubtedly contributed to the rapid escalation of violence. The TDFs were under republican control and, in time, they provided the basis for the emerging Slovenian and Croatian armies.

Even the federal army was 'republicanized.' This was not so much because the higher officers of the army were promoted according to the quota assigned to each Yugoslav nation, to the frustration of Serbs' career prospects who compromised the majority of the middle and lower-rank officers, but because its supreme commander was the collective presidency rather than the federal government. Thus, the army could act only with the consent of the republican leaders. But these leaders would never have allowed the army to intervene against them and their plans for Yugoslavia.

In the absence of an agreement among the republics, the army was immobilized. Time and again, the military leadership and the federal Minister of Defense, General Veliko Kadijevic, a Croat, asked for the army to intervene and fulfill its constitutional role as guardian of Yugoslavia's integrity. It was not allowed to do so since the presidency could not reach a decision. In the first half of 1991, the army pressed hard to be allowed to disarm the Slovenian and Croatian militias Permission to do so was never granted.

The army did intervene on one occasion when the interests of the republican leaders converged enough to give it the green light. This was the case of the army's intervention against the pro-democracy movement in Serbia in March 1991. Both Milosevic and Tudjman saw the suppression of the democratic movement in Serbia to be to their advantage.
Finally, faced with Slovenia's open rebellion in late June 1991, the army did move, but only through an unconstitutional authorization given by the federal cabinet and the federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat, rather than through a decision of the collective presidency. It was a half-hearted attempt that was to backfire miserably, speeding up the country's disintegration.

In the previous pages we examined the constitutional-structural transformation and the confederalization of Yugoslavia. Of equal importance was the collapse of Yugoslavism as a political ideal and culture. Structural and cultural change went hand in hand and the two processes reinforced each other. The more ethno-nationalized republican politics got the greater the drive was for the further erosion of the powers of the federal government. And the more incompetent the federal center was rendered the less legitimate Yugoslavism appeared.

Between 1989 and 1991 republican politics were sharply ethnicized. Appeals to ethnicity became politically popular and legitimate. "Brotherhood and Unity," the basis of Titoist Yugoslav political culture, was abandoned. This was dramatically reflected in the amendments inserted into republican constitutions by the democratically elected leaderships.

According to such amendments Croatia became "the national state of the Croatian nation." Croatia's Serbs saw their status declining as they were relegated to the position of an ethnic minority among many others. The amendments also provided for the adoption of traditional Croatian ethnic symbols (a new coat of arms, flag, and national anthem) as the official insignia of the republic. The Latin script used by ethnic Croats was explicitly
identified as the republic's official alphabet. Not only was there no effort to pacify some of the anxieties of the Serb minority that had viewed the election of Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) with great suspicion, but a policy was followed that exacerbated memories of a time when their ethnic community was in an inferior or persecuted position and renewed fears that Serbs would be left to the mercy of the Croatian majority and the HDZ's nationalists. Similarly, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia turned into the national state of Macedonians with Macedonian the official language of the state, in disregard for the Albanian community's sensitivities.

Such outright proclamations may have been avoided in the case of Serbia's constitution but the abolition of the regional autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989, a central piece of Milosevic's agenda, signaled the political marginalization of ethnic minorities in Serbia, a profoundly multi-ethnic society, the population of which is only 66% ethnically Serb. Non-Serbs today are alienated by the climate of intolerance that has accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia and the aggressive nationalism of Serbian politics and society. To this date, Kosovo's Albanians, some 20% of the total Serbian electorate, refuses to participate in elections. Milosevic's domination of Serbian politics has been possible, to a large extent, thanks to their abstention. The Serb 7% of the Kosovo

electorate fills all the seats allocated to the province. This provides Milosevic and his supporters with a bonus of 40-50 seats in the 250-member Serbian parliament (Skupstina).
Chapter Five: Pluralization, Crisis, Nationalism and Conflict

/. The Argument and the Model

If the Balkan politics of the last two centuries could be reduced, broadly speaking, to the interplay of the intervention of external powers with local nationalisms, the end of the Cold War produced the strategic disengagement of outside powers, thus increasing the maneuvering room of local actors. 'The really new thing is that at the end of the 1980s the peoples of the Balkans had found themselves—probably for the first time in their history—on their own, with no external powers trying to impose their will either on the region as a whole, or on any parts of it. The upheavals that have been taking place there are not being caused by external forces, as always happened in the past, but are occurring as a result of pressure from within, exerted by indigenous forces.' The most important indigenous force has been the combination of socio-political pluralization and nationalism.

Historical explanations of the recent war in Yugoslavia that are based on Great Power ambitions, ancient hatreds and a clash of civilizations are inadequate and usually misleading. Although outsiders did play a role in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and

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though memories of past atrocities are alive and were skillfully manipulated by demagogues who also tried to paint the conflict in civilizational terms, it is much wiser to seek an explanation of the recent conflicts in the interaction of the legacy of the political culture of ethnic nationalism with the demands of the transition away from communism or corporatist capitalism towards a pluralist polity and a free-market economy.

In conditions of rapid change and rising uncertainty, political leaders and ruling elites have sought to bolster their legitimacy by appealing to nationalism throughout the region. Two of the most visible examples of such a development have been Serbia since the mid-1980s and Greece in the early 1990s. In both Serbia and Greece there is a long tradition of ethno-nationalist and populist politics. Both countries experienced significant change in the late 1980s and a resurgence of minority activism that fueled the majority group's mobilization.

Elites may resort to conflictual strategies with the outside world as long as they are convinced that this is an effective way to hold or acquire power and that the domestic benefits of the conflictual strategy outweigh the external costs. They follow a short-term policy of attaching higher value to present and immediate gains against future and possible costs. In effect, they discount external and future costs in favor of domestic and present gains.

Through a rational cost-benefit analysis, ruling elites might choose strategies, conditioned by historical legacies and contemporary power balances, that enable them to stay in power. They include stimulating, using or opposing nationalist mobilization. Governments respond to both domestic and outside pressures. Sometimes, they use the
former to neutralize the latter and vice versa (two-level games). Sometimes, nationalist mobilization acquires a momentum of its own and external costs increase to a point where a government's balancing act can no longer be sustained. New strategies are devised or successful challengers replace old elites. Nationalism is not always a sure winner. Because of nationalism's explosive emotional charge and polarizing potential, its rational fine-tuning is difficult and often impossible, at least in the short run. Politicians who decide to ride the nationalist wave choose a high-risk course of action that can bring them power or disgrace.

A useful way of thinking about foreign policy is to study not only capabilities but preferences as well. "Realists minimize the importance of domestic politics because for them national behavior is driven by forces external to the life of the society. But to the non-realists, domestic politics is very important. The anti-realist approach argues that the international system always leaves some discretion to countries: fight or give up, adapt or resist, develop their countries or stay poor, build an army to stay independent or become subservient, let in foreign capital and goods or keep them out, balance or bandwagon, appease or fight or ally or wait." As long as the very survival of the unit is not in question, countries have discretion over their behavior (some more than others). It is at this point that a way of understanding of how this discretion is exercised is needed. That requires an analysis of the internal norms and processes, conditioned by political culture and choice, that shape behavior.

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In Serbia and Greece nationalism created a political context where the state interest was defined not in terms of the territorial security of the state as classical realism argues, nor of its economic well-being as liberalism might claim, but of the survival, physical and cultural, of the Serbian and Greek nation defined in ethno-cultural terms as a community of people of common descent and cultural traditions.

Governments choose different foreign policies within the constraints imposed by their exhaustible resources (capabilities) and value systems (preferences). A primary preference is staying in power (which often has nothing to do with the realist concept of 'national interest'). A conflictual policy must serve this purpose. According to this analysis, its primary target is the electorate at home rather than the enemy abroad.

Towards outsiders, nationalist mobilization is a means because it bestows governments with negotiating advantages (or disadvantages) and increases (or decreases) national capabilities. Towards domestic rivals it is an end because it empties the political debate of troublesome issues and de-legitimizes one's opponents. Yet, it is not always easy for governments or their rivals to remain on top of the nationalist wave. As policy moves from rhetoric to action, the costs increase. When these costs are internalized to a considerable degree, a potential anti-nationalist backlash might occur.

In both Serbia and Greece threatened elites either in power or in opposition, endangered by economic and political change, resorted to nationalism to deflect demands for radical change and shift the focus of the political debate to non-threatening issues defined in ethno-cultural terms. Through the use of nationalism, these elites attempted to
acquire popular legitimacy and to de-legitimize their opponents by branding them as traitors to the nation.\textsuperscript{6}

Since political mobilization occurs most readily around grievances and because aggression in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century needs to be justified in defensive terms, political leaders and elites in search of power in these countries sought to construct an image of threat to the nation. If such a threat is "external" so much the better because external threats maximize the domestic benefits while minimizing the costs imposed on their own supporters, and thus the danger to their own power bases.\textsuperscript{7} Consequently, the need for an external threat gave rise to a conflictual, uncompromising, maximalist and revisionist foreign policy. In the case of Serbia such a policy ended in war while in the case of Greece, aggressive policies short of the use of force, such as the imposition of a trade embargo, were pursued.

In the international arena, actors do not simply choose policies or behaviors and then realize expected outcomes in a mechanical way. Instead, the outcomes realized depend on how actors' choices interact with the international environment.\textsuperscript{8} Thus, actors are engaged in processes of international strategic interaction, they think strategically, considering how their choices will interact with those of others.


However, domestic-oriented leaderships think less strategically or, rather, the focus of their strategic thinking is the domestic rather than the international environment. By overpricing domestic benefits and discounting external costs, these leaderships are prone to ignoring the effects that their policy has abroad as long as its domestic benefits appear to exceed external costs. Leaders and supporting elites have a strong interest in keeping the 'costs' out and the 'benefits' in, having the former externalized as much and for as long as possible.

Nevertheless, their strategy remains path-dependent and prone to change. In fact, in both the Serbian and the Greek cases, leaders' strategies changed quite a lot and evolved significantly over time. But it was a change driven not so much by the actions of outsiders and the direct interaction with the international environment but, rather, by the effects of the gradual 'domestication' of the costs their initial strategy had incurred. Thus, change came about slowly and was conditioned by the intensity of and the specific ways in which such a 'domestication' occurred.

In sum, the governments of Serbia and Greece followed confrontational foreign policies that were perceived by neighbors and outsiders as aggressive and in defiance of established international norms. Serbia strove for a policy of "Greater Serbia" and territorial expansion. Greece tried to block the international recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Both countries invested considerable resources and bore the heavy burden of international isolation (each to a varying degree) for a policy that by 1995 had been largely abandoned.

Serbia recognized Croatia and Bosnia, abandoned Krajina Serbs when the Croat army successfully dismantled the defiant Serb Republic of Krajina in August of 1995, and pressured the Bosnian Serbs to compromise and accept the Dayton deal in the fall of 1995.
Greece lifted its veto on the accession of Macedonia to international organizations and it established economic and diplomatic relations with the new republic without the latter g its name.

Judged by the goals initially set, the foreign policy the two states pursued failed. Croatia achieved more (territorial integrity plus a strategic role in Bosnia) with less investment of resources than Serbia. Bulgaria, for all its historical attachment to Macedonia, largely avoided the Macedonian question altogether to the benefit of its international reputation, contrary to Greece. But the leaders and the elites who endorsed the 'failed' policies in both Serbia and Greece are still in power. For them, the chosen policies may be considered a success.

The proposed model aims at explaining external conflict in general, and the paradox of "failed policyT(successful leaders" in particular, by looking at internal dynamics. A theoretical framework is proposed according to which the dependent variable of "external conflict" is explained by the independent variables of "domestic elites' competition for power" and "nationalism" and their interaction in an environment of rapid change and rising uncertainty.

However, Bulgaria has not recognized the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation and has refused to sign bilateral agreements with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in "Macedonian."
2. Definitions

Elites are not restricted to the government. They extend to the political opposition (challenger elites), the mass media and the press, business interests, trade unions, etc. The leading participants in the political debate and their autonomy depend on the nature of the political system. They all form poles of the domestic political dynamic but it is ultimately the government which decides and implements foreign policy and which is directly pressurized from abroad.

Nationalism is defined in a wide range of ways.\(^{10}\) For the purposes of this study, it is the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or constructed; the logic of this position tends to move nationalism from cultural to political forms, and to entail popular mobilization.\(^{11}\) Here nationalism is defined as a political culture that pervades or seeks to pervade state institutions. In the latter case, nationalism turns into a political movement that is inspired by an ideology that has two characteristics: (1) individual members give their primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national community,\(^{12}\) and (2) these ethnic or national communities desire and protect their own independent state. Nationalist politics

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\(^{12}\)Anthony Smith defines "ethnic community" as a community that has a common name, a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, a common culture, a link with a historic territory or homeland(which it may or may not currently occupy), and a measure of common solidarity. See Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) pp. 22-30.
are defined by notions of ethnic primacy. Nationalist mobilization seeks to codify and
defend such a primacy in state institutions and repel any threats that might compromise it.

Such a definition avoids E. J. Hobsbawm's and Ernest Gellner's definition of
nationalism as "primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be
congruent."\textsuperscript{13} This idea is problematic, because in describing nationalism as an idea holding that
states and nationalities should be coterminous, it omits the many nationalisms that would claim
their own state while also denying the statehood aspirations of other nationalities. Such an
asymmetry is the case in former Yugoslavia where Serbs demanded the self-determination of
Serb-populated Krajina and Bosnia while at the same time denying this right to the Albanian
majority of Kosovo. In fact, the very essence of every Balkan nationalism is the self-
glorification of oneself and the demonization of the other. For example, Greeks claim that they
"have always maintained a superior civilization in the Balkans."\textsuperscript{14} This is why the notion of
"primacy" is more helpful.

The proposed definition should be considered only as a starting point. Nationalism is
contextual and acquires many forms. As it was described before, nationalism in Southeastern
Europe developed differently than in Western Europe. It is susceptible to change and, indeed, it
has evolved quite dramatically over time. So, for example, while Greek nationalism has
preserved some core characteristics over time, it referred to different things in the 1810s,
1840s, 1920s, 1940s, 1950s, 1970s and today. While it started out with a universalist platform
against Ottoman oppression,\textsuperscript{15} it later narrowed its

\textsuperscript{13} See Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge
\textsuperscript{14} Anastasia Karakasidou, "Politicising Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek
\textsuperscript{15} See, for example, the constitutions of Rhigas Feraios, the Greek revolutionary thinker and
activist of the late 18th century.
base to ethnic Greeks to become virulent irredentist. It was then that it abandoned its Enlightenment emphasis on Classical Hellas and its universalism and turned to a Romantically-inspired concept of historical continuity, rehabilitating Byzantium and Orthodox Christianity as the defining part of Greek identity. After 1922, Greek nationalism turned inwards into national reconstruction. Still later, it allied itself with anti-communism first and with anti-British and anti-American sentiment later. In Cyprus it turned anti-colonial and in Macedonia it regressed back into ethnicity. This flexibility of nationalism has allowed politicians across the spectrum, from the far right to the far left, to use easily nationalism for their purposes.

The independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1991 was a great opportunity to defeat the narrow-minded, defensive, rigidly ethnic side of Greek nationalism. Such an effort was apparent in Bulgaria's handling of the problem. On the contrary, Greece came up with a 19th century reaction in a late 20th century world, helped by Macedonian extremists in Skopje.16

is not a study of the Macedonian dispute in all its various aspects nor is it an attempt to justify one side and condemn another as so many scholarly papers have in the past few years. On the contrary, it is an analysis of the political use of nationalism at the end of the 20th century, focussed on Greece's reaction to FYROM's independence. Although the focus is on Greece, this reaction did not take place in isolation but in relation to developments in neighboring FYROM and also in Macedonian diasporic communities in North America and Australia. In The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) anthropologist Loring Danforth examines what he terms the "global cultural war" between Greek and Macedonian immigrants and the spill-over of their antagonism to their respective homelands. It was the immigrants' nationalist and exclusionary agenda that communists within Yugoslavia had suppressed, that the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity adopted upon its foundation in 1990. IMRO-DPMNU is the only Macedonian party with branches not only within the territory of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but abroad as well, notably in the United States, Canada, Germany, and Australia. IMRO-DPMNU seeks to unite Macedonians in a greater Macedonian state. Its constitution reads that it "seeks the spiritual, economic, and ethnic union of the divided Macedonian people and the creation of a Macedonian state in a future united Balkans and united Europe." It advocates the
Nationalist mobilization describes the mobilization of the majority of the politically relevant population against a threat—real or perceived—to the security or identity of the nation defined in ethnic terms. Thus, the Serbs mobilized in defense of the security of their co-nationals in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo and of their identity that is inexorably linked to Kosovo. The Greeks' nationalist mobilization was primarily in defense of their identity and the need to reconfirm the Greekness of historical Macedonia.

A conflictual foreign policy is a matter of perspective. What is a defensive policy in one capital might be perceived as offensive from another. Given this difficulty, a conflictual foreign policy is simply defined here as any foreign policy that raises the strong opposition of foreign powers.

The term power as used in the model does not refer to national power but to the government's tenure in office. A basic assumption is that the domestic arena is of central concern for state decision-makers and ruling elites because, most of the time, it is the locus of their power. Ruling elites and ambitious challengers engage in a struggle to define national interests in a way coincidental with their own power interests. In other words, they strive to express their interests in the 'language' of the collective interest, and in the process fine-tune the collective national interest in ways that suit them best.

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National interest is not given but continuously negotiated. In fact, what constitutes the national interest forms the very basis of the domestic political debate. If "politics is the authoritative allocation of values,"\textsuperscript{18} political contenders and the constituencies they represent attach different value to different policies and outcomes and thus, identify different national interests. As has already been mentioned, for a nationalist the 'national interest' is equated with the defense of the security and identity of the ethnic community.

3. A Three-Level Explanation

The case of the Serbs' nationalist mobilization is fairly well documented, although not sufficiently explained. It is widely accepted that a ruthless leader, Slobodan Milosevic, turned to aggressive nationalism to stay in power and avoid structural reforms. He used the existing tradition of Serbian ethno-nationalism to redefine Serbian national interest in conflictual terms with the help of the tightly controlled media. In the process, he won every election and turned his Socialist Party of Serbia into a formidable electoral machine that has dominated Serbian politics to the present day.

Based on a three-level analysis, the argument can be further elaborated. Domestically, Yugoslavia was confronted with a severe economic crisis. Regionally, the fall of communism in the area put pressure on Yugoslavia to democratize and marketize. Internationally, with the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost its privileged position as a buffer between East and West, deserving the tatter's political and financial support. The new emphasis on liberal economics and monetary orthodoxy coupled with its diminished strategic importance, left Yugoslavia no room but to adopt IMF-sponsored austerity

programs. In this three-level interaction, domestic political elites in fear of losing power and status used the nationalist card, within a certain political system and culture that made this effective, to mobilize popular support, suppress opposition, divert the electorate's attention and avoid, at most, or at least, manage change.19

It is a common mistake, however, to consider nationalist mobilization as the sole product of elites' rational calculations and manipulation. Ethnic affiliations fulfill important social needs; they provide blood solidarity and personal help in an increasingly impersonal environment. Ethnicity provides trust, reciprocity, fair dealing and predictability.20 "If impersonal criteria of fair treatment and impartiality are novel, suspect or imperfectly understood, then protection deriving from the very partiality of ethnicity can provide a cushion against arbitrariness.121 Thus, in a world of increasing uncertainty, profound change, mounting crisis for the impersonal state institutions and rising social disillusionment, people fall back on ethnically-based community networks for protection and meaning.

What emerges is a comprehensive, three-level explanation of nationalist mobilization in which domestic elites inflame existing nationalist sensitivities to remain in power or to acquire power in the face of increasing demands for socio-economic change. Those who are to lose the most from change, usually the least dynamic, most state-

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19 A model three-level analysis to explain the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been used by Slobo Avineri. He explains Oslo as the result of the interplay of the Intifada (local), the Gulf War (regional) and the end of the Cold War (international level); class lecture at Corfu Summer Seminar on Conflict Resolution, Institute of International Relations of Greece, September 4, 1996.
21 Ibid, p. 81.
dependent segments of society, i.e. pensioners, farmers and the unskilled labor, lend their support to the politics of nationalism and economic protectionism.

Three-Level Analysis

- International System
- Regional
- Domestic Developments

Greece is a more subtle and intriguing case. Contrary to Serbia, Greece is a consolidated state with no internal 'enemy.' It possesses a fairly prosperous economy which is well integrated in the global distribution of labor. It has a strong middle class, a stable democracy, a vibrant press, a blossoming private electronic media and a maturing civil society. In many respects, it has been a historical success, a Balkan exception in a region of poor, authoritarian, ethnically divided states. Nevertheless, not only did Greece not escape the general pattern, but became deeply entangled in the Balkan nationalist conflicts. All these qualities proved no barrier to the formidable nationalist mobilization that swept the country from December 1991 until March 1995 centered around (but not restricted to) the question of the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although such a mobilization did not produce the violence of the Serbian case, it did take an aggressive form with the imposition of. first, an unofficial (in August 1992) and, later, an official trade embargo (in February 1994) on the new state.

Although there has been an abundance of essentialist reports on the irrationality, backwardness and otherness of Greece in the Western press, there has not been much for example. The New York Times, Financial Times and The Economist in April-June 1992 and February 1994. Marlise Simons in an article entitled 'For the Name of Macedonia, A Burst of Greek Pride,' for The New York Times of April 17, 1992, wrote
serious analysis on the causes of the Greeks' nationalist mobilization in the early 1990s. Few writers have put forward a satisfactory explanation for the enormous emotions and political pressures that the "Macedonian Question" gave rise to in the country.

A preliminary explanation could again be based on a three-level analysis where domestic elites (challenging and not ruling as in the Serbian case), including state-dependent business interests and trade unions, allied to defeat the government's economic liberalization program—forced by globalization and Europe's accelerated integration—and led to a definition of the national interest in terms of uncompromising 'historical rights.' Tellingly enough, in a powerful combined appeal to ethno-nationalism and economic protectionism, the deputies who defected from and brought the Mitsotakis' government down in September of 1993, cited as their reasons Greece's impeding recognition of Macedonia and the privatization of the state telecommunications corporation.

that "Greece seems hypnotized once again by its past, not in study of its glorious achievements, but in an extraordinary burst of nationalism set off by the disintegration of Yugoslavia to the north." On May 9*, 1992, The Economist, under the banner "The Sick Man of Europe," blasted: "The European Community's frustration with Greece has been festering for a long time. Now the rot in the relationship has become too deep to ignore. No article in the Treaty of Rome allows the European Community to expel a member. With Greece's relations with its partners at an all-time low, there are some who lament that absence," pp 55-56. An editorial in The Boston Globe on April 22, 1994, p. 14, declared that "There is no little irony in the fact that while the Clinton administration dithers on what America's commitment to Bosnia should be, Macedonia—the one Balkan country where US troops are committed and on the ground—is being seriously destabilized by neighboring Greece...Papandreou's blockade has been a major embarrassment for the rest of the European Union, which recognizes Macedonia, and the EU is taking Greece to the European Court of Justice. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of Germany said the Greek position is 'opposed to the usual behavior among civilized European nations. We don't need another crisis point in Macedonia." See also, "The Two Macedonias," The New York Times. April 5, 1992, p. 16, "Blockade by Greece puts EU on spot," The Financial Times. February 18, 1994, p. 3, "EU turns screw on Greece over Macedonia," FT, February 19, 1994, p. 2, "Hawks and Handsaws: Beware of Greeks Baring Teeth," FT, February 26, 1994, p. 26.
Chapter Six: Serbia (1986-1995)

"No one should dare to beat you." "You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses...Otherwise your ancestors would be denied and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it with the rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia."

Slobodan Milosevic, April 24, 1987, addressing a crowd of Serbs in Kosovo Polje, Kosovo.

"Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through two world wars, they have liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves...The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated...Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet..."

Slobodan Milosevic, June 28, 1989, at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in Gazimestan, Kosovo.

"Anybody who doubts the deeply nationalist aspect of this war has clearly never been anywhere near the battlegrounds."


"Slobodan, they call you freedom,
you are loved by big and small. So
long as Slobo walks the land,
the people will not be in thrall."


The story of the Serbian nationalist mobilization in the 1980s that decisively contributed to Yugoslavia's collapse in the 1990s, is the story of the rise to power of one man: Slobodan Milosevic. The background that made this rise possible has already been outlined. It includes traditional Serbian ethno-nationalism and its historical grievances,

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2 Ibid, p. 72.
further fed by the granting in the 1974 constitution of autonomy to two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina; the purge of Serb liberals and the conservative turn of the Serbian League of Communists after 1972; the confederalization of Yugoslavia that fragmented the Yugoslav body politic and made the republics and their ethnic elites the center of authority; the rising legitimacy of ethno-nationalist demands and the erosion of a Titoist culture of "brotherhood and unity"; the economic-turned-state crisis of Yugoslavia in the 1980s; and the growing demands for political and economic liberalization following the geo-strategic changes in Eastern Europe after 1989, along with the Serbian communists' turn to ethno-nationalism to deflate these demands.

Slobodan Milosevic did not enter politics until 1984, when he was elected head of the Belgrade branch of Serbia's Communist Party. Thanks to his powerful connections and to a reputation for competence, Milosevic had risen as a successful technocrat from his first job in Tehnogas in 1968, to the company's presidency in 1973, to the presidency of Beobanka, a major Belgrade bank, in 1978, but he had remained outside politics until then.

In the five years following his political inauguration in 1984, Milosevic experienced a meteoric rise to power that culminated in his election to the presidency of Serbia on May 8, 1989, enjoying spectacular popularity among Yugoslavia's Serbs. This rise can only be explained by the ethno-communist politics of Yugoslavia and Milosevic's skillful manipulation and exploitation of Serbian nationalism around the issue of Kosovo first, the centralization of Yugoslavia later, and finally, the fate of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs.

Milosevic was the product of the Titoist system that he then used to destroy Titoist Yugoslavia. The purge of Serbian liberals in 1972, and the repression that followed, opened the communist ladder to careerists and doctrinaires who rose to the top.
The elimination of strong personalities weakened any opposition to the rise of a strong man such as Milosevic.

The essence of Milosevic's politics was his willingness to break political taboos, his understanding of the workings of modern politics and the importance of television, and his mastery of party mechanisms. Milosevic is not an ideologue; his relationship to communism even in his heyday as a rising party apparatchik was practical and pragmatic, contrary, say, to his Marxist wife Mira. According to Laura Silber, "Milosevic believes in nothing, except in keeping control over Serbia into the next millennium."

Contrary to most communist leaders, Milosevic has not been afraid of the crowds but rather used popular mobilization to eliminate opponents and seize power. As Aleksa Djilas says, he "found the strength to overcome the fear of the masses, so characteristic of any entrenched bureaucrat." He soon discovered that "the best way to escape the wrath of the masses was to lead them." He proved ready to use nationalism as an effective political tool. His embrace of the Serbian cause was not an irrational and passionate move but a carefully calculated risk he was willing to take.

Lacking any strong convictions of his own was an advantage. His ability to transform himself was unparalleled, even by Balkan standards. As some Serbian journalists later put it, Milosevic "succeeded in tricking both the communists and the nationalists: the

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communists believed he was only pretending to be a nationalist and the nationalists that he was only pretending to be a communist.\textsuperscript{5}

Milosevic started as a younger and more energetic version of the Soviet Union's Yegor Ligachev, ready to fight those communists in Yugoslavia who aspired to be Gorbachevs. He attacked dissident intellectuals, firmly opposed all demands for liberalization, and punished any manifestation of Serbian nationalism.\textsuperscript{6}

Then, faced with a growing nationalist and anti-communist opposition, led by intellectuals like Jovan Radulovic, Slobodan Selenic, Gojko Djogo, Vuk Draskovic, Vojislav Lubarda and, most important of all, Dobrica Cosic, Milosevic shed his colorless communist skin and embraced nationalism. He legitimized Serbs' grievances and stimulated their fears as a way of consolidating his power in Serbia and controlling all of Yugoslavia. He reinvigorated the Communist Party of Serbia, turning it into a successful electoral machine and, in the process, introduced mass politics to Yugoslavia. Milosevic was exceptionally effective in simultaneously attracting widespread support in Serbian elite circles and mobilizing hundreds of thousands of frustrated citizens in Serbia.

Having ignited the Yugoslav wars with his inflammatory rhetoric, his media campaigns and his carefully planned moves to arm Serb militias in Croatia and Bosnia and orchestrate a campaign of terror and ethnic cleansing,\textsuperscript{7} beginning in the spring of 1993, he turned into a peace-maker. In Dayton, according to all accounts, he made more

\textsuperscript{6}Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," p. 86.
\textsuperscript{7}According to the confessions of Borisav Jovic and Vojislav Seselj in the carefully documented Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1997), by Laura Silber and Allan Little, pp. 245-250.
concessions than the American negotiators had dreamed of. He gave up Sarajevo, even making derogatory comments about the Bosnian Serbs whom he had pledged, only four years earlier, to unite with Serbia proper.\(^8\)

Although not a gifted public speaker—contrary to Greece's Andreas Papandreou, the quintessential charismatic demagogue—and a fairly mediocre and banal thinker, Milosevic has been charismatic in his ability to sense, grasp and direct popular sentiment. Despite the lack of oratorical skills, Milosevic has good communications skills suited to the tastes of the Serbian electorate. Milosevic deliberately adopted a political style meant to appeal to Serbian nationalism. He insisted on a combative spirit and a readiness to make sacrifices. He appealed to pride, dignity and honor, striking a deep chord in the Serbian psyche. His public appearances have been deliberately rare. He projected the public image of a serious and austere politician. This Roman gravitas appealed to Serbs' political sense of the moment.\(^9\)

Since his rise to power, Milosevic has shown a full understanding of the workings of modern politics and the importance of media, television in particular, in influencing public opinion and formulating the public agenda according to his needs. He seized full control of the two flagships of the Serbian media: Polmka and Radio Television Belgrade.\(^{TM}\) The former was the largest and most respected Yugoslav newspaper in circulation, with an unrivaled network of correspondents in Eastern Europe and a tradition of uncensored reporting and analysis. RTV Belgrade broadcasts nationally and has been

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\(^9\)See Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic "

\(^{TM}\)For an excellent report on Milosevic's media politics and his use of television for political goals, see Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (London: Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship, 1995).
the single most important source of information for Serbs outside Belgrade. Both organizations were purged and became "hollow vessels which Milosevic's bureaucracy filled with seductive nonsense, designed to manipulate and feed the gullible and disoriented Serbian people with a diet of suspicion and intolerance. The role of television during the elections had been especially tendentious."11 "The new nationalism shares one important element in common with the old communism.. In both cases the press is a vehicle for transmitting the regime's views to the people, and its purpose is to indoctrinate, manipulate, and intimidate."12 Milosevic took as much care in the selection of the head and the editorial board of RTV Belgrade as he did with the chief of his secret police. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, "Milosevic met with the head of Belgrade Radio-Television every day."13

Opposition leaders in Serbia have often focused their attack on RTV Belgrade, a station that Vuk Draskovic called "TV Bastille." In 1991, in what became the largest challenge to Milosevic's rule prior to the 1996 demonstrations, Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement organized public demonstrations demanding freedom of the press and the resignations of public television executives. After days of upheaval, Milosevic was forced to replace his confidants, but RTV Belgrade has remained his mouthpiece. Many observers of Yugoslav affairs have accused RTV Belgrade and RTV Zagreb of being the primary war criminals for their role in exciting ethno-nationalism.

RTV Belgrade has served a variety of purposes. When in need of a moderate image, Milosevic allowed Vojislav Seselj, the extreme nationalist leader of the Radicals,

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13Ibid.'
ample publicity. As soon as the latter's star threatened to outshine Milosevic's, he disappeared from the TV screens. Radovan Karadzic, a former darling of TV talk shows, similarly vanished when Milosevic embarked on his peace-making campaign. Many politicians experienced similar ups and downs in their TV exposure depending on their relationship to, and the agenda of, Milosevic (and his wife).

Milosevic has been far too clever to banish free press completely, a policy that is very difficult to enforce anyhow in the conditions of the 1990s in a country close to the very center of Europe. Instead, he has permitted the operation of some free news agencies like the weekly Vreme, the Studio B TV station and the B92 radio station. But he has made sure that their audience is confined to Belgrade and does not reach the Serbian heartland where the majority of the population lives. This difference explains, to an extent, the diverging electoral behavior of Belgrade and the countryside.

In the early 1980s, following Tito's death in 1980 and the eruption of civil disturbances in Kosovo in 1981, Serbian and, increasingly, Yugoslav politics came to be dominated by the problems in that province. In 1983, tens of thousands of Serbs turned out for the funeral of Aleksandar Rankovic to mourn the powerful Serb Stalinist hard-liner and 'centralizer' who was sacked by Tito in 1966 and had lived in obscure retirement since his fall from power. Many of them shouted slogans such as "Serbia is Rising!" Rankovic may have been bad, reasoned these people, but at least he kept the hated Shiptars, or Albanians, in their place.  

These developments proved Serbian nationalism, based on its ethnic grievances of mistreatment and victimization, to be alive and well, and a powerful political force to be

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reckoned with. Serbs attributed their rapidly declining percentage in Kosovo's population to the Albanian majority's allegedly discriminatory policies. Although the deteriorating economy was the most important factor in Serbian emigration out of Kosovo, by 1986 leading Serb intellectuals had declared that "the physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija is a worse historical defeat than any experienced in the liberation wars waged by Serbia from the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 to the uprising of 1941 "

Yugoslavia entered the second half of the 1980s burdened with declining international status and a deepening economic crisis. The relaxation of East-West tensions following Gorbachev's ascendance to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, adversely affected Yugoslavia's privileged Cold War position as a buffer state. The foreign debt crisis coupled with Yugoslavia's declining geo-strategic importance, and the larger consolidation of orthodox economics' hegemony in the West, left no room for maneuvering and forced the Yugoslav leadership to embark on an economic program of austerity and stabilization. The resulting decline in living standards corroded the social fabric, and the rights and securities that individuals and families had come to rely on.

The much more affluent northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia grew increasingly resentful of Yugoslavia's federal policies for regional redistribution of wealth and pushed for a cutback in subsidies and an increase in republican autonomy in order to protect their living standards from further deterioration. Amidst declining resources, questions of economic reform turned into constitutional conflicts, and then a crisis of the state itself, among politicians who were unwilling to compromise.

* "Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War
Having dominated Yugoslav politics after the crackdown on the Croatian Spring in 1971 and the purge of liberal Serbian leadership in 1972, Serbian conservatives were now faced with the more serious challenge of radical political and economic reforms, at a pace dictated by foreign creditors, and the severity of the financial, monetary and foreign exchange crisis. A wide coalition headed by Milosevic and composed of party apparatchiks, orthodox Marxist intellectuals, nationalist writers and parts of the Yugoslav army, turned to nationalism.

Nationalism created a political context where individual interest was defined not in terms of economic well-being, but of the survival of the Serbian people. The conservatives' original goal was to recentralize Yugoslavia in order to crush reformist trends throughout the country, but especially in Serbia itself. By 1990, in a changed international context and with a backlash against their centralization strategy in other republics, the conservative coalition moved to destroy the Yugoslav state and create a new, Serb-majority state. By stimulating nationalism, this coalition deflected demands for radical change and allowed the ruling elite to reposition itself and survive in a way that would have been unthinkable in the old Yugoslavia, where only 39 percent of the population was Serb.¹⁷

Milosevic used popular mobilization against local communist bureaucracies and Titoist structures and endorsed the nationalist program formulated with growing vigor by many Serb anti-Communist intellectuals. He stole the program of the nationalist

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opposition in order to seize power in Serbia and leave the anti-Communist opposition powerless and without a cause.\textsuperscript{18} Nationalism was used to defeat both fellow communists and the democratic-nationalist opposition and to consolidate power in Serbia.

\textit{Milosevic's Evolving Political Strategy}

Milosevic's strategy developed in five distinct phases. First, Milosevic defeated the liberal reformers within the Serbian Communist Party through a mixture of Serbian nationalism and renewed emphasis on orthodox Marxism. Economic reformism was branded anti-socialist and anti-Serbian. In January 1986, despite very strong opposition from within the party leadership, Milosevic was elected head of the Serbian party's Central Committee.

Secondly, Milosevic strove to consolidate his power base and achieve full control of Serbia by placing his confidants in control of the republic's media and financial institutions and by abolishing the autonomy of Vojvodina (October 1988) and Kosovo (March 1989). In January 1989, he managed to replace Montenegro's party leadership with people from his own camp. Milosevic organized massive rallies of Serbs in what he, the quintessential bureaucrat, called the "anti-bureaucratic revolution", culminating in the celebration of the 600th anniversary-of Serbia's defeat by the Turks on June 28, 1989, when a million Serbs flocked to Kosovo to worship Serbdom.

The emergence of nationalism was vaunted as the rebirth of dignity. Serbs believed that, after fifty years under the enforced slogan of "Brotherhood and Unity," Milosevic

had once again given them back their national identity, the right to say they were Serbs.\textsuperscript{19} By the spring of 1989, Milosevic had emerged as the triumphant and undisputed leader of Serbia. He was in control of four of the eight votes in Yugoslavia's collective presidency, the supreme decision-making body of the federation. Milosevic had become the first strongman in Yugoslav politics after Tito who could appeal directly to popular sentiments, a populist leader, amidst a bunch of gray and uninspiring communist politicians.

Thirdly, having consolidated his power in Serbia and Montenegro, Milosevic turned to the federal institutions. He now shed old Marxism and advocated market reforms. He used economic arguments and the need for a "modern federation" to defend Yugoslavia's recentralization and defeat confederalist Slovenia and Croatia while courting Bosnia and Macedonia for their support. After all, as the International Monetary Fund\textsuperscript{30} and other international financial institutions had argued, successful market economics required a centralized capacity for the successful coordination of macroeconomic policy.\textsuperscript{21} His new agenda provoked the strong opposition of Croatia and Slovenia, traditionally very sensitive to Serbia's hegemonic designs, and catalyzed their secessionism.

Milosevic, however, unlike federal prime minister Markovic, was a Yugoslavist only to the degree this suited his Serbian and personal designs. Milosevic, like other republican leaders, successfully opposed the holding of federal multiparty elections or the adoption of long-proposed amendments to the federal constitution that might have

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\textsuperscript{19}Unfinished Peace, p. 26. \textsuperscript{20}Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp 16-17. \textsuperscript{21}and Little, Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation, p. 58.
relegated federal governmental institutions and restructured the country in a cohesive and rational manner.\textsuperscript{22}

A good example of his hypocritical support for the federal institutions was the scandal that erupted in early 1991 over the Serbian republic's unauthorized appropriation of approximately SI.4 billion from the federal bank.\textsuperscript{33} Milosevic did not hesitate to usurp federal money, undermine Yugoslavia's financial stability and Markovic's reform efforts, in order to buy popular support in his native Serbia. As the Slovenian government maintained, the financial maneuver illustrated the attitude of Serbian authorities toward the resolution of the country's crisis and was evidence of "who is breaking up Yugoslavia."\textsuperscript{34}

By 1990, following changes in the rest of Eastern Europe, Milosevic and his Serbian conservatives were raced with the additional threat of mass political participation and the emergence of a multi-party political system through which the general population would choose its government. The threat now was not the liberals within the party, but the reform-minded northern republics of Croatia and Slovenia and the successful liberalizing policies of popular federal prime minister Ante Markovic.

Milosevic had to confront the rise of mass political participation outside his control in his own backyard, Serbia. The belated awakening of Serbian civil society and the emergence of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement, headed by writer Vuk Draskovic, and a number of civic-oriented democratic parties\textsuperscript{25} could turn politically

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threatening. MOosevic prevailed and won the first competitive elections for the presidency of Serbia in December 1990. By embracing nationalism, Serbia’s Communists were the only ones in the whole of the old communist world who were able to survive free elections undefeated, and stay in power until the present day.

Fourthly, when his centralizing drive stimulated the awakening of Croatian nationalism, Milosevic tried to draw a line and distinguish between homogenous and Serb-free Slovenia and Croatia. Milosevic raised the 'Serbian Question, the fate of out-of-Serbia Serbs to put pressure on Croatian, Bosnian and other nationalists to stay in Yugoslavia. He repeatedly threatened the Croatian leadership that Croatia could seek independence only within much reduced borders. Milosevic claimed that sovereignty laid not in the Yugoslav republics but in the Yugoslav nations, and the Serbian nation as a whole, within or without Serbia, had the same right to self-determination as the Croatian. He argued that the Serbs should never be obliged to be divided and live in different states.

Milosevic succeeded in making sure that Serbo-Croatian political cooperation in the new, democratically elected Croatian parliament broke down. "Pressure from Belgrade...may have been the main reason that Raskovic [the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia] turned down an invitation to join the new Croatian government as a deputy prime minister, and later informed the Croatian Assembly that all five of his party's deputies would cease participation in legislative activities." 26

Milosevic also lent his support to the extremists within the Serbian Democratic Party of Croatia and helped arm Krajina Serbs as an important negotiating card against Tudjman. Krajina Serbs declared in July 1990 that they, "on the basis of their

26Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 131.
geographical, historical, social and cultural specificities, are a sovereign people with all the rights that constitute the sovereignty of peoples."27 If the country were to remain a federation, then the areas in Croatia having a Serbian majority would need to have only the rights necessary for cultural autonomy. They warned Zagreb, however, that should Croatia secede from the Yugoslav federation, their community would seek political autonomy.28

Fifthly when his strategy failed to frighten Tudjman, who explicitly declared that Croatia would go independent if Slovenia did, when h became obvious that the preservation of Yugoslavia was unattainable, and when domestic pressures in Serbia, culminating in violent street demonstrations in March 1991, challenged his authority, Milosevic embarked on a new policy of a small Yugoslavia by ejecting Slovenia and most of Croatia. Since Bosnia and Macedonia proved reluctant to join in this new "Serboslavia", Milosevic turned to his final alternative of a "Greater Serbia" which would unite all the Serb-populated regions of former Yugoslavia in the same state. Between the summers of 1991 and 1993, Milosevic endorsed a virulent revisionist foreign policy that instigated a war in Croatia and Bosnia, isolated Serbia internationally and branded him a villain of the international community. For all the external pressures, Milosevic's power base within Serbia, especially in the countryside, remained secure and his leadership uncontested.

Milosevic used international sanctions and pressures from the West to his political advantage. Sanctions reminded Serbs that they were international pariahs, outnumbered

and surrounded by hostile forces. They prompted Serbs to dig in their heels, resist the outsider and close ranks around Milosevic, their 'national' leader. They cut off Serb liberals from their international contact and support networks, and they helped Milosevic brand his opponents as traitors, accusing them of being an enemy from within. In this way, for example, he easily defeated Milan Panic, the Serbian-born American pharmaceutical magnate and the liberals' last hope, in the 1992 presidential elections.

In conclusion, first the physical and spiritual security of Serbs was thought to be in danger. Secondly, the "national interest" was defined as the defense of this endangered security. Thirdly, a choice was made that sought the recentralization of Yugoslavia as the way of satisfying this national interest. When this failed, an alternative strategy was pursued that aimed at the establishment of a large, Serbian nation-state. Both the policy of 'recentralization' and that of 'Greater Serbia' were informed by the same underlying interest: the security of the Serbian nation. They were never antagonistic but complementary to each other. Often, the threat of the latter was used to achieve the former. The pursuit of these choices provoked the opposition of the other former Yugoslav republics and the international community, and was eventually defeated in battle. Serbia was to be small but a nation-state nevertheless. Recently, the costs of this failure led to a re-conceptualization of the national interest. Peace, good-neighborly relations, international reintegration, economic stabilization and political normalization appear to have acquired a significance they did not have before. However, for these goals to become

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30 See Marcus Tanner, "Sanctions Fail to Sway a Small Town in Serbia-The people of Sid are much poorer after a year of isolation but no one wants to give up the fight," The Independent. May 31, 1993.
a policy priority a lot will depend on developments in Kosovo and the emancipation of Serbia's civil society.

2. A Chronology: From the Ballot-Box to the Battlefield

Despite the success of Ante Markovic's 'shock therapy' in bringing inflation down and putting some order to the chaotic federal public finances in 1989, the political crisis of Yugoslavia continued unabated. The crisis had started with Albanian demands for the establishment of a Yugoslav "Republic of Kosovo," independent of Serbia, that stimulated Serbian nationalism and helped Milosevic's rise to power. By the late 1980s it had turned into a generalized all-Yugoslav political crisis, culminating in an open confrontation between Serbia and Slovenia in December 1989 over the future of the federation and the direction and pace of political and economic reforms. On December 27, 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed new laws on elections and political association, effectively restoring political pluralism in the republic. Multiparty elections were scheduled for April 1990.

The event that best crystallized the crisis was the 14th Special Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Convened with the aim of providing a solution to the Serbo-Slovenian dispute, it was abruptly interrupted on January 22, 1990, and indefinitely postponed after the Slovenian and the Croatian delegations decided to leave. After that debacle the League of Communists of Yugoslavia fragmented into its republican pieces and ceased to function as an all-Yugoslav party. The loss of the LCY was significant because it deprived the federation, at a critical moment, of a unifying

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institution. By bringing the crisis to the highest echelons of power and by spotlighting the Yugoslav deadlock publicly for Yugoslavs and foreigners to see, the 14* Congress could be thought as the first scene of the final act of the death of the Yugoslav federation.

The failed congress was a first attempt at a negotiated settlement of the Yugoslav dispute but led instead to further polarization. There would be many more attempts in the following months but with no better results. Increasingly it became clear that the republican leaders were calling all the shots with the authority of the federal government in rapid decline.

During 1990 all six Yugoslav republics held free, multi-party elections. The new republican leaders, strengthened by a recently acquired popular legitimacy, emerged as the focus of all negotiations. During the year, without much notice from the rest of the world, preoccupied as it was with crises elsewhere, republican leaders positioned themselves in preparation of the coming battle, seizing control of the media, stockpiling weapons, training loyal paramilitary forces, mobilizing their diasporas abroad and hoarding as much hard currency as they could get their hands on.

Slovenia held the first multi-party elections in post-war Yugoslavia as scheduled on April 8, 1990. The united anti-communist opposition of DEMOS won a majority of 55% of the votes and the seats in the Slovenian Assembly, while incumbent, reformed communist Milan Kucan was elected president.

In similar elections in Croatia two weeks later, the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) received 41.5% of the votes and won 193 seats out of a total 365, thanks to the majority electoral system that the Communists had voted in on the eve of the elections. The electoral system was a serious political blunder because it further polarized Croatian
politics at a time when compromises were urgently needed. It punished parties with cross-ethnic and cross-regional appeal and transferred seats to nationalist, regional parties with well-concentrated electoral support. On May 30, 1990, the Croatian Assembly (Sabor) elected Franjo Tudjman President of Croatia and appointed Stipe Mesic Prime Minister.

The victory of Tudjman and his Croatian nationalists further aggravated the crisis of Yugoslavia. During the 1980s Croatia had kept quiet in the dispute between Serbia and Slovenia. With the election of Tudjman, the so-called "silent republic" regained its voice. Yugoslavia from its first inception in 1918 and, especially, since its second reincarnation in 1945 had always been based on Serbo-Croatian cooperation and goodwill. Given its size and political weight in the federation, Croatia's belated nationalist awakening was bound to have serious consequences for the federation.

It was obvious that a primary culprit of Croatian nationalist mobilization was Milosevic. His uncompromising nationalist rhetoric was bound to provoke powerful counter-reactions in the other republics. The moderation of the League of Communists of Croatia had electorally backfired, sending the powerful message across Yugoslavia that success at the polls could only come at the price of espousing nationalism.

On July 5, 1990, the Serbian Assembly dissolved Kosovo's Assembly after the latter had proclaimed the sovereignty of the Kosovo Republic. On July 16, 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia merged into the new Socialist Party of Serbia, in preparation of the forthcoming competitive elections. Slobodan Milosevic was elected president of the party by an overwhelming majority of 1228 out of 1294 votes that reflected both his great personal popularity and his tight control of the party machine.
On August 17, 1990, Serbs in Krajina rebelled against Croatian authorities with the encouragement of Milosevic. They took up arms from the reserve police forces and set up barricades cutting Croatia in half. Two days later, they voted at a referendum with more than 90% in favor of autonomy of the region. Milosevic appeared determined to use the Krajina Serbs' rebellion to curtail Tudjman's own national ambitions and force him to accommodate Serbian designs for Yugoslavia.

On September 28, 1990, the new constitution of Serbia was passed. Kosovo and Vojvodina were deprived of "attributes of statehood" and their autonomy within Serbia was curtailed. Milosevic's efforts to recentralize Serbia, first initiated with his anti-bureaucratic revolution against opposing party officials, bore full fruits. On the eve of a crucial election, Milosevic could proudly boast to the Serbian electorate to be the national leader that had established "Serbia's constitutional and legal unity."

Three days later the Krajina Serbs moved to claim the same rights their compatriots denied Albanians in Kosovo. They proclaimed the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina with the support of Belgrade. Time and again, Milosevic would fail to explain this apparent contradiction in Serbian policy, i.e. fighting for the right of self-determination for Croatia's Serbs while denying the same right to Serbia's Albanians. The result was a damaged credibility for Milosevic that prepared the ground for the future international isolation of Serbia.

On October 3, 1990, Slovenia and Croatia submitted their joint proposal on the "Confederal Model of the Yugoslav Community." From that moment onwards, the two northern republics would closely coordinate policies against the common enemy: the federal government of Markovic and Milosevic's Serbia, both conveniently located in Belgrade. The Croatian-Slovenian plan envisioned a much looser Yugoslavia and was the
first of the three main proposals that were put forward by the Yugoslavs themselves for the settlement of the crisis through the reorganization of the federation.

Being diametrically opposed to Croatian and Slovenian suggestions, Serbia and its Montenegrin ally submitted their own plan for the recentralization of the federation. On February 22, 1991, Milosevic and Montenegrin President Morrir Bulatovic issued their common proposals for a new 'reinvigorated' Yugoslav federation. Finally, Bosnia and Macedonia, fearing the consequences of Yugoslavia's coming disintegration, attempted a last minute compromise between the centralizers and the decentralizers, the 'federalists' and the 'confederalists,' without any success. On June 3, 1991, Izetbegovic and Gligorov, Presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia respectively, issued their own "Platform on the Future Yugoslav Community" which foresaw Yugoslavia as the commonwealth of sovereign republics with the asserted aim of "preserving the federation."

Meanwhile political developments in Yugoslavia accelerated in the last two months of 1990. In November 1990 two more Yugoslav republics held elections. In Macedonia the VMRO-DPMNE nationalists won 37 seats against 31 of the League of Communists of Macedonia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the vote was split among the nationalist parties representing the republic's three ethnic groups. The (Moslem) Party of Democratic Action (PDA) won 86 seats, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) won 72 and the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) 44. Non-ethnic parties, including the League of Communists, received a total 25% of the votes. As tensions grew and ethnic polarization increased, non-ethnic parties became completely marginalized. Even foreign mediators would ignore them in the coming negotiations although they represented V* of Bosnia's population and the best hope for inter-ethnic cooperation.
Elections were held in Serbia and Montenegro in December 1990. The Socialist Party of Serbia received 48% of the votes and won 192 out of 250 seats in the Serbian Assembly. Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of Serbia with a comfortable majority of 65% of the votes. Obviously, his personal popularity far exceeded that of his Socialist Party. The victory in free elections strengthened Milosevic in his dealings with domestic opponents and his fellow republican leaders. Thanks to their espousal of nationalism, his socialist party and its ally in Montenegro were the only successors of the League of Communists to win elections in Yugoslavia. For the first time Albanians abstained from elections, in protest to the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy. Their abstention handed, and would continue to hand in the future, all of the seats allocated to Kosovo to Milosevic, and thus, had the unanticipated paradoxical effect of further strengthening his power.

1990 was a year of great change in Yugoslavia. The communist monopoly in power was over. Free, fair and competitive elections for republican legislatures and executives were held for the first time since the interwar period. However, these same elections that opened a new promising era for democracy in the rest of Eastern Europe, brought about the triumph of 'ethnocracy' and nationalist populism in Yugoslavia. All across the country, uncompromising, nationalist leaders with a narrow, ethnic, anti-federation agenda won over their moderate opponents, without much notice from the international community that continued to hail the "positive changes" in Yugoslavia. Nowhere was the triumph of ethnocracy and the defeat of genuine liberal democracy more complete than in Serbia.

Nationalist leaders had a vested interest in fueling ethnic tensions through the media and the various state agencies they controlled. The greater the polarization the more marginalized their liberal-moderate opponents became. For the immediate future,
Milosevic's and the other nationalists' popularity was bound to rise even further. A significant spill-over effect further strengthened nationalists across Yugoslavia. The rise of Milosevic in Serbia made the rise of Milosevic-type politicians elsewhere much easier.

The new leaders were much more nationalist, much less Yugoslav and much less susceptible to compromise than the ones they replaced. They would all stay in power for the whole duration of the coming wars and would survive well into 1998. No elections for the federal legislature were held. When Femadez Ordonez and Catherine Lalumiere, representing the Council of Europe, urged Yugoslavia to hold elections for its Federal Assembly, as a precondition for Yugoslavia's admission to the Council of Europe, their recommendations went unheard. When federal elections were proclaimed, it was too late since there was no longer a federation to begin with.

With their minds fixed on the coming battle, republican leaders purchased weapons and built up reliable military forces. Milosevic had already expanded the size of the Serbian police to a credible force of 100,000 men under his absolute personal control. He was massively arming paramilitary forces in Croatia and, later, in Bosnia. And he had an increasingly firm enough control of the Yugoslav army to defend his vision of Yugoslavia. Croatia, starting from a much weaker position, went to the international weapons black market to build up its 'defense forces'.

On January 9, 1991, the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia ordered, against the objections of the Croat representative, the dismantling of all irregular forces and the delivering of the weapons illegally brought into the country to the nearest authorized institutions or units of the Yugoslav National Army. Despite the order, the threats and warnings of the federal government, Croatia continued to purchase arms from abroad through Hungary and ethnic militias continued to grow in strength.
On January 25, 1991, the Collective Presidency ordered the compulsory demobilization of the reserve police forces in Croatia. Zagreb once more refused to comply. Moreover, in another act of defiance, it refused to arrest Martin Speigel, its Minister of Defense, who had been sentenced by a martial court for his involvement in illegal arms exports to Croatia. The federal government's inability to enforce its decisions and the emergence of openly antagonistic centers of authority were a good proof of the decay of Yugoslavia that had rapidly accelerated in 1989-1991.

On March 9, 1991, mass demonstrations in Belgrade confronted Milosevic with his first serious challenge inside Serbia. The demonstrations were put down harshly by police, leaving two people dead and several wounded. Milosevic was able to neutralize his liberal opponents by evoking the danger of the national 'enemy' i.e. "Croatian fascists and Albanian separatists," and the need for the national unity of all Serbs. The failure of the demonstrations to topple Milosevic or win any tangible concessions from his regime, largely due to their inability to connect with the Serbian workers and countryside, frustrated the last hope for a negotiated settlement of the intensifying Yugoslav crisis. As nationalist mobilization took off in the spring and summer of 1991, Serbian liberals went silent and were completely sidestepped. It would take them five long years until November 1996 to come out against Milosevic again, in the demonstrations of the winter of 1996-1997.

On March 28, 1991, the first of a series of direct meetings among republican presidents was held in Split. No agreement was reached then nor was to be reached in the future. It was this inability and unwillingness to comprise that doomed Yugoslavia and brought about its violent dissolution. The sixth and last summit of republican presidents...
took place in Stojcevac near Sarajevo on June 6, 1991, and confirmed the complete deadlock of Yugoslavia.

On May 19, 1991, 94% of those who voted in Croatia's referendum for independence, gave their votes for an "independent and sovereign state of Croatia." As expected, Krajina Serbs boycotted the referendum. It became clear that referenda in ethnically divided societies lead to further polarization and make negotiations and compromises harder. Europeans, however, ignorant of local Yugoslav conditions, arrogant of their 'superior democratic traditions,' and hostile to anything reminiscent of Titoist collectivism, would insist on referenda as the precondition for the international recognition of secessionist republics, further pushing Yugoslavs towards polarization.

Contrary to popular perceptions, the international community was deeply involved in the Yugoslav conflicts and played a significant role in the violent destruction of Yugoslavia. Opposed to the forceful change of borders and regional instability, the West initially took a clear position in favor of the unity of Yugoslavia. In March 1991, U.S. President George Bush declared that "the U.S. would not reward those who seceded unilaterally" As late as June 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was saying that "the US wouldn't recognize the would-be breakaways' independence under any circumstances," and on June 21, 1991, the European Community announced that it would like Yugoslavia to remain one country and offered a credit of $850 millions on the conditions that Yugoslavia stayed together At this time, both the US and the EC wanted to discourage a Soviet break-up. Western pro-Yugoslavia bias encouraged Milosevic and his generals without discouraging Slovenia or Croatia.  

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On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Both President Kucan of Slovenia and President Tudjman of Croatia spoke of "dissociation" rather than "secession" to appease the world community and appeared willing to discuss a looser Yugoslav confederation. In polls, Slovenes and Croats were almost equally divided between the option of breaking-now and that of continuing the negotiations, with a slight majority for the former.\textsuperscript{33}

The limited military action of the Yugoslav army in Slovenia in late June 1991 was met by fierce resistance and changed the mood in the West and made it more flexible toward Slovenia's secessionist demands. At the same time, Slovenian and Croatian efforts to brand the conflict the result of the centuries-old fault line of the Habsburg and Ottoman empire, Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, rich, democratic Westward-looking Slovenia and Croatia versus communist Serbia, met with some success in the Western press.\textsuperscript{34}

Following intensive negotiations mediated by the European Community's troika, two cease-fires were signed on June 29, 1991, that provided for the suspension of the declarations of independence for three months in exchange for the return of soldiers to the barracks. Stipe Mesic, the Croat representative to the collective presidency, was installed in the Presidency of Yugoslavia

Despite strong initial hesitation and amidst mounting rumors of an impending military coup, the army returned to the barracks in Slovenia by July 4, 1991. The mediation effort that the E.C. enthusiastically undertook, proved a cataclysm for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33}Ibid..}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{34}The Economist July 6, 1991, p. 45.}
Yugoslavia, because it internationalized the dispute between Slovenia and the Serbia-dominated Yugoslav federation and lent international personality to Slovenia. Contrary to declarations, European mediation recognized the limited sovereignty of Yugoslavia on Slovenia by pressing for the army's return to the barracks. Instead of denouncing Slovenian secessionism, Europeans legitimated it by happily accepting its suspension for a mere three-month period. The initial fighting made the West more favorable to Slovenia's and Croatia's drive for independence, solidified support for independence domestically in the two republics, humiliated the Yugoslav army and forced it out of Slovenia. By all accounts, Slovenia was the clear winner of the confrontation.

The partial success of the cease-fire in ending violence in Slovenia and in providing a breathing space for negotiations in early July 1991 heralded the "rising star of the European Community. After its flop in the Gulf show, the Community is defying the critics who concluded that it could never perform convincingly in foreign policy. Yugoslavia will be remembered as its first big part."35 Nothing, of course, would prove further from the truth. Yugoslavia was not to be a triumph but rather a disaster for Europe's nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy

The fundamental mistake made early in the conflict was incrementalism. Instead, of aiming at a total, comprehensive solution of the Yugoslav crisis (i.e. a looser confederation or outright independence with strong guarantees for minorities) that would address the political-constitutional problems that underpinned tensions in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, i.e. the allocation of power and the treatment of minorities, Europe took a minimalist approach through a strategy that dealt with one crisis at a time. In this way, Europe was dragged into the conflict and, often, it became a victim of the manipulations

of the skillful Yugoslav leaders. It would take a lot of time for Europeans to realize that Milosevic, for example, was not to be taken at his word and that agreements were honored according to circumstances.36

On July 7, 1991, in Tito's favorite Brioni island, it was agreed that Slovenia and not Yugoslavia would collect customs duties, 50 E.C. cease-fire observers would be dispatched to Yugoslavia, formal negotiations would start on August 1, and the E.C. would advise on constitutional issues. Milosevic-controlled media denounced the Brioni accords as an E.C. neocolonial intervention in the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia.37 Judging, however, by the weak resistance of the army, it was clear that Milosevic had decided to let Slovenia go. His efforts to recentralize Yugoslavia had failed. He now turned to his second option: the creation of a Greater Serbia encompassing the Serb-populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina together with Serbia and Montenegro.38

Before July was over, violent clashes broke out between Croats and Serbs across the southern perimeter of Croatia, with Milosevic's encouragement. What followed has been well documented: violence escalated and the Europeans' efforts at peace-making failed, largely because of their own internal disagreements of what needed to be done.

36In an interview with the author, former foreign minister of Greece, Michalis Papakonstantinou, expressed his disgust for Milosevic' lies and systematic violations of agreements. "He [Milosevic] would say the most outrageous things with a straight face, and people believed. It took us time to realize that he is using us and is not serious." Athens, February 16, 1998.
•<*>In the meantime Tudjman aspired to his own Greater Croatia and, with an eye on Croat-inhabited Western Herzegovina, demanded the self-determination of the different parts of Bosnia but denied the same right to the Serb-inhabited parts of Croatia. Izetbegovic on his part protested and warned that Bosnia's partition was the worst solution and would lead to war.
Frustrated by Milosevic's intransigence and appalled by the size of the carnage, they recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992, under intense German pressure. Having run out of options, Europeans wanted to believe that recognition could provide a quick fix cost-free. They miscalculated once, more since violence spread into Bosnia where it continued to rage for the following four years.\(^39\)

Following the decision of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 15, 1991, adopted by the Muslim and Croat deputies only, on the "Memorandum on Sovereignty," a referendum on Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence was held on February 29, 1992, with the encouragement of the European Community. Only 63% of the electorate participated due to the Serbs' abstention. 99% of those who voted opted for a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^40\)

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39 Peace returned to Croatia in early 1992. On December 1, 1991, the so-called Vance Peace Plan on the UN peace-keeping operation in Croatia was submitted to the UN Security Council. Under its provisions peace-keeping forces would be deployed in specified areas designated as "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPA zones). There would be three such areas: in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. The UN peace-keeping operation was meant to be a temporary arrangement designed to create conditions for peace and security to allow for the negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the crisis to proceed. UN peace-keepers were to remain in Croatia until the Croatian army forcefully took over the latter two areas in 1995. Eastern Slavonia returned peacefully to Croatian control in January 1998 under the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords.

40 After five rounds of negotiations, the leaders of the three national parties—PDA, SDP and CDU—signed the EC-sponsored "Declaration on Principles of New Constitutional Order for Bosnia-Herzegovina," better known as the Coutilhero Plan, according to which Bosnia-Herzegovina would become independent within the present borders but internally be reorganized into three constituent units based on the national principle. This last provision while satisfying the Serbs and the Croats, was a bitter pill for the Moslems to swallow who favored a unitary Bosnian state. With the encouragement of the United States, Izetbegovic withdrew his support for the agreement. It would take four years of war, for an agreement based on similar principals to bring peace back to the tormented lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Dayton.

On April 6, 1992, as soon as the European Community decided to recognize the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, armed clashes broke out in Sarajevo and other
While Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted to the UN General Assembly on May 22, 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 757 on May 30, 1992, imposing a trade embargo and other sanctions on rump Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). The Security Council condemned the failure of the Yugoslav authorities to comply with previous resolutions and decided to suspend Yugoslavia's membership in the United Nations.

Following repeated warnings from the international community, Milosevic's Yugoslavia was forced into international isolation at great cost for the local economy and society. Sanctions affected the whole of Southeastern Europe and destabilized much needed trade relations in the region. Serbia lies at the very center of the Balkan peninsula and Belgrade has traditionally been its most important transportation junction. At a time of a painful economic transition, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey were cut off from the rest of Europe.\footnote{Sanctions would remain in place until the end of war They were suspended after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords However, the US government has unilaterally preserved a so-called outer wall of sanctions, including a ban on Yugoslavia's access to IMF and other international finance, in order to put pressure on Milosevic to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal on Yugoslavia and find a peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem.}

1990 set the stage for the confrontation, 1991 witnessed the collapse of Yugoslavia and the eruption of hostilities in Croatia, and 1992 saw the implosion of places in which 14 people were killed and more than 100 wounded This marked the beginning of what was to become the bloodiest conflict Europe has witnessed since the end of the Second World War. The escalation of violence was dramatic and took many Yugoslavs and most outside observers by surprise In less than a month, Bosnia-Herzegovina was in a state of an all-out war Such a rapid escalation was only possible by the widespread distribution of arms to the civilian population and the arming of ethnic militias by unscrupulous leaders, Milosevic in particular.
Bosnia. Faced with increasing international pressure, Milosevic decided to broaden his
government and use the credibility of some respectable personalities. On June 15, 1992, the
Federal Assembly elected Dobrica Cosic as the first President of the new Yugoslavia. The
popular writer sought an understanding with the West and warned his compatriots against the
perils of isolation. On July 14, 1992, at Cosic’s proposal, the assembly appointed Serbian-
American businessman Milan Panic as the Yugoslav Prime Minister. Neither Cosic nor Panic
were to last long. Both would be dismissed by the Milosevic-controlled assembly within a
year. They were too naive to realize—until it was too—late that, for all their official titles,
Milosevic was still calling all the shots.

By fall of 1992, Panic had understood that the only way to move his peace
initiatives for Bosnia and reformist agenda for Yugoslavia forward was to acquire direct popular
legitimacy himself. He embarked on a daring gamble: he challenged Milosevic himself for the
On December 20, 1992, elections were held across Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). At the federal elections for the Chamber of Citizens, at which only 70.7% of registered voters took part, with Kosovo's Albanians abstaining once more, the Socialist Party of Serbia won 47 seats, the Serbian Radical Party 34, and the allied opposition DEPOS 20. At the elections for the National Assembly of Serbia the Socialist Party won 101 seats, the Serbian Radical Party 73 and DEPOS 49. At the elections for the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic was elected in the first round, after winning 2,515,047 votes, or 56% of the votes. Milan Panic came a distant second with a respectable 1,516,693 votes or 34%.

Panic, an amateur politician, had no friendly media coverage of his candidature outside Belgrade and no organizational structure to support his campaign. From the very start, he was branded a foreign agent in the service of foreign interests and his rusty Serbian accent, after years spent in the United States, was no help. Milosevic played the nationalist card, skillfully defying the West in defense of the Serbs, and did not hesitate to ally himself with ultra-nationalist Seselj, to isolate Panic and Cosic. Milosevic was able once more to project himself as the credible statesman Serbia needs in the current time of national crisis.

The December 1992 elections were marked by the failure of the liberal-democratic opposition, Milosevic's continued popularity, albeit diminished compared to the 1990 elections, and the spectacular rise of Seselj and his Radicals. Thanks to abundant access to the Milosevic-controlled media, Seselj came from obscurity to dominate the electoral
campaign and captivate the hearts of Serbs with his ultra-nationalist message of a Greater Serbia extending through all of Bosnia and half of Croatia.

Seselj's electoral success was surprising to most and shocking to many Serbs. Having promoted him, Milosevic now felt threatened. After a while, he quickly deprived Seselj of media access and had him portrayed as another Zhirinovski. Seselj's rise was temporarily halted. The early elections of December 19, 1993, were meant to provide for a stable Socialist government and get Seselj off Milosevic's back. They succeeded in both. 4,136,532 voters went to the polls or 63 per cent of the total number of registered voters. The Socialists won the greatest number of votes and seats—37.9 per cent of votes and 123 seats out of a total 250, DEPOS-17.2 per cent and 45 seats, the Radicals-14.4 per cent and 39 seats, the Democratic Party—12 per cent and 29 seats, and the Democratic Party of Serbia—5.2 per cent and 7 seats.

The decline in Seselj's electoral fortunes, opened the way for Milosevic's peacemaking initiatives in Bosnia. In May 1993, he had already endorsed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and pressed the Bosnian Serbs leaders hard to accept it. Their refusal caused a rapid deterioration in the relations between Belgrade and Pale. After the December 1993 elections, Milosevic imposed a full trade embargo on Bosnian Serbs to force them into compliance. This rupture in relations altered the strategic environment in Bosnia and contributed to the Serbian military defeats in 1995 that opened the way for the Dayton Peace Accords.

Seselj helped Milosevic both inside and outside Serbia. Seselj represented a worse alternative, making Serbian liberals and the West less hostile to Milosevic than they would
be otherwise. Created, strengthened and weakened by Milosevic, Seselj has been a convenient safety valve for the Belgrade regime. Since their electoral constituencies largely overlap, popular discontent has been safely channeled to Seselj and back to Milosevic without fundamentally challenging Milosevic's rule.

However, Seselj has managed to build his own autonomous base over the years and prove wrong those who thought of him a political comet of no lasting duration. Today, Seselj has successfully capitalized on the Serbs' post-war disillusionment, Milosevic's betrayal of Greater Serbia in Dayton, and the quarrelsome, inefficient and corrupt opposition's failure to provide a credible alternative to Milosevic's rule. In the Serbian presidential elections in late 1997, Seselj came first, far ahead of the liberal opposition, and he could have even been elected President of Serbia, had it not been for the low turn-out that caused the cancellation of elections and Milosevic's manipulation of voting procedures.

Despite Milosevic's continued electoral success, it is clear that both he and his socialists have experienced a long and irreversible decline in popularity between the first elections in 1990 and the most recent ones in 1997. Milosevic has succeeded in staying in power only because of the fragmentation of the opposition and the Albanians' abstention from voting. In early 1998, confronted with an economic crisis and mounting domestic criticism, Milosevic attempted to rally Serbs behind him once more, by inflaming Kosovo. It is a dangerous game with unpredictable results.

Today Kosovo is the most serious problem of Yugoslavia. Without some sort of settlement, there can be little hope of a democratization of Serbian politics, of a full normalization of Yugoslavia's external relations, and of stability in the Southern Balkans.
In response to Serbian suppression, Kosovo's Albanians have developed their own underground institutions. There have been regular presidential and parliamentary elections. Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic Alliance of Kosovo have enjoyed widespread support by the overwhelming majority of the population. Rugova has opted for a policy of abstention from all state functions and institutions and a Ghandian-like non-violent confrontation with Belgrade. This policy ensured peace in the province for the duration of the war in Bosnia.

Rugova had hoped that the international community would force Milosevic to seek a compromise. Kosovo, however, was not part of Dayton's agenda. On the contrary, following Dayton, Milosevic's international standing enjoyed a boost and he emerged as a serious statesman the West could do business with. Milosevic was praised repeatedly by American diplomats for his efforts in implementing the Dayton accords. Albanians' increased frustration at the world's neglect coupled with Kosovo's miserable economic conditions, fed the emergence of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army that invited the disproportionately harsh, collective punishment of the Serbian police in March 1998.

It seems that the nationalist fervor that was first ignited in Kosovo in the early 1980s and progressively spread into Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, is making a full circle back to Kosovo. And it will be most interesting to see how Milosevic, who built his political career on the policy of reintegrating the historic province into Serbia and disenfranchising the Albanians, tackles the Kosovo problem and Albanian nationalism.
Chapter Seven: Greece (1991-1995)

"We will not accept agreements which question and undermine our national rights. The name Macedonia is our soul."

Andreas Papandreou, September 18, 1993, at a PASOK electoral rally in Thessaloniki, Greece

"Macedonia poses a clear and present danger to Greece. It is not an emotional, Mediterranean reaction. We really have a challenge to our national security, because the objective is a Macedonia with the Aegean."


"The [conservative] government's planned partial sale of [Greek telecommunications state monopoly] OTE is a national crime and the [future] PASOK government would overturn all contracts."

Andreas Papandreou, Athens News Agency. September 6, 1993

/. The Historical Background

In its present-day usage, the term 'Macedonia' describes a former Ottoman region that was divided among Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. This division, however, did not settle its fate once and for all. On the contrary, Macedonia has continued to disrupt the Southern Balkans for more than a century now. Initially, the 'Macedonian Question' was part of the broader 'Eastern Question.' It is, in other words, the story of the collapse of a pre-modern, imperial, multi-cultural, religious order and its replacement by a modern (or, better, modernizing), uni-cultural, secular order of nation-states. As has already been described above, the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of its successor nation-states was a painful and protracted process because of the extraordinary ethno-cultural diversity of the Balkan landscape, the social and economic backwardness of the Balkan people and the interplay of Great Powers' balance-of-power politics.
Macedonia was both one of the most diverse Ottoman regions and one of the most strategically located, controlling the main North-South and East-West communication axes that cut across the Balkans. As a political problem it emerged onto the modern international scene at the end of the 19th century, at a time of competing Great Power imperialist projects, emancipated and increasingly confident local nationalisms and the accelerating decay of Ottoman authority.

Macedonia followed the general pattern of Ottoman settlement in the Balkans: Turks, Greeks, Jews and Armenians lived in the few urban centers while Christian Orthodox Slav peasants predominated in the countryside. The latter's national identity remained underdeveloped until the late 19th century when neighboring nation-states started competing ferociously for the region and the hearts and minds of its people.

The Ottoman state was organized along the religion-based millet system; there were three main millets in the Balkans: the Muslim, the Jewish and the Christian Orthodox led by the Greek Patriarch in the Fanar district of Constantinople. As Western ideas and culture spread and the newly created nation-states in the Balkan periphery of the empire started aggressively to challenge the Ottoman order and seek the complete re-organization of Southeastern Europe on the basis of the national principle, the pre-modern millet system, that fused religious with political authority, was attacked and de-legitimized by emerging modernist, secularist nationalisms. The Christian Slavs viewed the Fanar Patriarch with suspicion as a Greek agent and demanded their religious autonomy. Such autonomy was granted by the Sublime Porte and was, subsequently, followed by political autonomy

Macedonia became the apple of discord among increasingly aggressive Bulgarian, Greek and, to a lesser extent, Serbian nationalisms, following the proclamation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, a Bulgarian-controlled Christian Orthodox Church independent of the Fanar. In 1878 Macedonia was awarded to the newly-established, Russia-backed Bulgaria in San Stefano but, due to British and Austro-Hungarian
intervention in defense of the European balance of power, it was quickly returned to the Ottomans at Berlin in the same year. Since then, Macedonia has remained the site of aggressive ethno-nationalisms, 'Great Ideas' of territorial expansion, programs of ethno-cultural assimilation, and nation-engineering on a grand scale.

The vision of San Stefano nourished Bulgarian irredentism and alarmed Greek nationalists. A second round of Greek-Bulgarian competition, between Bulgarian and Greek irregulars who infiltrated Ottoman Macedonia with the help of loyal locals, erupted into armed struggle in 1904. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 restored order only temporarily. Ultimately, the Young Turks' turn to an unmitigated Turkish nationalism, radicalizing the local ethno-nationalisms further and closing the door, once and for all, despite the Young Turks' initial pronouncements, to the prospect of an Ottoman civic state along Western Ones.

The Christian Balkan armies, allied together, defied the Great Powers and expelled the Ottomans from most of their European possessions in the First Balkan War of 1912. Then they fought against each other for the division of the Ottoman spoils in the Second Balkan War of 1913. In this struggle Bulgaria came out the great loser. It was this failure of Bulgaria to capture northern Macedonia, with the exception of a small portion that amounted to only 10% of the total territory of the region, that resulted in the introduction of a fourth, and increasingly influential, factor into the Macedonian game: Macedonian nationalism, a South Slav nationalism that was distinct from both Bulgarian and Serbian nationalism.

Bulgaria tried to recapture Macedonia in the First World War by allying itself with the defeated Central Powers, only to lose again. These failures fed Bulgarian revisionism and Bulgarian-Macedonian extremism in the inter-war period. Bulgarian nationalists from Bulgarian Macedonia resorted to terrorism and covert operations within Bulgaria and across the border, in neighboring Yugoslavia and Greece, causing political instability at
home and growing tension abroad. As a response, the Greek army temporarily invaded Bulgaria in 1925.

In the inter-war period both Greece and Serbia followed a policy of assimilation of local, ethnically alien populations. However, the belated incorporation of the Macedonian lands into the process of nation-state formation, their extreme diversity, and the nationalist competition among neighbors presented nation-builders with considerable problems. Out of the failure of primarily Bulgarian and Serbian and, secondarily, Greek nationalism, a new nationalism was born, centered not outside, in a neighboring country, but within Macedonia itself. The emergence of a "Macedonian nation" was a gradual process that involved the Slav population of Yugoslav Macedonia and some Slavs in neighboring Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia, a result of the deliberate policies of Titoist Yugoslavia after 1945, and the rejection of what had been, until 1944, a strong Bulgarian orientation.

During the 1920s and 1930s, centralizing Serbia dominated the Versailles-born Yugoslavia. Belgrade followed a harsh policy of Serbianization of Macedonian Slavs. Their subsequent resentment of Serbia and their close ethnic bonds with Bulgarians, made Slav Macedonians welcome the Bulgarian army in 1941, following the Hitler-sponsored division of Yugoslavia. However, Bulgaria's quasi-colonial treatment of local Slavs caused enormous disillusionment, while the emergence of a strong partisan movement supporting an autonomous Macedonia turned the Macedonian Question from a struggle between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia into a struggle between the emerging, nationally-minded Macedonians with their Christian neighbors. The collapse of Nazi Germany and the triumph of Tito's partisans led to the establishment of a Macedonian republic as part of the new Yugoslav federation. Tito attempted to use Macedonianism as a means to expand southwards and eastwards into Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia. Much of his aid to the Greek communists during the Greek civil war served this goal. However, Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 put an end to his expansionary goals and forced him to seek the cooperation of the West. He closed the Yugoslav border and ended all aid to Greek
communists bringing the war to a quick end in 1949, while any thought of a union with Stalinist Bulgaria was quickly abandoned by both sides.

Greece had been earlier confronted with an unusual paradox. It had lost Western Anatolia, a region with a Greek majority, to Kemafist Turkey and won Greek Macedonia where Greeks were in minority. Between 1912 and 1949 significant demographic changes in concert with deliberate state policies Hellenized Greek Macedonia almost in its entirety.

In 1919 a voluntary exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria produced the first exodus of Slavs and influx of Greeks to Greek Macedonia. The Greek defeat in Anatolia in 1922 and the mandatory exchange of populations agreed to in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, provided for the departure of 400,000 Muslims and the arrival of 1,300,000 Christians to Greece, most of them departing from and arriving in Greek Macedonia. The German occupation of Greece in 1941 led to the liquidation of the significant Jewish community of Thessaloniki. Finally, the defeat of the communists and their local Slav Macedonian supporters produced one more exodus of Slav Macedonians from Greek Macedonia.

These events, which were not, most of the times, welcomed by the Greek state were, nevertheless, coupled with official Greek policies aimed at suppressing local cultural, ethnic and even national, identities in support of a homogeneous Greek national society. One thing is certain: in this endeavor the Greek state has been enormously successful, rendering present-day Greece one of the most ethnically homogeneous states in Europe, and by far the most homogeneous of all Balkan states. The Macedonian dispute of the early 1990s challenged this success and stirred painful memories of the "northern danger" that Greeks thought they had put to rest.

Many writers have elaborated on the specifics of the Greek assimilationist policy and pointed to the outright oppression of Slav and other alien ethnic identities that occurred during the Metaxas dictatorship between 1936 and 1941. It is often forgotten
that this policy of homogenization was carried out primarily by the Liberals of the Second Hellenic Republic. It was they who dominated Greek politics between 1922 and 1933 and established a Venizelist republic in 1924, following the monarchy's discrediting in the Anatolian expedition and the King's expulsion from the country in 1922.

The Venizelos-led Liberals, being the new force in Greek politics after 1910, were the agents of a 'modernizing' nationalism. Having expanded the state northwards, southwards and eastwards, they were now devoted to building, through an efficient state administration and educational system, a modern 'European' state, understood as a homogeneous, uni-cultural nation-state. Sensing the danger, all the minorities of northern Greece (with the exception of Muslim Turks), including Slavs, Jews and Albanian Chams, lent their electoral support to the royalists of the Peoples' Party. The anti-Venizelist Peoples' Party emerged as the protector of particularist interests, defending the 'old order' against the onslaught of the modernist Greek state. Thus, the Venizelist educational policy which seems undoubtedly repressive from a 1990s perspective, was thought as legitimate state policy in the 1920s, an attempt to eradicate illiteracy through the spread of a standardized national language. It was this modernist onslaught on local, traditional, pre-modern loyalties rather than outright oppression that is most responsible for the assimilation of weak ethnic identities into a broader Greek national identity.

Following the turmoil of the 1940s and the previous 40 years, 1949 brought, at last, stability to Greece and Greek Macedonia. The Macedonian Question was largely left to rest for the following forty years of the Cold War. Occasionally, Belgrade, under pressure from Macedonian nationalists in Skopje, raised the issue of a suppressed 'Macedonian' minority in Greece, but overall, strategic considerations made Belgrade reluctant to alienate Athens. Increasingly, however, the decline in the power of central authority following the 1974 constitution and Tito's death in 1980, made it difficult for

-This is a fascinating story brilliantly narrated by George Mavrogordatos in his seminal work Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece. 1922-1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
Belgrade to keep Skopje at bay. Furthermore, the emergence of large and prosperous Macedonian communities in Canada and Australia with the organization and financial resources to defend the rights of their ethnic kin in Greek Macedonia, added one more international player to the Macedonian equation: the Macedonian diaspora.

In sum, the Macedonian Question is a century-old political problem. Initially it was part of the wider Eastern Question of the succession of the Ottoman empire. Bulgaria, Greece and later, Serbia fought for territory and peoples' allegiance in Macedonia. The repeated defeats of San Stefano Bulgaria in battle and at the diplomatic table gave rise to a new Balkan nationalism, Macedonianism, that demanded the independence of a Macedonian nation-state. The majority of Slav Christians in Yugoslav Macedonia and a few in neighboring Bulgaria and Greece lent their loyalty and support to the Macedonian national idea.

However, the construction of a Macedonian nationalism required a new reading of the region's past that directly collided with traditional Bulgarian and Greek national history and questioned Bulgaria's and Greece's sovereignty in their parts of Macedonia. A Macedonian ethnic state achieved independence in 1991 Greece regarded Macedonian nationalism and Macedonian independence as a direct challenge to its own national identity, national history and national homogeneity Their defense was thought to be a vital national interest. A strategy was devised that put pressure on Skopje to abandon the name "Macedonia" as a precondition for international recognition This strategy was opposed by Greece's allies and the international community at large Increased international isolation and the economic costs of the embargo caused a re-prioratization of national interests that gave preference to a compromise in return for increased trade and an enhanced regional role for Greece.

2. On the Eve of the Storm
1989, Eastern Europe's camus mirabilis, took Greece by-surprise and found the country unprepared to deal with the new post-Cold War reality. Such lack of preparation could be traced in several areas and social-political phenomena:

- Greece's Balkan illiteracy: Greek policy-making elites, in their urge to integrate into the European mainstream, had neglected their Balkan backyard. At the time of communism's collapse and the Balkans' opening to the world, Greek political, media and business elites suffered from a profound Balkan illiteracy that eventually found its way into official Greek policy in the region.

No policy can be successful without prior knowledge involved. It was astonishing how little Greeks knew about the Balkans despite their aspirations to play an important role in the region. The Greeks' lack of knowledge was in sharp contrast with what their northern neighbors knew about Greece. Perhaps because of the openness of Greek society and the well-developed spy network inherited from the communist era, the fact was that Greece's northern neighbors had a much better idea of what Greek politics and society was all about than what most Greeks knew about their neighbors.

Demonizing Gligorov was not very helpful. Acknowledging the man's extraordinary political skills was a first step in trying to understand the internal dynamics at play in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Establishing educational projects, training new experts in Balkan affairs and shifting some of the little research conducted on Western Europe towards the Balkans could help decrease Greece's Balkan illiteracy.³

³ A striking example of how little the Greeks knew about the Balkans concerned the Milosevic-Karadzic split in the summer of 1994 over the Vance-Owen peace plan on Bosnia. Athens remained completely bewildered by the on-going internal fighting between the two leaders of the Serbian nation, Greece's traditional friend and ally. No politician or journalist attempted to account for the internecine quarrel. The reason for Greece's bewilderment lay in the lack of knowledge of how deep the division was between, on the one hand, the urban, inner-Drina Serbia of the partisan tradition, and on the other hand, the mountainous, outer-Drina Bosnia of the chetnik, royalist tradition. Milosevic, the
-Ignorance of the near past. Greeks are brought up within a closed, over-centralized, Helleno-centric educational system that, in its emphasis on the glory of classical Greece, neglects and, often, distorts, the country's recent Ottoman and post-Ottoman past. Greeks are educated to ignore the past multi-ethnic identities of their country and are ready to project their country's present relative homogeneity into the indefinite past. Because of such ignorance, they were persuaded of and demonstrated in defense of the '3,000-year old Greekness of Macedonia,' an absurd and outright false, by any historical account, claim.

-Minorities as geopolitics: Minority issues are not dealt with as questions of human rights but are factored into geo-strategic considerations. Despite their longstanding participation in the European human rights structures, i.e. the Council of Europe, Greeks appear unaware of the significant evolution that occurred between 1945 and 1989 in the perception and expected treatment of minorities. This explains the ease with which Greeks, like so many other people in Southeastern Europe, conflate minority issues with issues of sovereignty and borders and quickly equate accusations of minority mistreatment with territorial claims. This conflation, historically explained by the fluidity of Balkan borders, leads to absurdities such as the official Greek position that there are no minorities in Greece, except for the officially recognized Muslim minority in Western Thrace.

-Siege mentality. Such anti-minority perceptions are coupled with a certain siege mentality epitomized best in what a former president of the republic called the "brotherless, friendless Greek nation" that has dominated Greek thinking for over a century, a mentality that has only been reinforced by the renewed antagonism with Turkey after 1974. Between 1989 and 1995, when Greeks looked around in their region, they saw alien and difficult neighbors, especially Turkey, who could easily turn into enemies ready to challenge the status quo.
This siege mentality makes Greeks defensive and oversensitive. This over-sensitivity is important because it helps exaggerate risks and turn them into threats. The resolute face-off of such threats becomes a national interest and a national priority. Official policy loses the initiative and the necessary perspective to evaluate risks calmly. It becomes reactive and driven by impulses, public opinion and demagoguery. Populist politicians and a polemical media in pursuit of sensational stories are ready to assume the worst and pick up insignificant 'provocations' to reinforce Greeks' reactionary defensiveness.

The collapse of the old communist order in the north presented Greece with both opportunities and risks. On the one hand were the renewed possibilities presented by the opening of a new economic hinterland in the Balkans. On the other, there were risks of old ethnic rivalries exploding. Unfortunately, official Greece, contrary to Greek business, and driven by the fear-building media, chose to focus almost exclusively on the risks and ignore the opportunities.4

-Arrogance: Defensiveness and insecurity are coupled with a certain arrogance on the part of Greeks vis-a-vis their Balkan neighbors. Such an arrogance is somehow understandable given the difference in income and living standards between Greece and its Balkan neighbors. This difference was the product of the prolonged decline of communist economies after the mid-1960s and has changed significantly the whole geostrategic outlook of the Balkans. Spectacular as this economic imbalance was in 1989, it became a dramatic gap after the post-communist economic collapse of the early 1990s. Thus, for example, the Greek-Albanian border became one of those rare areas in the world where one can pass from the Third to the First World in a matter of minutes.

This economic and political discrepancy is further exacerbated by a perceived 'historical superiority' that bestows a status-bearing classical heritage and all its cultural capital on contemporary Greeks. Thus, a power superiority was coupled with a moral superiority that made Greeks insensitive to their neighbors' legitimate nationalist feelings, precisely at a time when those feelings' had been re-accentuated, playing a critical part in the dissolution of the communist order then taking place.

This arrogance might have even been welcomed if it had helped Greeks take the constructive initiatives their region needs, but instead, it goes a long way toward explaining a Greek proclivity for opening up too many foreign fronts. There was a time in the early 1990s when Greece had serious bilateral disputes with Albania, FYROMacedonia and Turkey. Arrogance contributed to Greece's maximalist demands for Macedonia to change its name and initial rejection of a compromise. For the first time in recent memory, democratic Greece came in direct collision with international public opinion and appeared in defiance, to say the least, of international legality.

In contrast to previous conflicts, i.e. Cyprus and the Aegean, where Greece could claim the high moral and legal grounds, Greece was the bully this time around. Greeks opted for power politics but they badly miscalculated the regional balance of power. They believed that they could afford this because they had the might even if they did not have the right. This produced an unprecedented degree of isolation (in political and psychological terms) of Greece from its European partners and NATO allies, an isolation that even powerful countries can ill afford.

-Forgetting without forgiving. The end of the civil war was never followed by an open public discussion of what happened in Greek Macedonia. In the name of the forward-looking modernization of Greece's physical and social infrastructure, forgetting became officially sanctioned. However, forgetting did not necessarily lead to forgiving. History's dirty laundry was never openly confronted and was not put to rest once and for all. Four decades later the ghosts of the civil war and the inter-war years came to haunt
Greece's view of itself and its neighbors. Forgetting produced a vacuum in collective historical consciousness that was easily filled by stereotypes and convenient labels.

Serious research and scholarship was discouraged in favor of pseudo-historical studies by pundits like former ministers Nikolaos Martis and Stelios Paphthemelis with the sole goal of proving the Greekness of Macedonia since the time of Philip and Alexander the Great.

A good example of the difficulty most Greeks have in dealing with their country's recent past in an open and honest way and the extent of "un-remembering" this past is anthropologist Anastasia Karakasidou's dissertation Fields of Wheat. Hills of Blood-Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990 (The University of Chicago Press, 1997). Aside from a few methodological flaws that some of her colleagues have pointed out (and a certain anthropological perversion for projecting the micro onto the macro level to produce unsubstantiated political arguments), the book says nothing new. It recounts the story of certain village communities in Greek Macedonia and their progressive Hellenization over the last hundred and twenty years.

The book, however, caused an enormous turmoil. It divided social scientists and polarized scientific associations such as the Modern Greek Studies Association of America. The debate was quickly popularized and spilled over into the press. Karakasidou was repeatedly denounced as a national traitor, a non-Greek foreigner, a crazy woman, a calculative manipulator who, in her urge to secure academic tenure in America, added credibility to Skopje's claims. She even received death threats and the Cambridge University Press canceled the publication of her manuscript. Incredible as it seems, the Karakasidou affair illustrates the intensity of passions and the difficulty in discussing, even in a dry 'scientific' way, issues that affect national identity and history.

-Rights versus interests: Political discourse in Greece emphasizes Greek rights, which are thought to extend back to ancient times, rather than Greek interests, which
require an appreciation of current realities and a defense using arguments and intelligent diplomacy. Viewing Greece's relations with its neighbors as a matter of justice and the repeated references to rights rather than interests, make negotiations and a bilateral give-and-take with foreign parties almost impossible and, certainly, more difficult to sell to the wider public. If foreign policy is a matter of justice, then diverging opinions can easily be branded as treacherous, making domestic political debate almost impossible. A highly moralistic and legalistic language is used, which frequently leads to rejectionist attitudes by Greeks if foreigners fail to respond appropriately. Consequently, Greece has been notoriously reluctant to enter into negotiations to solve bilateral disputes.

Defining foreign issues in terms of rights absolves political leadership of the responsibility to negotiate with neighbors and carry the political cost of the inevitable compromise that international negotiations, short of the victorious use of force, involve. Such a reluctance to negotiate and compromise has repeatedly led to foreign policy failures, as Cyprus best illustrates. Such failures should be traced to the traditional weakness and the populist proclivities of Greek political leadership and to a simplistic, reductionist, nationalist political culture that views foreign issues as mere matters of right and wrong, justice and treason.

-The crisis of the Greek state 1989 marks the apogee of a state crisis in Greece long in the making. The crisis was multi-faceted and was, broadly speaking, the result of socialist mismanagement in the 1980s and the avoidance of necessary structural reforms in the face of the pressuring demands of globalization and European integration. The crisis manifested itself in the virtual collapse of public finances with a public deficit of 20% of GDP (one of the highest peacetime levels in world history) and rampant corruption, illustrated best by the 200-million dollar failure of George FCoskotas' Bank of Crete.

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5Ibid, p. 171.
6Ibid, pp. 171-172.
What lay underneath all these failures was a total collapse of the state's regulatory capacity, be it its tax-collecting or bank-controlling mechanism. The Greek state bureaucracy, inefficient, over-bloated and corrupt as it had been prior to 1981, suffered most from the socialists' policies of 'democratization,' a euphemism for the abolition of hierarchy, accountability and any semblance of meritocracy and the hiring of thousands of loyal but unqualified socialist supporters. The end result was that the Greek state was turned into a 'giant with feet of clay' overextended and omnipresent, but weak and completely hostage to political authorities and the PASOK party machine.

The Greek foreign service did not escape 'democratization.' Party lackeys were indiscriminately promoted in key positions. The service's esprit de corps was largely destroyed. The few good professional diplomats were sidelined and over-rolled by populist politicians. When Ioannis Tzounis, a senior Greek diplomat, suggested alternative, more flexible, strategies vis-a-vis Macedonia in 1992, his confidential memos were leaked to the populist press (i.e. Elefterotypia daily). He was de-legitimized as a junta sympathizer and the credibility of his proposals was quickly destroyed. After that incident, all potential dissenting voices in the foreign service were silenced for good. The decay in personnel and structures and the weakening of the position of professional diplomats vis-a-vis their political supervisors goes a long way toward explaining the weakness of the resistance against populism and demagoguery, and led to Greece's clear lack of long-term strategy, its inability to establish priorities and its poor judgment.

All in all, in the beginning of the 1990s, Greece had neither the experience nor the expertise required to deal adequately with what amounted to a geo-strategic watershed: the end of the Cold War, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the independence of Macedonia. A populist political culture that exaggerated external threats and regarded foreign affairs as matters of justice and inalienable rights to be defended at all costs against malicious

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7See Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, 'A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-Authoritarian Greece,' in Greece. The New Europe, and it
foreigners, overestimated national capabilities and discounted costs. This led to the elevation of a minor concern, i.e. the possibility of a future official Macedonian irredentism, to rise to the top of the country's foreign policy agenda and dominate Greek politics for three years.

3. The Protagonists

The electoral defeat of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in June 1989 and the outright victory of the center-right New Democracy in April 1990, appeared to be Greece's second chance at socio-economic modernization—a fresh start after eight years of socialist mismanagement.

However, the stunning 47% of the vote and the broad social consensus that New Democracy achieved in 1990 was not enough to overcome the government's thin parliamentary majority of one seat—a result of socialist electoral law—and the significant, even irreconcilable, political and personal differences that divided the party's leadership.

This double weakness of the new administration was further accentuated by the broader financial and state crisis precipitated by years of populist overspending and ten months of weak, communist-dependent, coalition governments between June 1989 and April 1990 Hard choices were required to achieve macro-economic stabilization and structural, economic and administrative reform, at a time when internal party infighting and militant public sector trade unions paralyzed governmental decision-making.

Of great importance to the mechanics of Greek democracy in the 1990s, was the consolidation of a powerful triangular relationship between business interests, political authorities and the media—the so-called 'interwoven interests.' Such a development became possible thanks, first, to the emergence of unregulated private electronic media

outlets that, from the start, captured more than 80% of the market and effectively ostracized public broadcasting and secondly, thanks to the influx of generous E.U. structural aid. This aid is state-administered and has increased the incentive of entrepreneurial elites to cultivate their influence with political authorities to win public contracts and subsidies.

Thus, big industrialists with public contracts worth billions of drachmas operate loss-making TV and radio stations to buy political influence. This became possible because of the weakness of the Greek state and the lack of political will to regulate the market. What started as a promising development, the breaking of the state's monopoly in broadcasting and Europe's generous developmental aid, has created a closed system of power that is insulated from elections and political turnovers because it involves both major parties of Greece. This system was the operational environment in which Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras and opposition leader Andreas Papandreou, the Greek protagonists of the Macedonian saga, functioned.

Constantine Mitsotakis was an experienced politician who had been a member of the Greek parliament since 1946, having won a seat in every election except that of 1974. Mitsotakis started his career as a member of the Liberals, one of the two great political families of Greece before 1974, the other being the Royalists-Conservatives. His rising star suffered a tremendous blow when he sided against his Prime Minister, George Papandreou, Andreas' father, in 1965 and toppled the centrist government in cooperation with the conservatives. During the junta and the first few years of democratic rule afterwards he wandered in the political wilderness until Constantine Karamanlis invited him to join his New Democracy government in 1978. Six years later he took over the leadership of the party after defeating a traditional conservative, Constantine Stephanopoulos, the current President of the Republic. Mitsotakis tried to turn New Democracy from a party of notables into a mass party with a strong social presence in trade unionism and higher education. He promoted his own loyal supporters in key
positions, alienating much of the party's old guard. In ideology, he abandoned much of the traditional statism of the right and espoused free-market economics.

Mitsotakis remained a foreign import to the body of New Democracy. He was not a conventional right-winger. He felt insecure and, in his efforts to consolidate power, he relied on his family and a closed circle of trusted friends who were often promoted to the party's senior positions for their loyalty rather than their merit. The assassination of the most capable of them, Nikos Bakoyannis, Mitsotakis' son-in-law, in September 1989, deprived Mitsotakis of much needed political counsel and created a vacuum in his personal cabinet that was never effectively filled. The continuous friction with the old guard produced a first 'schism' in 1985 with the departure of Stephanopoulos and the creation of a competing center-right splinter group, DIANA (Democratic Renewal). Despite the loss of the 1985 parliamentary elections and Stephanopoulos' defection, the election of New Democracy candidates to the municipalities of the three largest cities (Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus) in October 1986 marked the first victory for the party since the parliamentary elections of 1977 and consolidated, once and for all, Mitsotakis's hold on party leadership.

Intra-party cleavages were papered over but did not altogether disappear. First, ideological divisions persisted: New Democracy remained divided between free-marketers and etatist-protectionists of the Gaullist-Karamanlis variety who refused to acknowledge the difference between the expansive, state-supported high growth of the 1950s and 1960s and the restructuring demands of the 1980s and the 1990s. Furthermore, the arrival of a new generation of party leaders and the opening of the party to society threatened the fiefdoms of party notables with their strong local bases and accentuated their opposition to the Mitsotakis party order.

The old guard failed to appreciate the revolution that PASOK had brought about in Greek politics and the need for the center-right to rebuild its forces and respond to societal demands for an active presence in, say, the trade unions, and the various youth,
women and farmers' organizations. It resented Mhositakis and his people as newcomers. Mhositakis had built an image of the tough politician who gets the job done no matter what. Much like the Tory 'aristocracy' that resented Margaret Thatcher's adversarial and uncompromising approach to politics, New Democracy's old guard felt justifiably threatened by the new 'immoral' politics that Mhositakis introduced.

Thus, New Democracy assumed the responsibility of government, internally divided and with the modernization of its party structure and its ideology far from complete. How incomplete this modernization was became apparent with the fall of the government and the resignation of Mhositakis from the party leadership three years later. The election of Miltiadis Evert to the party chairmanship in 1993 (where he remained until 1997) marked New Democracy's historical regression from traditional European liberalism to a populist, protectionist and nationalist right, that produced one electoral defeat after another and a massive internal crisis in late 1996.

New Democracy's internal divisions reflected the difficulty Greece has had in shedding a populist-statist political tradition and successfully facing up to the challenges of a unified Europe and a globalized economy. Macedonia played into this division and further polarized the party between its traditionalist and modernizing wings, a polarization that eventually caused the collapse of the Mitsotakis government and initiated the realignment of Greek political forces. This realignment remains incomplete but is evident in the support New Democracy's modernizers lend to the current Simitis government and the similar views held by members of the popular right and PASOFCS die-hard 'patriots' in issues of foreign policy and the economy.

An understanding of the difficulties Mitsotakis had in controlling his party and its various personal antagonisms is crucial, as they form the background of the Macedonian crisis. In his effort to control his party and frustrate Even's ambitions, Mhsotakis promoted and supported Antonis Samaras as a loyal rising star. He trusted him with a difficult and demanding portfolio, the Foreign Ministry. Mitsotakis could not have
miscalculated more seriously. Instead of an experienced politician, Mitsotakis chose a novice with the most serious flaw of all: unassailable personal ambition. Samaras was to turn the foreign ministry into his launching base for the premiership and in the process conduct Greek foreign policy solely as a show for domestic political consumption and short-term political gains. He courted public opinion intensively and became the most popular Greek politician but he will be remembered as a bad foreign minister. Finally, in 1996 he lost his parliamentary seat and currently he wanders in a political no-man's land. Although some sort of a come-back should not be ruled out in the strange world of Greek politics, it is almost inconceivable to see him play the role he had between 1990 and 1993. Samaras' spectacular rise and equally spectacular decline is a good reminder of the high risks involved in nationalist politics.

In the late 1980s Antonis Samaras represented the modern face of the Greek center-right. He had impeccable credentials: a Harvard degree, good rhetorical skills and nice, youthful looks. Samaras had a special personal relationship with Mitsotakis and his powerful wife and commanded immense popularity among the rank and file of the party. Had Samaras remained in New Democracy rather than defected, even in opposition to Mitsotakis, he would have been the party's new leader and prime ministerial candidate. Samaras had everything in place: excellent public relations and friendly access to the press, the trust of his party and his leader, and the approval of Greece's foreign partners, including the United States. At the age of 42, at the head of Greece's foreign service, Samaras' star seemed destined to rise further In the words of an American official in the U.S. embassy in Athens, "Samaras was groomed to become the new leader of Greece." Seven years later, Samaras' star has all but disappeared, fighting to survive political obscurity. He gambled on Macedonia and lost

Nobody knows exactly what prompted Samaras to make Macedonia his political flag in the hope of getting to the premiership faster. Nobody knows what made him betray
his party, his boss and patron, Mitsotakis, and plunge Greece into a political crisis that only benefited Papandreou. As the great-grand son of Penelope Delta, the well-known liberal nationalist writer of the early century, whose novels on the Macedonian struggle between Greek and Bulgarian irregulars are part of many young Greeks' education was his devotion to 'Macedonia' sincere, inspired by ancestral tradition? Did he seriously believe that Greece had the right and the might to force the new republic to change its name? Or, afraid of becoming the convenient scapegoat of failed policies, and did he decide to make the 'great leap forward', attempting a heroic exit to preserve his popularity and posterity? Nobody knows for sure, but he probably did feel that Greece was both right and powerful enough to impose its maximalist position. And he obviously did believe that by doing so he was also serving his political future. In a recent interview with the author (February 17, 1998), Samaras stood firm by his beliefs, defended his motives as noble and patriotic and fully endorsed the highly nationalist-conspiratorial account of the Macedonian crisis written by his former assistant, Alexandras Tarkas, AthinaSkopje: Piso Apo Tis Kleistes Portes [Athens-Skopje: Behind the Closed Doors], (2 vols, Athens: Labyrinthos, 1995).

Andreas Papandreou has been the grand master of late twentieth-century Greek politics. It is impossible to summarize his role in a few lines. Suffice it to say that by introducing mass politics into Greek political life, Papandreou revolutionized and irreversibly changed the rules of the political game. The party he founded in 1974 and controlled with an iron fist until his death in 1996, PASOK, developed into an extraordinarily successful vote-winner. Conveniently positioned between the Marxist left and the old parties of the center and the right, PASOK expressed the new radicalism of the growing lower and middle classes without, however, directly threatening Greece's sociopolitical system. PASOK's was radicalism 'lite,' suited perfectly to post-junta Greek politics.

8It is said that Mitsotakis thought of Samaras as the eldest son he never had and treated him with a kind of paternal affection that annoyed many in New Democracy, including Mitsotakis' own daughter, Dora Bakoyanni.
Papandreou was a master of political tactics; his sense of timing, his grasp of the popular mood, and his extraordinary rhetorical skills made him a formidable opponent. On the eve of the June 1989 elections, he changed the electoral law to proportional representation to block Mhsotakis' bid for power. Papandreou partially succeeded; it took Mhsotakis three elections and 10 months of further economic slide to win an overall majority. And even then, this majority was very fragile. Having achieved the highest electoral percentage in recent European parliamentary history, New Democracy was left with a majority of one seat. This, together with the collapse of public finances preceding its ascendance to power, effectively jeopardized the Mhsotakis administration from the start and positioned Papandreou favorably for an electoral recovery.

In his recovery, Papandreou was helped by the amazing 39% of the vote he still managed to win in 1989-1990, at the nadir of his political fortunes. This result was far from the humiliation that many had expected and his opponents had hoped for. Papandreou and PASOK remained the only credible alternative to the rule of the center-right. Papandreou quickly identified two privileged areas through which he could bounce back: the economy and his personal criminal prosecution. Papandreou became the defender of public sector unions in their struggle to block Mhsotakis' attempt at privatization and at reforming the social security system. At the same time, Papandreou portrayed himself as the victim of a witch-hunt and mobilized his supporters to force the government to drop the criminal charges against him and some of his associates.

The out-break of the Macedonian issue in December 1991 was unexpected but presented Papandreou with an opportunity to consolidate his electoral rise by criticizing the government for a nationally harmful policy and by exploiting the increasingly apparent divisions inside the government over Macedonia. In April 1992, in a major by-election in
the Second District of Athens (where one out of every seven Greeks votes), PASOK registered a spectacular 10% rise in its power. April 1992 marks the transformation of PASOK from a political lame-duck to a government-in-waiting. Gradually the control of political developments passed from the disintegrating Mitsotakis government to Papandreou and PASOK. The result of the October 1993 elections was a foregone conclusion.

Macedonia served Papandreou two purposes. First, it made nationalism politically fashionable again. Papandreou had partially based his political rise in the 1970s on nationalism and his antagonism with Turkey and the United States. He came to power in 1981 with the pledge of making Greeks "nationally proud," promising to resist foreign intervention in Greek affairs at all costs. He won the 1984 Euro-Parliamentary elections with the slogan that "Greece belongs to Greeks", opposed to the right's overzealous Europhilia. In other words, Papandreou successfully defined the Greek "national interest" in terms not of, say, economic development, but in terms of national pride and national sovereignty against the intrusive European Community.

However, the 1988 Davos rapprochement with Turkey, PASOK's U-turn espousal of Euro-federalism, and the new international conditions made nationalism unappealing, to the detriment of the populist Papandreou who thrived on nationalist coronas, denouncing foreigners and flattering Greeks. Macedonia offered Papandreou the opportunity to fall back on his favorite nationalist rhetoric that had served him so well in the past, and to extract great political benefits by presenting himself as the defender of the rights of the Greek nation.

Macedonia also helped Papandreou to paper over some serious disagreements in his own party on issues of domestic politics, silence the reform-minded internal opposition
and evade politically risky commitments in economic issues. At times of "national urgency" combating inflation became petty politics. Macedonia allowed Papandreou the opportunity to project a national role for himself as the ultimate protector of Greek rights against the amateurs and, even, traitors of New Democracy. Papandreou was no longer simply a party leader but a wise national leader to whom a majority of Greeks looked for guidance in times of peril. Mitsotakis tried in vain to play down the significance of the dispute and affirm that Turkey, not Macedonia, is Greece's first foreign policy priority. His declaration that "Macedonia will be forgotten in ten-years time" was mocked as irresponsible and careless leadership. Mitsotakis was, of course, wrong; it took Greeks not ten but two years to forget all about Macedonia.

4. The Macedonian Saga

Greece entered the 1990s in the midst of a severe financial crisis and a skyrocketing public deficit of 20% of GDP that seriously threatened the solvency of the treasury. The new Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis and his closest associates put together a program of vigorous economic reform, based on macro-economic stabilization and micro-economic structural reform. As soon as the government embarked on the implementation of its program, it was confronted with massive opposition spearheaded by the public sector trade unions and the defeated socialists. Unrest spread quickly, forcing the government to overhaul its reform plans.

Having spent the first two years maneuvering in vain with trade unionists and the socialist opposition, Mitsotakis appointed a new economic team in January 1992 with a fresh mandate for rapid reform. The least dynamic and most state-dependent groups of

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9The Mitsotakis' agenda included reform of the labor market, the social security system, education, the farm sector and large scale privatization.
society rallied against change. Andreas Papandreou, an experienced populist, and his socialists provided the political leadership and expression for this opposition that included public sector employees, farmers, pensioners, the unemployed and business interests connected to the state.

In the summer of 1991 the American political analyst Joe Giick conducted an extensive public opinion research. According to his report, Greeks believed that they were experiencing a national crisis. There was no agreement on the content of the crisis but people spoke about it in four different ways: "shame" for Greece having been left behind Portugal, 'loss" for the missed opportunity of the 1980s to become "modern" and "European" when Greece wasted its European membership in populist spending, "threat" of foreign influence on the Greek way of life, and "moral decadence" of important social values. According to Glick, the national crisis struck at the heart of Greeks' pride.10

The independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its claims to a distinct Macedonian national identity offended Greeks' relationship to their own history, while European reactions alarmed Greek fears for Europe's intentions. On February 14, 1992, a million Greeks demonstrated in Thessaloniki, the capital of the Greek province of Macedonia, demanding that the Republic of Macedonia not be recognized until it changed its name and that Greek 'history' be respected.11 Although at the end nationalist mobilization and popular demonstrations exacerbated problems, initially they were welcomed even by well-intentioned liberals as a way of covering the deficit of social values that the social crisis had produced.12 It was thought that this generation of

10Theodore Skyiakakis, Sto Onoma tis Makedonias [In the Name of Macedonia] (Athens: EUiniki Euroekdotiki, 1995), pp. 251-253.
12Skylakakis, p. 252.
Greeks might have mismanaged the national economy but he would not allow the same thing to happen to national patrimony. Macedonia became the battleground for the redemption of Greek pride after the decadence of the 1980s.

Despite Mhsotakis' personal opposition to popular demonstrations when delicate diplomacy was needed most, members of his government, including his Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras, jumped on the developing Macedonian saga to bolster their political careers. They hoped to challenge Mhsotakis and position themselves favorably in the next leadership contest. Despite the latter's desperate efforts to win over Greece's partners in Europe and the United States, he seemed that there was nothing to satisfy the Greek public short of the abandonment of the name "Macedonia" by the new republic, a concession that Mhsotakis and the whole Greek political leadership knew was impossible for Skopje to make.\(^1\)

The construction and overplaying of an external security threat helped state-dependent interests to invoke "national security" to defeat the government's privatization program. For them, the telecommunications and energy sectors had to remain state-owned to ensure the decision-making autonomy of Greece in case of an external crisis. Protectionism or economic nationalism was coupled with foreign policy nationalism with the end result that the liberal-reformers within New Democracy who advocated orthodox economic policies at home and compromise abroad, found themselves politically isolated. The government fell and a coalition of nationalist-protectionists carried the day.\(^2\) Having won the election in October 1993, the Socialists abandoned economic reforms and in

\(^{13}\) As it was admitted off the record to this author in numerous interviews with party leaders, cabinet members and senior foreign policy editors.

\(^{14}\) Dimitri Keridis, "Greek Foreign Policy after Macedonia," Emphasis 11 (Boston, April/June 1995), pp. 36-37.
certain areas reversed them. Mhsotakis and his allies lost not only lose their parliamentary majority but even the chairmanship of New Democracy in favor of the nationalist-protectionist-populist Mihiadis Evert. Four months later on February 16, 1994, Papandreou imposed a full trade embargo on Macedonia to force Skopje into submission. The embargo had the unanticipated effects of domesticating much of the costs of the nationalist foreign policy by severely hurting Greek business interests and the country's international standing. Following a calmer first half of 1995, an Interim Agreement between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was signed on September 13, 1995, where, in exchange for the lifting of the Greek embargo, FYROMacedonia agreed to change its flag and reinterpret its constitution in accordance with Greek demands.

The story of Greece's nationalist outburst in the early 1990s and demands that the newly independent Republic of Macedonia change its name before being internationally recognized, has many similarities with that of Serbia, but also five important differences. First, contrary to Serbia, a country in transition, Greece has a consolidated parliamentary democracy with a free and independent-minded media and a vibrant civil society. Greece also possesses a market economy with a strong entrepreneurial culture that is well integrated into the global distribution of labor.

Secondly, in Greece, nationalism was stimulated and manipulated by a political-business coalition opposed to a reform-minded government rather than the government itself and was used to defeat its program of socio-economic reform.

\footnote{Valinakis and Dalis, p. 438.}
\footnote{Ibid, pp. 496-497.}
Thirdly, in the Greek case the military option was never seriously considered. When Milosevic allegedly proposed to Mhsotakis to jointly partition Macedonia, Mhsotakis flatly rejected the idea. There was always a clear limit to the goals and the means of the nationalist policy agenda. Threatened elites had other policy alternatives and the use of force was too costly an option to pursue.

Fourthly, whereas in Serbia the rallying point of nationalist mobilization was primarily the fate of a people, the Serbs outside Serbia proper, in Greece it was a symbol, the name of neighboring Macedonia. Serbs embarked on aggressive revisionism, first of the Yugoslav status quo as enshrined in the 1974 constitution, by abolishing the autonomy of Kosovo, and then by attempting to change the internationally recognized borders of Croatia and Bosnia. On the contrary, Greeks reacted against the potential revisionism of neighbors and never questioned the validity of borders.

Finally, Greece is a well consolidated nation-state and ethnically, by far, the most homogeneous one in the Balkans. On the contrary, Serbia in 1991 was coming out of the trauma of the loss of Yugoslavia and had to jump start a process at nation-state formation that was suspended in 1918 and reversed after 1945. Today, Serbia remains ethnically the most divided nation in Southeastern Europe with a minority population close to 1/3 of the total. Given this division, and as long as Serbian politics are based on the national principle, true democracy and the rule of law will remain elusive.

In Yugoslav Macedonia, Greece had neither people to defend nor territories to conquer. But this and all the above mentioned differences with Serbia did not prevent the overwhelming majority of Greeks from mobilizing as if Macedonian independence were an existential threat. The Macedonian adventure of Greek foreign policy illustrates best that what is believed to be the "national interest" has, often, nothing to do with an objective
reading of reality and everything to do with partisan competition, popular anxieties and firmly entrenched political cultures.

5. The Chronicle of the Crisis

The Macedonian crisis burst into the Greek foreign policy agenda with the holding of the first free elections in Yugoslavia's Socialist Republic of Macedonia that brought Macedonian nationalism to the fore. Following the election of a new government, demands for Macedonian independence gained momentum and culminated finally in a popular referendum that endorsed independence from Yugoslavia and raised the question of the new state's international recognition.

Greece perceived the constitution, national symbols and above all, the name of the new state, to be a threat to its own identity and territory and embarked on a campaign to condition the international recognition of the new republic on a change of name that would clearly distinguish it from the Greek province of Macedonia.

As long as the issue was kept within the confines of the European Community, Greece succeeded in blocking the international recognition of Macedonia by virtue of its veto. However, when Skopje, frustrated by the Europeans' intransigence, moved the issue to the United Nations, Greece was confronted with the inevitability of Macedonia's UN membership but still managed to persuade enough members of the Security Council, including the Europeans and the United States, to accept Macedonia under a temporary name and without a flag. Since then, negotiations between Athens and Skopje have been conducted with partial success. An Interim Agreement was concluded in 1995 that established relations between the two countries but the issue of the name remains
unresolved, and will probably fizzle away in the years to come as more and more states establish diplomatic relations with Skopje under Macedonia's constitutional name.

The chronicle of the crisis could be summarized below as follows:\(^{17}\): in November-December 1990, in the first free multi-party elections to take place in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the nationalist VMRO came first, obtaining a plurality of 38 seats (31.7\%) in the legislature. Unfortunately for VMRO, however, its leader, the 25-year-old poet, Ljubco Georgievski, failed in his own bid to win a legislative mandate. On January 25, 1991, the republic's parliament proclaimed the sovereignty of Macedonia. Two days later, the parliament elected former communist leader, Kiro Gligorov, as President of the Republic. On February 17, 1991, the socialist designation was dropped from the official title of the country. On April 15, 1991, the parliament ratified a first round of constitutional amendments that stressed the ethnic "Macedonianness" of the state. On September 5, 1991, in an effort to refute a return to the nationalist past, Bulgaria's president, Zelhiou Zhelev, declared that his country would recognize Macedonia under its constitutional name but, still, refused the existence of a Macedonian nation. On September 8, 1991, 95\% of the 72\% of the Macedonian citizens who actually participated in the referendum, voted yes to the question "are you in favor of a sovereign and independent Macedonian state, with the right to participate in a future union of sovereign Yugoslav states?" On September 17, 1991, the parliament ratified the results of the referendum on independence and declared the withdrawal of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation.

On November 13, 1991, for the first time, the Greek government spokesman declared that "Greece is not willing to recognize an independent state that bears the historical Greek name of Macedonia." On November 17, 1991, the Macedonian

\(^{1}\) The account that follows relies heavily on data provided in Valinakis and Dalis, Tg Zitima ton Skopion.
parliament adopted the new constitution of the country. An alarmed Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that the constitution of the new republic allowed for the change of borders in article 73 and for the protection of the "Macedonian nation" in neighboring countries in article 49. On December 3, 1991, Kiro Giigorov asked for the international recognition of his country from the foreign ambassadors in Belgrade.

On December 4, 1991, the Greek cabinet agreed to three preconditions for the international recognition of Macedonia, according to which it should change its name, denounce all claims against Greece and admit to the non-existence of a "Macedonian" minority in Greece. On December 16, 1991, the European Council of Foreign Ministers recognized the disintegration of Yugoslavia and asked authorities in Skopje to adopt constitutional and political guarantees that Macedonia had no territorial claims against a neighboring country and would not undertake any hostile propaganda including a use of name that implies territorial claims. Although at the time, these requests were hailed by the Greek government as a major diplomatic victory, the Greek Foreign Minister who participated in the Council, Antonis Samaras, was later criticized for bending on German demands for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, opening the way for the bloodbath in Bosnia, and for the vagueness of the European preconditions for the international recognition of Macedonia.

On January 3, 1992, Constantine Karamanlis, the Greek President of the Republic, sent a special letter to the leaders of the European Community's member-states. On the same day, an unofficial, exploratory meeting between Foreign Ministry experts from Greece and Macedonia with the aim of reaching a settlement to the developing dispute between the two countries, came to a dead end due to Macedonia's categorical refusal to discuss any issue related to its name.
According to the account of Evangelos Kofos, a senior expert on Macedonia at the Greek Foreign Ministry and member of the Greek team in that meeting, the Greek representatives, to their surprise, were given strict orders by the Foreign Minister to avoid any compromise and to seek a full change of the name of Macedonia. For Kofos, the hardening of the Greek position that led to the public explosion of the dispute two months later, should be traced to early January 1992 when, for the first time, opposition deputies headed by Stelios Paphthemelis (PASOK-Thessaloniki district) argued for a policy that aimed at Skopje's total abandonment of the name of Macedonia. At the same time, Greece stopped referring to Macedonia and Macedonians as Slav-Macedonia and Slav-Macedonians and started using the degrading term Skopje and Skopjens for the people of the new state instead.

On January 6, 1992, the Macedonian parliament adopted two minor amendments of articles 3 and 49 of its constitution in order to meet some of the Greek demands. In response, the European Community's Badintir Commission, formed by the Council to evaluate the former Yugoslav republics' application for recognition and named after its French chairman and leading constitutional jurist, concluded that Macedonia fulfilled all three preconditions set by the Council. The decision fell like a bombshell on the Greek political scene and greatly alarmed the government Andreas Papandreou realized for the first time that Macedonia could be politically very profitable to him and could facilitate his political comeback. He accused the Greek government of failing to appoint a Greek representative in the Commission, thus damaging the national interest.

On January 12, 1992, Constantine Karamanlis sent a second letter to European leaders urging them to comply with the Council's preconditions and deny Skopje

18 Interview of the author with Evangelos Kofos, Athens, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 3, 1993
international recognition. On January 14, 1992, Francois Mitterand recommended the recognition of Macedonia, sending shock waves through the Greek political establishment. Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis embarked on an extended tour of European capitals to 'salvage' what looked like a lost cause.

Unexpectedly, the first Greek loss would come from the East rather than the West: on January 15, 1992, Bulgaria became the first nation in the world to extend recognition to Macedonia (without recognizing the existence of a separate Macedonian nation), causing a deterioration in Greek-Bulgarian relations. President Zhelev who took personal responsibility for Bulgarian haste, was later severely criticized by his compatriots for this move. Bulgaria would continue to have an unresolved dispute with Macedonia to the present day and bilateral cooperation would remain elusive because of Sofia's refusal to recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian language and nation.

On January 17, 1992, Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras sent a letter to his European colleagues presenting the Greek case against the recognition of Macedonia. This was one of the many lengthy but unpersuasive presentations of the Greek case to foreigners in the years to come. Greek arguments focused on the Greekness of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonian kingdom, the Greek civil war in the late 1940s and Tito's attempts to usurp Greek territories through the fabrication of a distinct Macedonian nation.

On February 5, 1992, Turkey recognized Macedonia, without the Bulgarian reservations. Turkey's recognition heightened Greek anxieties of a Turkish-led political encirclement of Greece. At the time, Turkey's influence in the Balkans seemed to be markedly on the rise. In Bulgaria the Turkish party became the power broker between the socialists and the UDF anti-communist liberals. Under the premiership of Philip Dimitrov,
Bulgarian-Turkish relations improved dramatically and Bulgaria moved away from its traditional pro-Greek stand to a, for Athens, irritating equidistance. Albania under the new President Sali Berisha eagerly sought Turkey's alliance and thought of Ankara as a valuable counterweight to Serbian and Greek pressures. Finally, Macedonia was also ready to exploit Greek-Turkish antagonism to isolate Greece and win its case internationally. The Turkish recognition of Macedonia was followed by exaggerated accounts of a Muslim arch stretching over Greece's northern and eastern borders, masterminded in Ankara and executed with the cooperation of Sofia, Skopje and Tirana. It should be noted that Turkey's grandiose Balkan policies came to almost nothing and Ankara, after 1995, distracted by its problems to the East, receded from the Balkans as fast as it had entered in 1991.

In the meantime, on February 14, 1992, one million Greeks demonstrated in Thessaloniki for the 'Greekness' of Macedonia. This was the first in a series of popular demonstrations that were to surprise both the government and the opposition for their virality and the large crowds they attracted. It was obvious that Macedonia had touched a sensitive chord in the Greek body politic and that it would dominate the country's politics in the medium term. Prime Minister Mitsotakis found such demonstrations dangerous but his objections were easily swept away by the growing popular fervor.

On February 17, 1992, the Portuguese Foreign Minister and President of the European Council, Z. Pineiro, undertook to explore a possible settlement of the dispute. His initiative would culminate in the famous Pineiro Plan, a package deal rejected by both Greece and Macedonia.

In an unprecedented move Greek political leaders convened on February 18, 1992, under the chairmanship of Constantine Karamanlis in an effort to forge a "national
consensus" on Macedonia. There would be two additional meetings. Faced with mounting international criticism, Mitsotakis thought of these meetings as a way to share with the opposition the responsibility of a compromise and salvage his government. His policy however backfired and instead of tying his opponents' hands, he found himself tied to a maximalist policy that asked for the abandonment of the name of Macedonia by Skopje. Papandreou, on the contrary, exploited the meetings to reconfirm his nationalist credentials and gain the political initiative by setting the tone and the agenda of the political debate.

Following Italian and Dutch comments that offended Greek sensitivities, Greek consumers boycotted Italian and Dutch products in February 1992. The success of the boycott, despite the government's condemnation, heightened the popular appeal that Macedonia had for Greeks. The boycott caused the further deterioration of Euro-Greek relations and Rome, the Hague and the European Commission threatened Greece with retaliation.

On April 7, 1992, the United States recognized the independence of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but not of Macedonia after pressures by the Greek lobby in Washington. On this issue, the Bush administration decided to follow the European Community's lead. Recognition would be extended after the EC-brokered settlement of the dispute to the satisfaction of both parties involved.

After months of worsening relations between Mitsotakis and Samaras, on the eve of the second conference of Greek political leaders, Samaras published his seven points on Macedonia that outlined a hard-line policy against the northern republic. Samaras demanded that the council of political leaders fully clarify that the name "Macedonia" is non-negotiable for Greece under any circumstances. In case the Greek demands were not
satisfied, Greece should block the European recognition of Skopje and close its borders with it.

On April 13, 1992, Mitsotakis expelled Samaras from the government. Mitsotakis then took over the portfolio of foreign affairs himself, in an effort to pacify hostile public opinion and underline the fact that Macedonia remained a first priority for the government. A senior Greek diplomat, Ioannis Tzounis, was appointed deputy minister to assist Mitsotakis in his effort to find a way out of the impasse. During the preceding months, Greece became the recipient of an extraordinary wave of bad publicity from the international media. Greece was portrayed as a Balkan villain, a regional nationalist bully that tried to suffocate little but righteous Macedonia.

On April 16, 1992, Hans Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister and a senior European statesman, defended Community solidarity and declared that Germany was in favor of a solution that was acceptable to Greece. On May 2, 1992, Mitsotakis participated for the first time in the European Council of Ministers as a foreign minister. Genscher, in a gesture of political support for his old friend Mitsotakis, proposed to recognize Macedonia under the name "Republic of Skopje." Britain, France and Italy objected to turning the EU into a "godfather" for the new nations of Eastern Europe. On May 11, Greece promised financial and technical assistance to Skopje when a settlement was reached. On May 30, 1992, fifty thousand Greek-Americans demonstrated in front of the White House in Washington in support of Greece's position on Macedonia. On June 3, 1992, the Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco da Silva, announced that Greece rejected the Portuguese presidency's proposal for the name of "Upper Macedonia" as the basis for the resolution of the conflict. On June 9, 1992, the Greek parliament, in full session, issued a resolution, supported by all parties except the Communist, in favor of the full application of the three preconditions prior to the international recognition of Skopje. On June 18,
1992, the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, proposed the name "Vardar Republic" for Skopje, after the Vardar river that cuts across the new state.

On June 27, 1991, at the conclusion of the Portuguese presidency, the European Council in Lisbon came out clearly and unequivocally on the Greek side, declaring that the European Community would not recognize the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under a name that included the word "Macedonia" in it. While the decision caused a government crisis in Skopje, the immediate resignation of the Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Malefski and the fall of the Nikola Klouysef government ten days later, Mhsotakis returned triumphantly to Athens to claim all the glory for the "great national success." Even opposition leader Andreas Papandreou, who had scheduled a press conference to condemn the government, was surprised by the European declaration and seemed at a loss.

Faced with European intransigence, Gligorov redirected Macedonian efforts at diplomatic recognition away from the European Community and towards the United Nations. On July 30, 1992, he wrote to the General Secretary of the UN requesting Macedonia's admission to the organization. On August 6, 1992, Russia rebuffed Greece and, following president Yeltsin's trip to Bulgaria and talks with Zhelev, recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name.

The honeymoon Mitsotakis had enjoyed following Lisbon quickly came to an end and pressures to produce a solution on Greek terms increased again. It became clear that Lisbon was only a respite, a window of opportunity to reach a solution and not a permanent Greek victory. Because of Greek maximalism and inflexibility on Macedonia, Mitsotakis, tied by the decisions of the council of political leaders and pressured by the
opposition, Samaras and the hostile media, found it impossible to capitalize on the Lisbon success and reach a settlement with Gligorov.

Faced with Greek hostility, on August 11, 1992, Macedonia provoked Greece by adopting the Star of Vergina, found in 1977 outside Thessaloniki in Greek Macedonia in the tomb of Phillip II (the father of Alexander the Great), as its national flag. The 16-ray star was considered a Greek national symbol for Greeks who reacted angrily to "one more Skopjen provocation" by posting posters with it en masse. The Greek government adopted the star and the head of Alexander the Great as the two faces for the new 100-drachma gold-colored coin.

On November 30, 1992, the British presidency's special rapporteur, Ambassador Robin O' Neil, proposed the name "Macedonia-Skopje" as the basis of a settlement. O' Neil's proposals included the word "Macedonia" in the name, contrary to the Lisbon decision, signifying Britain's reluctance to fully adopt the Greek position and Europe's increasing frustration with Greek maximalism. On December 12, 1992, the European Council in Edinburgh asked the Council of Ministers to continue its efforts to find a solution to the Macedonian dispute but declared that member-states were not bound to follow the Lisbon decision if the issue came to other fora such as the UN or the CSCE. On December 16, 1992, Macedonia requested admissions to the UN for a second time.

1992 ended with Greece having wasted considerable political capital in an effort to persuade its European partners not to recognize Macedonia. Some success was achieved in Lisbon but it was only temporary. Amidst mounting international pressure and bad publicity, Greece saw the Macedonian issue being dragged away from Europe and into the UN, in a forum where Athens exerted a much weaker leverage.
On January 5, 1993, the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, in a letter to Mhsotakis and Gligorov, elaborated President Francois Mitterrand's proposal for the international arbitration of the Greek-FYROM dispute. On January 7, 1993, Gligorov, optimistic about his country's prospects in the UN, rejected the French proposal. On January 8, 1993, Papandreou, sensing the government's cul-de-sac, rejected the French proposal and reiterated Greece's maximalist position for the full abandonment of the word "Macedonia" by the Skopje authorities. On January 10, 1993, in search of allies, Macedonian Prime Minister Victor Tservenkofski declared that Macedonia's hope was Turkey, further infuriating Greek nationalists and accentuating Greek fears for a developing hostile Turkey-sponsored arch over Greece's northern border.

On January 25, 1993, Britain, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, suggested the following three temporary names for FYROM: Macedonia-Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Macedonia-Skopje and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On January 26, 1993, Greece handed in an official memorandum to the UN Secretary General in regard to Macedonia's request for admission to the organization. The memorandum marked a significant departure from the hard-line maximalist positions Greece had previously espoused and opened the way for a more constructive, flexible and pragmatic handling of the problem. In paragraph 10 it stated that "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia insists on the monopolization of the Macedonian name [...] There is no doubt that the exclusive use of the Macedonian name for the official designation of this republic will be an incentive for territorial claims not only by today's aggressive nationalists in Skopje but by future generations as well." And in paragraph 15 it stated that "Greece wants to underline that the admission of FYROM to the UN prior to [...] the abandonment of the use of the name 'Republic of Macedonia' will increase tension..."
In both statements Greece appeared, for the first time, to object not to the use of the name Macedonia by FYROM but to the exclusive, monopolistic use of the name by FYROM. Realizing the dead end of its initial policy for the complete abandonment of the name Macedonia and the weakness of the Greek position in the Security Council, Athens attempted a readjustment of Greek strategy. This readjustment, however, was never stated clearly back home nor was it explained to the Greek public for fear of provoking a nationalist counter-reaction and the downfall of the government. This created enormous confusion with Papandreou and Samaras accusing Mitsotakis of lying to the Greek people and of having sold out Macedonia without a fight. Instead of explaining the need for a new policy, Mitsotakis insisted that nothing had changed, damaging both his own personal, and his government's, credibility.

On January 27, 1993, the Presidency of the Republic announced the cancellation of the meeting of the council of the political leaders following Papandreou's refusal to participate. Papandreou realized the dead end Mitsotakis had found himself in, and was determined to extract as much political capital out of it as possible. Mitsotakis wanted the meeting in order to confront the opposition leaders, Papandreou in particular, with their responsibility and share the "blame" and the political cost that the need for a policy readjustment involved. Papandreou, an experienced politician whose top priority was his own electoral come-back, was not about to do Mitsotakis a favor and refused to participate in the council, rendering it meaningless. Karamanlis, to the anger of Mitsotakis, refused to convene the council without the participation of Papandreou.

On April 7, 1993, the Security Council unanimously decided with resolution 817/1993 to admit Macedonia to the UN under the temporary name of "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and without a flag, and asked the two co-chairmen of the conference on Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, to mediate in the dispute.
under the auspices of the General Secretary. This was the first time a state was admitted to the UN under a temporary name and without a flag. However, the temporary name did include the word "Macedonia" in it. From the Greek point of view, resolution 817, based on a proposal by SC members Britain, France and Spain and supported by the US, was a mixed bag. A day later, the UN General Assembly admitted FYROM as the 181st member of the organization.

On April 12, 1993, indirect negotiations sponsored by Vance and Owen, following the Security Council's request, began in New York with the participation of Greek foreign minister Mihalis Papakonstantinou and the Macedonian vice-president Stefan Tservenkovski. On April 15, 1993, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Italy recognized FYROM. On April 26, 1993, Albania, after some initial hesitation because of the strong Albanian minority in Tetovo, recognized FYROM as well.

On May 1, 1993, the Greek government hosted an international conference for the pacification of Bosnia with the participation of the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian leadership. In this conference a major rift between Belgrade and Pale occurred when Milosevic accepted and Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, rejected the Vance-Owen plan. After intense pressure, Karadzic agreed to sign the plan on the condition that this was endorsed by the Bosnian Serb parliament in Pale. On May 16, Mitsotakis traveled to Pale and pleaded the case for peace to the Bosnian Serb leadership, composed of politicians, military officers and Christian Orthodox clergy. The Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the plan, putting an abrupt end to the Greek diplomatic initiative and humiliating Mitsotakis, who had staked his personal credibility on the plan. Greece continued to be harshly criticized in the world press for its Macedonian policies, its cooperation with Serbia and the breaking of UN sanctions against Belgrade.
On May 28, 1993, Mhsotakis rejected the UN-proposed confidence building measures and the name "Nova Makedonia" (New Macedonia). According to ambassador George Papoulias, head of the Greek delegation in the negotiations to the UN, and ambassador Evangelos Kofos, the Foreign Ministry's expert on Macedonia, a solution was close after a month and half of talks. MSstotalds, however, called them off after being threatened by Miltiadis Evert, a senior deputy and future leader of New Democracy, that he and his political friends would withdraw their confidence in the government if Greece accepted a solution that included the word "Macedonia" in the name of the new republic. Faced with the threat of bis downfall, Mitsotakis backed down and asked Papoulias to return to Athens.\(^{19}\) He left, however, a window open for direct Greek-FYROM negotiations in the future. The failure to reach an agreement in May 1993, due to internal party infighting, signaled the downfall of the New Democracy government. Throughout the summer it suffered one crisis after the other until a few deputies close to Samaras defected and forced Mitsotakis to ask for early elections under the worst possible conditions for him.

On June 3, 1993, Papakonstantinou admitted that Greece might accept the name "Slav Macedonia," but not "Nova Macedonia" that Vance and Owen had proposed, because the former clearly distinguished between an ethnically Slav and an ethnically Greek Macedonia. However, Macedonia's Albanians strongly objected to the further ethnicization of the republic's name to their own exclusion. On June 10, 1993, the United States announced its decision to send a 300-men force to FYROM as a measure of preventive diplomacy, signaling the West's determination to contain the conflict in Bosnia.

\(^{19}\) This was confessed to the author by both Papoulias and Kofos in various interviews including the one in Washington, D.C., on May 8,1996. Mitsotakis has also confirmed Evert's threat to bring the government down in an interview with the author in his office in Athens on February 16, 1998.
and not allow it to spread southwards to engulf Kosovo, Macedonia and possibly, Greece and Turkey.

On August 13, 1993, Samaras, who had already formed his own political party called Political Spring, accused the government of allowing the free flow of oil from Thessaloniki to Skopje. On August 18, 1993, Stelios Paphthemiis, a hard-line nationalist deputy of PASOK from Thessaloniki, filed a suit for the alleged "oil scandal" in an effort to further embarrass the government.

August 1993 turned out to be exceptionally active politically, contrary to Greek tradition, as the government tried to push through parliament major legislation for the privatization of the Greek Telecom Corporation (OTE), against the strong opposition of the public sector trade unions and PASOK. Papandreou accused Mitsotakis of selling out the "national wealth" and hinted at possible embezzlement. The economic minister, Stephanos Manos, strongly opposed a proposed slow-down of his reformist program. On September 6, 1993, Samaras asked everyone in New Democracy to come out and bring the government down since it had become dangerous for the motherland. Two New Democracy but Samaras-loyal deputies defected. Mitsotakis lost his parliamentary majority and was forced to resign On September 9, 1993, he asked Karamanlis to dissolve the parliament and proceed with early elections for October 10, 1993.

On September 28 and again on October 5, 1993, in TV interviews, Papandreou declared that a PASOK government would not recognize Skopje under a name that included the word "Macedonia" or its derivatives. He thus smartly changed the framework of the whole debate strengthening his nationalist credentials and his popularity. Whereas Mitsotakis tried to stop others (i.e the European Community, the United States, the United Nations and the international community at large) from recognizing Macedonia and
was forced to make some concessions to win some time, Papandreou, on the eve of the elections, appeared uncompromising towards Skopje by focusing solely on Greece's policy. The question of what effect this inflexibility might have on others was never posed. It was answered, however, after the elections, when a PASOK-led Greece abruptly withdrew from the UN negotiations, provoking a massive wave of recognitions of Macedonia by Greece's European and American allies.

On October 10, 1993, PASOK won the elections easily with 47% of the popular vote. Papandreou's remarkable comeback was a personal political triumph of the first order. The outcast of 1989 returned with a strong parliamentary majority, thanks to New Democracy's new electoral law. Greece's European partners reacted angrily. Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, warned Greece to be careful and avoid the reckless behavior of the 1980s. Alain Juppe, the French Foreign Minister, declared that the Greeks had a very short memory. European conservatives did not forget Papandreou's foreign policy and economic populism and the considerable headaches they both had caused for Brussels in the 1980s and, contrary to the Clinton administration, strongly disapproved of the governmental change in Greece on the eve of the Greek presidency of the European Union in the first half of 1994.

On November 5, 1993, the new Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, asked the UN Secretary General to freeze the negotiations due to the alleged intransigence of Skopje. On December 14, 1993, six EU countries, Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark, established diplomatic relations with Macedonia. On December 18, 1993, the Greek government spokesman, outlined the three preconditions for the improvement of Greek-FYROM relations that included renouncing territorial claims, abandoning the Star of Vergina and amending articles 3 and 49 of the Macedonian constitution. On January 14, 1994, Gligorov urged Papandreou for a direct Greek-
FYROM dialogue without preconditions. On February 9, 1994, the United States officially recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but, after heavy lobbying by the Greek-American community spearheaded by Clinton's advisor, George Stephanopoulos, refrained from establishing full diplomatic relations. On February 14, 1994, during a cabinet meeting Papandreou announced a full trade embargo on FYROM and the closing down of the Greek consulate in Skopje until the three Greek preconditions of December 18, 1993 were met. Papandreou stated that Greece had no claims on FYROM and it was ready to guarantee the republic's territorial integrity and provide generous financial assistance. But in the meantime and for as long as Skopje usurped Greek symbols and names and nourished irredentist claims against Greece, Athens would defend Greek national interest. The Greek trade embargo caused an avalanche of criticism against Greece in the international media and by foreign governments. The Greek presidency of the European Union seemed about to collapse before even starting. On February 21, 1994, the European Commission asked the European Court of Justice to examine the legality of the Greek embargo.

On February 23, 1994, Gligorov wrote to Papandreou to reject the Greek preconditions for the resumption of negotiations. On February 26, 1994, Greece, in its effort to justify the embargo, invoked article 224 of the Treaty of Rome that allows national governments to take unilateral action when a vital national interest is at stake. On March 18, 1994, President Clinton appointed Mathew Nimetz as special U.S. envoy for the Greek-FYROM dispute with the mission of jump-starting the efforts for a diplomatic settlement. On April 6, 1994, the European Commission decided to bring a suit against Greece to the European Court of Justice and asked for an emergency ruling in order to force Greece to lift its embargo against FYROM. It was the first time in the history of the Community that the European Commission took such a drastic measure against a country that held the presidency of the Community. The Court, however, sided with Greece. First,
it rejected the emergency request and then, it ruled that Greece had the right to break the Community trade policy to protect its security. Nevertheless, Greece might have won legally but it had lost politically, being severely criticized by all its allies.

On June 25, 1994, the Summit of the European Council in Corfu concluded the Greek presidency with unexpected success, thanks to the efforts of the alternate Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos. The Council decided to enlarge the Union with the admission of Sweden, Finland and Austria, and to conclude a treaty of cooperation with Russia. It failed only to elect a successor to Jacques Delors to the presidency of the Commission. Greece intelligently avoided bringing its bilateral problems and disputes to the summit. This could have put the whole summit in jeopardy. The professional organization of the summit provided Papandreou, the host of European leaders, a significant boost at a difficult moment.

On September 1, 1994, following intense pressure, the Greek Foreign Minister, Karolos Papoulias, indicated, Greece's willingness to lift the embargo if Gligorov made a gesture of good will, such as a declaration of his country's intention to abandon the Star of Vergina.

Gligorov's coalition government was massively endorsed by the people of FYROM in the elections of October 30, 1994. The ultra-nationalists of VMRO abstained from the second round of the elections following a disastrous performance in the first. The results of the elections strengthened Gligorov politically within FYROM and made a possible compromise with Greece more likely.

During 1994 Greece continued to block FYROM's admission to the OCSE and its closer cooperation with the European Union, coupling its economic efforts to isolate
FYROM with political ones. On December 8, 1994, Pangalos, having left the government and having failed to get elected mayor of Athens, came out very critical of Greek policies on Macedonia and the embargo, in particular. Pangalos' reaction was significant because it gave voice to the growing impatience of some parts of the Greek elites with Greece's inflexible and uncompromising Macedonian policy.

On December 17, 1994, serious disturbances broke out in Tetovo over the opening of an Albanian-speaking university. FYROM's government declared the university illegal and asked for its immediate closure. Albanians demonstrated for their cultural right of a higher education in their own language. Political instability highlighted both the fragility of FYROM and the short-sightedness of Greece's embargo that further aggravated FYROM's internal situation.

On January 8, 1995, Papandreou made some concessions towards FYROM, hoping that Greek flexibility would make Europeans and Americans increase their pressure on Skopje to compromise. Indeed, Klaus Kinkel asked Skopje to show its good will by dropping the Star of Vergina from FYROM's flag.

On January 17, 1995, a defeated and bitter Mitsotakis gave an interview on Macedonia and accused the whole political leadership of Greece, including President Karamanlis, of nationalist populism. He declared that the most important mistake of Greek policy was the great importance attached to the name. On January 20, 1995, Papakonstantinou also criticized Greek political leaders and stated that the decisions of the council of political leaders in 1992 were unrealistic. These public statements (Mitsotakis, Papakonstantinou, Rallis, Pangalos and George Papandreou) coupled with a series of anti-embargo articles in leading Greek dailies by prominent journalists and analysts prepared Greek public opinion for the possible compromise that seemed to be rapidly approaching.
Meanwhile, in public opinion surveys, Greeks thought of Turkey as the greatest danger to the country and attached little significance to FYROM as a potential threat.

On March 17, 1995, both Athens and Skopje accepted in principle the confidence building measures proposed by Cyrus Vance following an intensive round of shuttle diplomacy by Mathew Nimetz and Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European affairs. The measures included the change of FYROM's flag and constitution in exchange for the lifting of the Greek embargo.

On June 22, 1995, Vance met with the Greek and FYROM representatives separately. Gligorov continued to resist any change in the name of his republic but left a window open to examine other possible concessions in return for the lifting of the Greek embargo. He declared the treatment of Macedonian minorities in neighboring countries a domestic issue of these countries.

On September 4, 1995, both Athens and Skopje announced the initiation of bilateral negotiations at ministerial level, following intensive lobbying by Holbrooke. The announcement on the Greek side was made by Tom Miller, the second-in-command at the U.S. embassy in Greece, rather than the Greek government spokesman, leaving Papandreou vulnerable to opposition attacks for allowing such a visible U.S. intermingling in Greek affairs. The irony of all this was that Papandreou, the fierce anti-American demagogue of the 1970s who had annoyed the U.S. administration many times in the 1980s for his anti-NATO stands, was now attacked for "selling out" Greece to the American patrons.

On September 13, 1995, an Interim Agreement between Greece and FYROM was signed in New York by the ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries, Papoulias and Tservenkovski respectively, in the presence of Vance and Owen. Greece agreed to lift the embargo, establish partial diplomatic relations with FYROM, and allow FYROM's
admission to international organizations, in exchange for FYROM's agreeing to change its flag and stop using the Star of Vergina as an official symbol, and to provide all legal guarantees that its constitution complied with the principles of international law and good neighborliness. The agreement was interim because it did not address the main issue of the dispute, the name of the new republic. The two countries decided to refer the name issue to further negotiations and, in the meantime, start working together to the benefit of both sides.

The interim agreement was a well-structured package deal that gave something to both countries to make it politically possible for Papandreou and Gligorov to compromise. Masterminded by Holbrooke, Nimetz and Vance and coming about thanks to the pressure the U.S. administration exerted on both sides, it was a triumph of American diplomacy. With it, the U.S. closed the 'southern' Yugoslav front and was ready to proceed with tackling the much more important and difficult Bosnian problem.

On October 3, 1995, Gligorov was seriously injured in a bomb explosion in downtown Skopje. Although his would-be assassins were never discovered, it was widely believed that the attack was launched by ultra-nationalist Macedonians who objected to Gligorov's concessions towards Greece.

Papandreou suffered no such attack and had no particular problem selling the agreement internally. Greek public opinion was ready for a deal and the Greek business world was anxious to start trading and investing in FYROM. On November 6, 1995, during the parliamentary debate on Macedonia, all Greek political leaders came out in favor of compromise with the exception of Samaras who accused Papandreou of a sellout. The debate was dominated by the Mitsotakis-Samaras duel on events of 1992, to the satisfaction of Papandreou and his Socialists. By the end of 1995, FYROM had been
admitted to the OCSE, the Council of Europe and NATO's Partnership for Peace while special representation offices opened in Athens and Skopje. Three years later trade between Greece and FYROM is booming but, as predicted, no agreement has been reached yet on the name issue.

6. What Went Wrong?

Greece's Balkan policy between 1989 and 1995 is a showcase of what a state's foreign policy should not be. The policy was ill-informed, lacking both priorities and flexibility. Greece's Balkan policy was subordinated to domestic politics and the erratic and volatile public opinion. There was neither a comprehensive strategy nor good tactics. In sum, Greek foreign policy in the Balkans was ill-conceived and miserably executed. It is no wonder then that the policy backfired.

To put it straight: on all accounts the Macedonian adventure of the Greek foreign policy was a failure. Not only was the new republic recognized by most states of the world under its constitutional name, but Greece received considerable negative publicity that branded it a spoiler and a destabilizer in the region.

In 1989 Greece confronted a tremendous historical opportunity. No longer was the nation a puppet of Great Powers as it had been for most of its history as an independent state. Greece had managed to turn the national trauma of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 into a unique historical success, with the establishment and consolidation of a well-functioning democracy, while also being constructively engaged abroad. For all the mistakes that were made, Greek foreign policy had managed to emancipate itself from foreign intervention and to establish a healthy relationship with the country's friends and allies in the West. Most importantly, Greece had won a seat at the top table with its
membership in the European Community and NATO. Furthermore, it had executed a successful NordpolMk of close relations with the communist nations of the Balkans. In other words, in 1989 Greece possessed the diplomatic and economic capital to play a significant part in the transition of Balkan states towards free market parliamentary democracies. Instead, it decided to waste all the valuable capital it had accumulated in the previous years, in an absurd and increasingly vain attempt to prevent a neighboring state from using the name Macedonia.

The failure of Greek foreign policy and the divergence between Greece's potential and actual performance should be attributed to the weakness of Greek political institutions and the populist political culture that allowed and promoted nationalism in foreign policy to the detriment of the country's long-term national interest.

With the explosion of the Macedonian issue, efforts to deal with the chronic fiscal crisis of Greece and the reconstruction of its economy became complicated. The government's energies and attention were diverted. The New Democracy administration found it difficult to implement a vigorous stabilization program because it had to spend some of the precious little political capital it had on a possible compromise on Macedonia. Foreign investors were scared away from a country that aspired to become a regional hub and at the same time could not get along with most of its neighbors. Local business was hurt particularly in northern Greece because of the embargo imposed on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Further, the embargo had the unanticipated effect of forcing many of economic activities to go underground at the moment when the Greek state was trying to crack down on the overextended black market of the country. In some cases the embargo criminalized the economies of the regions bordering the Greek-FYROM frontier allowing for smugglers and black marketeers to accumulate excessive profits and creating a whole network of illegal activities.
From the start of the Macedonian saga, Greece correctly articulated two main objectives for its policies towards the new republic. The first objective was to enhance the independence and stability of the new state. Greece wanted neither a greater Bulgaria nor a greater Albania and, on that account, it preferred a buffer state in the center of the Balkans. As a status quo power, it demonstrated its disdain for border changes and instability, opposing the dissolution of Yugoslavia to the very end. Instability within FYROM could increase the southward flux of economic immigrants and enhance Albanian revisionism.

The second objective was to bring FYROM within the Greek orbit and to make it as dependent on Greece as possible. Some used the word satellite, while others preferred to see FYROM as a subordinate player inside a Balkan Christian Orthodox camp. Disregarding such confrontational visions, there was no doubt that Athens, given its chronic antagonism with Ankara, had a keen interest in preventing Turkey from re-entering the Balkans seventy some years after the demise of the Ottoman empire.

Having set these two objectives Greece then followed the opposite course. Athens insisted in the prohibition of the use of the name Macedonia by the new state and, to make its point clear, closed the border with FYROM in the hope of strangling the new republic economically and forcing it into submission. All its actions between late 1991 and mid-1995 aimed at undermining the stability of FYROM in one way or another. In doing so, it forced Skopje to seek regional allies in Sofia and Ankara. Turkey could not miss the opportunity to assist the poor, vulnerable, little fellow against Greek aggressiveness. Setting strategic goals and then doing everything possible to make sure they are not fulfilled is a recipe for disaster.
Greeks had great difficulty in explaining their policy abroad and in mustering some support for it, precisely because this policy was contradictory. In fact the very term policy overestimates what was a collection of actions with the sole purpose of stimulating and appeasing the Greek public.

The 'Macedonization' of the Greek foreign policy proved how weak the Greek foreign ministry apparatus and the Greek foreign policy-making bureaucracy were in contrast to the personal diplomacy exercised by ministers, prime ministers and their advisors. The imposition of the embargo, for example, was announced by the Prime Minister with no prior consultation with the Ministry that supposedly was responsible for the foreign policy of the country. Career ambassadors repeatedly expressed their frustration over being constantly steam-rolled by the ambitions and quest for short-term political gains of their political supervisors. Whereas for policies to be well-informed and long-term based in today's complicated world, there is a need for a highly trained, top quality foreign service with well-established links with foreign diplomats, Greek officers had neither the confidence nor the status to play a serious role in the formulation of policies. In Macedonia, they were usually ignored and invited to help only in last minute damage-control.

In present-day media democracies, public opinion plays a dominant role in policy-making. No policy that aspires to be successful in the long-run can ignore this fact. However, public opinion is volatile and sentimental and sometimes ill-informed. A political leadership worthy of the name first and foremost should establish the national interest of the country, and then take all the measures necessary to advance it.

What happened in Greece was that politicians deliberately misinformed the public. What they admitted in private they were afraid to state in public. The result was to follow
a policy they knew was wrong and destined to fail. Former Prime Minister Mitsotakis has been quite frank about this contradiction.²⁰

A good example of all this was my personal experience of an interview with the future Foreign Minister Pangalos in the summer of 1993 in Thessaloniki.²¹ As a leading opposition leader, Pangalos was kind enough to explain to me his personal opinions on the Macedonian issue. To my surprise, Pangalos was very critical of Greece's uncompromising, pifriximalist stand on Macedonia and regarded the Greek case lost and damaging to the credibility of the country. Distancing himself from his fellow socialists and his own leader, Andrea Papandreou, he asked for a new policy of accommodation with FYROM.

Refreshing as this position was, I was taken aback an hour later when, accepting his invitation, I accompanied him on the scheduled public speech he was to give in the Harilaou square of Thessaloniki. In front of a few thousand socialist supporters, Pangalos proclaimed the exact opposite positions from the ones he had just espoused in private. A born-again nationalist demagogue, he addressed the public with declarations such as 'Thessaloniki is Macedonia and Macedonia is Greece' and "We will never give up the righteous struggle to protect our soul and the name is our soul." After he finished his talk, I asked him what had happened that had changed his position so radically in such a short period of time. He shamelessly replied that "that's how politics is."

²⁰Mitsotakis has repeatedly stated that he knew that his policy would fail but he could not change it because of the fear of losing power. Interview with the author, Athens, February 16, 1998.
²¹The meeting took place in Electra Hotel in Thessaloniki on May 30, 1993.
The broadening of the foreign-policy community to include mayors, priests, and associations of any kind, although a testimony to the awakening of a vibrant civil society, was highly inappropriate for foreign-policy making. It seemed as if local leaders engaged in what they could not deal with to avoid dealing with what they could and should. Mayors in search of media exposure and votes often took matters into their own hands, circumventing the authority of the central government. Unable to establish a decent garbage-collection system in their localities, mayors insisted on having a say in the foreign policy of the country, secure in their positions and not having to bear any of the consequences if the policy failed.

There were extremists with powerful connections in the army, the media and the Church. Yet their extremism secured them a marginal place in the political debate. Even more dangerous were some 'moderates' of the mainstream parties, who nurtured the insecurities of the Greek public against a constructive engagement of the country abroad.

Greece is a small country with very limited resources. Its foreign policy agenda between 1989 and 1995 got too long. There was an urgent need for prioritization. To its East there was a threat: Turkey. To its North there were, and still are, risks: ethnic strife, economic decline, nation-state dysfunctions etc. But a threat was very different from a risk and there should have been no confusion between the two. In addition, amidst all the risks there were many opportunities for enhanced cooperation. While the Greek business community rightly concentrated on the opportunities, the Greek political and media elites focused, wrongly and exclusively, on the risks, blowing them out of proportion and turning them into tangible threats, for their short-term political benefit.

Because of the importance of the Western connection, through NATO and the European Union, for Greece's physical security and economic well-being, Athens should
articulate its foreign policy concerns in ways that are of interest an comprehensible to its allies and partners. In other words, parochialism should have been abandoned in favor of a vocabulary based on what Europe and the West considered important after the Cold War. Fitting Greek concerns within international principles and Western interests could have considerably enhanced the persuasiveness of Greek arguments abroad. Instead, Greece chose a policy that, for the first time in recent history, put it at odds with international legality and European norms and procedures (I.e. the embargo) and threatened to isolate it from the West.

Since 1995 Greece has embarked on a new policy characterized by pragmatism, flexibility, innovation, persuasion and willingness to take a new look at the country's external problems. Greece normalized its relations with FYROM and Albania and further improved them with the rest of the Balkans. Greece lifted its veto on Turkey's customs union with the European Union in March 1995 in exchange for the initiation of Cyprus' accession negotiations with the Union. Greece is currently reaping some of the benefits of these policies in improved cooperation in the Balkans and a positive outlook in the West. Turkey has not replied to Greek initiatives but Ankara certainly feels the pressure that the ball is in its court.

Ultimately, the institutional problem of Greek foreign policy-making persists. With emancipation comes responsibility For most of the post-WW II period, Greece did not have to bother with foreign policy. Washington took care of it. Beginning in 1974 the Greek foreign policy-making mechanism has been overwhelmed by the demands of an independent and innovative policy to which Karamanlis, Papandreou and Mitsotakis aspired. Karamanlis stepped into the vacuum and his personal diplomacy was successful in the 1970s. Personal diplomacy, however, is no longer a sufficient foundation for foreign policy, since issues have become too complicated. The Greek foreign service continues to
lack the quality and esteem the diplomatic corps has in all countries with a foreign policy worthy of the name. Capable diplomats selected, promoted, and rewarded on merit are what the country needs most. If the current modernization rhetoric is to have any meaning, it has to mean first and foremost meritocracy in place of clientelism and favoritism. Only with strong institutions will Greece be able to navigate successfully through the storms of the post-Cold War era. But, building strong institutions and shedding the old populist culture is part of the continuous effort to establish an efficient and popularly-responsive government.
Conclusion

1. Nationalism and Violence

Stephen Van Evera has put forward a number of useful hypotheses on nationalism and war.¹ For him, there are four primary attributes of a nationalist movement that determine whether it has a large or small potential of producing violence: (1) the greater the proportion of state-seeking nationalities that are stateless, the greater the risk of war, (2) the more nationalities pursue the recovery of national diasporas, and the more they pursue annexationist strategies of recovery, the greater the risk of war, (3) the more hegemonistic the goals that nationalities pursue toward one another, the greater the risk of war, and, (4) the more severely nationalities oppress minorities living in their states, the greater the risk of war.

For Van Evera there are also structural, political/environmental and perceptual factors that condition the operation of the above listed attributes and immediate causes: (1) stateless nationalisms pose a greater risk if they have the strength to reach plausibly for freedom and the central state has the will to resist their attempt; (2) the more densely nationalities are intermingled, the greater the risk of war; (3) the greater the defensibility and legitimacy of borders, and the greater the correspondence between these political borders and communal boundaries, the smaller the risk of war; (4) the greater the past crimes committed by nationalities toward one another, the greater the risk of war; (5) the more severely nationalities oppress minorities now living in their states, the greater the risk

of war; (6) the more divergent are the beliefs of nationalities about their mutual history and their current conduct and character, the greater the risk of war.²

This general conceptual framework holds great relevance to the situation in Serbia and Greece in the early 1990s and helps explain the violence in the Serbian case and its absence in the Greek case. In the Greek-FYROMacedonia dispute there were no state-seeking, stateless nationalities involved, there were no pursuits of aimexionist strategies of recovery or hegemonistic goals, and the oppression of minorities was very mild. To a large extent, Greeks and Macedonians were not intermingled, the Greek-FYROMacedonia border was 70 years old, well-established, consolidated, legitimate, defensible and fairly correspondent to contemporary ethnic boundaries. There were no great crimes committed in the recent past between the two groups with the exception of the clashes between monarchists and communists in the 1940s in Greece that never acquired a crude ethnic form. The one truly confrontational factor operating between Greeks and FYROMacedonians in the early 1990s was their divergent beliefs about their mutual history which caused considerable turmoil in their relations but was not enough to provoke an armed clash.

On the contrary, with the collapse of Yugoslavia, 1.5-2.0 million Serbs found themselves outside Serbia, stateless minorities among ethnically and politically alien majorities. Their intermingling was dense, borders were recent, indefensible and of little legitimacy, memories of past crimes were alive and further exacerbated by ruthless politicians and the media, minorities, like Albanian Kosovars, were oppressed, and the beliefs of the various ethnic groups about their region's history and their neighbors'

conduct and character diverged significantly. No wonder, then, that Milosevic found little resistance by fellow Serbs in his pursuit of a Greater Serbia.

2. The Political Culture of Nationalist Politics in Serbia and Greece

The rise of nationalist politics in Serbia and Greece should be understood within the context of a specific political culture and historical development. In this respect, both countries share many similarities that include:

1. Serbia and Greece were the first nation-states to emerge from the Ottoman empire. Due to a number of historical advantages (chapter three, section three), Serbs and Greeks were the first to develop a coherent nationalist program and pursue state building based on the ethno-nationalist principle. Their example stimulated the rise of rival nationalisms and was quickly followed by other Balkan peoples, including the Turks.

   Since then, Balkan politics have been dominated by nationalism. Balkan states have traditionally been defined not as associations of free citizens but as the historical expression of a particular nation. The rise of ethno-nationalist politics in the late 1980s-early 1990s in Serbia and Greece is not a historical novelty but should be traced to the 200-year old tradition of nationalism in Southeastern Europe and its dominant political role in both countries.

   2. Nationalism produced an abrupt break with the past and introduced the modern, ethnic, secular, bureaucratic and centralized state to the Balkans as the dominant form of political organization (chapter three, sections one and two). Because of the Balkan lands' ethno-religious diversity, nation building and state formation have been a much more painful and complicated process in the Balkans than in Western Europe. Nationalism came
late, but when it finally arrived it swept away the old, pre-modem and long-in-decline Ottoman order in a few decades.

The weakness of the old order and its rapid collapse prevented the successful negotiation of an alternative, not ethnic but civic, political re-organization of the Balkans or the development of effective arrangements for the peaceful accommodation of the ethnic minority problems of the proliferating new Balkan states. For these states the solution of their minority problems was expulsion and assimilation whenever possible (chapter three, section nine), a practice that continues to the present day as the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate.

The oppression of minorities fed their virulent irredentism and invited the intervention of their respective motherlands as the only way to protect one's own co-nationals from hostile majorities in neighboring states. The distrust towards non-territorial, power sharing arrangements and the frequent change of borders, equated minority activism with secession and invited its harsh suppression in defense of the unity of the state. This further alienated the minority in what could be described as the circle of oppression-irredentism-oppression.

The Balkan states have still not found a way to deal with their minority problems. Albanian demands in Serbia and Macedonian activism in Greece provoked the exaggerated fears of Serbs and Greeks for the imminent dismemberment of their countries and caused a disproportionately harsh response. Greece is a good example because although it did not suffer a security threat from neighboring Macedonia, this did not temper Greek fears and anxieties concerning Macedonian irredentism and of a loss of Greek Macedonia. Thus, nationalism and past traumas create their own reality, so that what to an outsider is a paranoid fear, is a real danger to an insider.
3. Nationalism has been detrimental to the development of stable, pluralist, liberal polities in Southeastern Europe. The creation and exaggeration of foreign dangers has allowed authoritarian leaders to suppress opposition and mobilize popular support in defense of national unity. When the state is in danger, real or perceived, any unconventional expression and strong criticism of the ruling authorities is viewed as an abuse of democracy rather than as a crucial pillar of democratic development. In March 1991, June 1993 and, more recently, March 1998, Serbian rulers were able to defeat, divide, immobilize and silence the opposition by appealing to the need for national unity in the presence of foreign aggression.

The prevalence of nationalism has given rise to polities with a combination of democratic and non-democratic features that can best be described as etnnocracies. Claiming to be committed to competitive pluralisms and the highest standards for protecting human rights, but markedly unenthusiastic or unschooled with regard to the operation of democratic norms, the ruling elites in such regimes are generally inconsistent and arbitrary in their enforcement of both civil liberties and state-sponsored repression. Superficially, the society appears free. Regular competitive elections are conducted, and an opposition media is permitted to openly function. At the same time, however, such elections and the media may often be subjected to regime manipulation. Anti-state dissent by ethnic minorities is viewed as dangerous, warranting repression. Political nonconformism is tolerated provided that it remains weak, unthreatening, and uncoordinated.3

4. In extreme cases, ethnocracies have produced complete ethnic segregation and a semiofficial apartheid system, as is the case in Kosovo where Serbs and Albanians live in two different worlds with minimal interethnic contact. The political marginalization of Kosovo's Albanians, who constitute approximately 20% of the Serbian electorate, has very negative repercussions for the quality and depth of Serbian democracy. Without a solution to the Kosovo problem, democracy in Serbia will remain unconsolidated and prey to the manipulations of authoritarian and nationalist leaders. Similarly, the full development of contemporary Greek democracy will come about only through the acceptance of modern Greece's multi-cultural origins and the full protection of the remaining minorities.

5. Prior to the Yugoslav wars, it was believed that modernization had largely eroded ethnic and religious divisions in the Balkans. In the decades after the Second World War, both Yugoslavia and Greece experienced rapid urbanization, industrialization, secularization, westernization and integration into the global distribution of labor. Both Yugoslavia and Greece witnessed the emergence of values associated with modernity that promoted inter-ethnic and inter-religious integration. In Yugoslavia, intermarriage by individuals belonging to different ethnic groups and the self-identification of citizens as "Yugoslavs" increased dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. In the same period, a traditional, patriarchal, immune to foreign influences, and of low social mobility Greece gave way to a much more open and liberal society.

However, such developments were often confined to the urban milieu and did not significantly penetrate the countryside. Furthermore, modern values and attitudes did not entirely replace traditional ones but were amalgamated together, producing new ones that were as ethnocentric and anti-universalist as the old ones.
Throughout Yugoslavia's history, Yugoslavian remained elite-driven with limited popular support. Ethnic identification did not give way to a super-ethnic identification with Southern Slav unity. Even the few segments of Yugoslavism that grew some deeper roots were brushed aside in the late 1980s.

Modernity and the socio-economic changes associated with it produce popular anxieties and fears that often reinforce traditional, nationalist and religious values. This is particularly true in times of crisis such as the one experienced by Serbia and Greece over the last ten years. In such conditions the invalidation of official values, and popular contusion about the validity and consequences of alternative values propounded by a plethora of new elite contenders, created fertile soil for ultranationalist political extremism. Yugoslavia's economic and constitutional crisis in the late 1980s had devastating effects on Yugoslavs' loyalties and value systems. Many sought refuge in their only superficially or partially eradicated traditional ethno-religious beliefs and resentments. Studies of citizen attitudes in different regions of the former federation indicate that the failures of the communist system contributed to the erosion of pan-ethnic values, and that by the late 1980s there was a discernible return, on both the elite and mass levels, to traditional ethno-religious commitments and also a growth in interethnic intolerance.⁴

Greece experienced a much less severe crisis that never seriously endangered the integrity of the country. But the crisis was real and multifaceted. It encompassed an acute budget crisis that grew into a major economic crisis and a moral-social crisis of rising corruption. Greece was labeled the black sheep of Europe and Greeks thought of their economic troubles as a traumatic national failure. Nationalist mobilization in the early 1990s fulfilled the need for national self-assertion. It was meant to be a healing for the

wounds of the 1980s but instead it deepened the crisis. Many Greeks thought that if they could not be good citizens they could at least be good patriots. Or, as Milosevic put it "If we have to fight, well then we will fight. But I hope they are not going to be crazy enough to fight with us. For if we don't know how to work and produce that well, at least we will know how to fight well." 

6. The nationalist mobilization in Serbia and Greece was initially supported by liberal intellectuals who saw it as society's political awakening, after a period of apathy and abstention from politics, in the service of a noble cause, the defense of the motherland and its historical and cultural patrimony. It was heralded as a new beginning for Serbs and Greeks who could work together and build a better future for the national collective. This positive, optimistic, unifying and assertive spirit of nationalism is often underestimated by outsiders but it is this quality that makes it so popular and politically powerful in neutralizing potential opposition.

In Serbia, the liberal opposition was completely coopted by Milosevic in supporting his nationalist program. Only when the costs of the war hit Serbian society hard, did the opposition became more critical of Serbian nationalism. At the height of the Macedonian crisis in 1992, there were almost no publicly dissenting voices to challenge official policy in Greece. It took some time for some intellectuals and a few politicians to realize the corrosive effect of Greece's Macedonian policy and ask for a change of policy in protest. Hopefully, today Greece appears to have partially learnt the lessons of past failures and to have developed a sufficient number of 'antibodies' to withstand a future assault of the nationalist 'virus.'

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5 Cohea, Broken Bonds, p. 227
7. Hugh Seton-Watson observed more than a half-century ago that "in Eastern Europe the greatest fortunes are made not in industry or banking, but in politics."6 This remains, to a large extent, true in the Balkans today and it is the result of the traditional weakness of the private market and civil society vis-a-vis the omnipotent state. The triumph of the bureaucratic-corporatist state over society was only possible because the state was perceived as the embodiment of the nation.

The omnipotence of the state has produced corruption, nepotism and clientelism and has left few restraints on manipulative, authoritarian leaders. Through the tight control of the vast state apparatus and the business and employment opportunities that this provides, Milosevic has been able to co-opt or isolate enemies. In this context, nationalism has often been used to shut out foreign competition and preserve a closed state-controlled corporatist system in the name of national security. The proposed privatization of the telecommunications corporation of Greece in 1993 was blocked by trade unionists, state-dependent business interests and a protectionist opposition who claimed that privatization threatened national security. Nationalism and economic protectionism go hand in hand; they provide the ideological legitimation of a specific articulation of state-society relations in Southeastern Europe. Only through a political revolution that would seek to decrease the productive and regulatory capacity of the state and revitalize civil society, is it possible to build liberal, civic-minded democracies in the Balkans.

8. The main cleavage of Serbian and Greek politics is not along class lines. Greece, for example, is a society with a small industrial base and a respectively small industrial working class. Employees of the public sector and a mass of self-employed (largely in

agriculture) closely linked to the state make up a social majority. According to a recent electoral study, class is not a predictor of voting behavior in Greece. In fact, Greece ranked last on the structural determination of the vote in a sixteen-country study.

Greek politics has been built around a left-right cleavage anchored not only in the individual welfare consequences of a giant spoils system but also in historically constructed political identities. The same is true for Serbia too. In both countries the defining historical experience that has shaped extremely strong collective political identities was the Second World War. It was then, that both Serbia and Greece experienced the emergence of a powerful radical left that fought against both the occupying Germans and local conservative monarchists. The Parnizans defeated the Chetniks in Serbia. Although the communists lost the Greek Civil War in 1949, the Greek left would take its historical revenge in 1981 with the electoral landslide of PASOK, which successfully blended the old left with a new post-junta socialist rhetoric.

The popular strength of the left in Serbian and Greek politics is a reflection of strong collective identities, deeply anchored in past conflicts. Milosevic and Papandreou exploited this strength very skillfully to gain support and isolate opponents by branding them die-hard reactionaries. Draskovic's and Mitsotakis' royalist overtures were exploited to the maximum by Milosevic and Papandreou to remind voters that their opponents' victory would reopen painful historical wounds.

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But the left's popular success should be attributed, first and foremost, to its successful fusion with nationalism. The communist-led anti-fascist guerrilla movement in the Second World War had all the characteristics of a national liberation struggle, like the ones that later took place in the decolonizing Third World. The nationalist credentials of the Yugoslav communists were further reinforced in 1948 when Tito split from Stalin. Papandreou realized the damage done to the Greek left's cause by its association with Moscow and, from PASOK's conception in 1974, he was quick to disassociate himself from Stalinist orthodoxy. His cause was tremendously helped by the right's, and especially the junta's, unconditional association with the West and the Americans. He was able to credibly distinguish between the right's alleged servile and anti-national policy and his own independent, nation-serving agenda.

9. The weakness of class-based politics in Serbia and Greece makes appeals to the ethnic community politically profitable. Without an interest-based party system, Balkan political life at times appear to be a remarkable throwback to Southeastern Europe's experience between the two world wars, with its predominance of highly factionalized nationalist political parties, control by politically cunning and power-hungry political leaders, frequent violations of human rights and legal norms, and popular cynicism born of rampant corruption.

Charismatic, populist politics need and feed polarization, nationalist politics find polarization in the face of an external aggressor, real or constructed. In the case of Serbia and Greece the role of the aggressor was played not only by Albanian, Croatian, Muslim and Macedonian nationalists but by the West as well. The West's sharp response, officially and unofficially, played directly into the hands of Serbian and Greek nationalists and was counterproductive.
Many outsiders believed that economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation would force Milosevic to change policy. In fact, the opposite was true. Sanctions, at least initially, helped Milosevic's regime and undermined his moderate opponents. The people who were cut off from abroad were not the Serbian peasants but the urban elites of Belgrade who were the only ones capable of opposing Milosevic and who had their faxes and contacts with the West severed. Because of sanctions, many of them fled Serbia, further weakening the opposition to Milosevic while the rest remained isolated and disillusioned. Sanctions enabled Milosevic to substantiate his charges about a German and Vatican-led international conspiracy against the Serbs and further inflame a traditional Serbian sense of victimization.

Sanctions destroyed Serbia's middle classes economically and put Milosevic and his cronies in charge of the Serbian economy. Managers of state monopolies made huge profits from legal and illegal activities. They have piled up billions of dollars in secret

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10See, for example, Chandler Rosenberger, "The Milosevic Mafia," National Review. February 7, 1994, pp. 28-30; Stephen J Hedges, "The Looting of Yugoslavia-While Milosevic's Cronies Enrich Themselves, the Economy Crumbles," U.S. News and World Report. July 21, 1997, pp. 38-43; Uros Komlonovic, "State and Mafia in Yugoslavia," East European Constitutional Review 6:4 (Fall 1997): pp. 70-73. Komlonovic's critique of Milosevic's politics is devastating. He argues that "at the top sit functionaries who are unequivocally loyal to Milosevic. They hold their positions in exchange for their loyalty to the president and his wife. They have power because they can allocate domestic customers to those who have something to sell. They distribute monopolies for the import of gas, cigarettes, and other profitable merchandise among various businessmen, while taking their own cut. Policemen and customs officers, whose job is to shut their eyes when necessary, also get a piece of the action. Political leaders from the current ruling coalition are also plugged in. Their task is to guarantee that 'business as usual' is conducted. Leaders of large state companies also play a role. They contribute funds when the state budget runs dry, for example, whenever there are not enough funds to pay state salaries. These three groups are interwoven at the top: most ministers also serve as high party functionaries and all of them sit on the executive committee of at least one large state company. This explains why businessmen at the bottom prefer to pay obeisance to a few
bank accounts in Cyprus. And single-handedly, sanctions politically isolated all those Serbs like former Primer Minister Milan Panic who advocated a rapprochement with the West and a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav disputes. Panic's isolation ensured his defeat by Milosevic in the crucial December 1992 presidential elections.

Of course, sanctions were not welcomed by Milosevic and, with the passing of time, they had serious economic consequences. But to believe that, faced with Western hostility, Milosevic would quit the battle, was a serious misreading of both the man and the situation. In many respects Milosevic welcomed the West's hostility and actively provoked it. According to Dusko Doder, "Milosevic made some disastrous diplomatic miscalculations. Instead of courting visiting American politicians, Milosevic snubbed them. He refused to meet with seven visiting U.S. senators, led by Bob Dole (R-Kansas), in the summer of 1990. Instead of making his case to foreign journalists, his government imposed local taxes on them. Rather than leveling with Serbia's traditional foreign allies, his aides involved them in a labyrinth of deception. Instead of calming Serb populations in Bosnia and the Krajina region of Croatia, Serbian politicians incited them to rebellion with rumors that Croats and Muslims were plotting new massacres against them."

Obviously, Doder judged Milosevic by an outsider's standards and found him to have miscalculated. But there was probably no miscalculation at all, only a deliberate policy of defying the West, creating real and imaginary enemies and igniting fears through the conscious practice of ethnic violence. Isolation helped Milosevic unite all the Serbs behind him and marginalized his liberal opponents In his value scale, the benefits of isolation outweighed important people than to shell out high taxes to the treasury. The insiders are perfectly satisfied, but state coffers remain empty, and the nation is impoverished."

11 Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993): p. 17
to a large extent, the costs, no matter what the damage to Serbia's economy and social fabric.

Similarly, in the 1980s, Papandreou engaged in meaningless polemics with the United States and Europe that marginalized Greece in NATO and the European Community without producing any tangible return for the country. In 1985 the U.S. Department of State went as far as warning U.S. citizens against visiting Greece because of the country's alleged laxity towards international terrorism. But domestically the formula worked and Papandreou was able to win one election after the other. The Western reaction provided Papandreou the enemy he sought and helped him consolidate his electoral base as the righteous defender of Greek national honor. International criticism of his embargo on Macedonia played the same role in 1994 and added credibility to the widely popular conspiracy theories of foreign support (Vatican, German or American led) for Macedonia.

10. Traditionally, the rise of nationalist politics in the Balkans has been most evident during periods of regime crisis and breakdown (i.e., the last phase of Ottoman control which led to the Balkan Wars, the final throes of Habsburg rule just before and during World War I; the collapse and dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941). Indeed, perceptive observers of Balkan society have frequently noted the close relationship between regime breakdown, historically based ethnoreligious antagonisms, and intense violence.  

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the profound international changes h

produced, represented a foreign policy crisis that further aggravated the domestic

problems of Yugoslavia and Greece (see the introduction and chapter five, section one). Yugoslavia and Greece found themselves in the midst of an international cataclysm they had no control of. The disappearance of the familiar coordinates of foreign policy enhanced sensitivities and fears. What to many Americans and West Europeans seemed the establishment of a new and better world order, appeared to Serbs and Greeks as a threatening new round of 'dividing spoils' in the Balkans. Foreigners not only failed to provide some ways for the constructive management of these fears but, often, unnecessarily inflamed them with a 'Balkanist' discourse on the un-Europeanness of Serbia and Greece (see chapter two).

2. Milosevic and Papandreou

The rise of ethno-nationalist politics in Serbia and Greece is inexorably linked with the rise of two brilliant political stars: Slobodan Milosevic and Andreas Papandreou. Both enjoyed spectacular popular ratings and were adored by millions of Serbs and Greeks as no other in their nations' recent political history. They have been towering figures who transformed the politics of Serbia and Greece forever.

Milosevic and Papandreou have been unconventional politicians ready to use, as well as to break with, long-established political traditions and radicalize the politics of their nations. And yet, they were the product of their time and epitomized a certain historical phase in the transition and reaction of their countries to more open, less state-dependent and more globally integrated societies. In such times of transition the importance of leadership is difficult to exaggerate.

First, what preceded their rise to power was a period of repression that cleared the field of potential rivals and made a moderate, centrist, liberal agenda politically
unattainable. The post-1972 purges in Serbia and the 1967-1974 junta in Greece opened up the political ladder for their rise and prepared the ground for their radical nationalism and protectionism.

Secondly, they positioned themselves in the privileged space of the center-left and capitalized on a long egalitarian tradition that is still strong in Southeastern Europe. Although they were initially supported by urban elites as potential modernizers, they quickly strove to express the worries of all those who had most to lose from reforms. They consolidated their power around these social groups.

Thirdly, their value system was different from traditional, communist and bourgeois politicians, and outsiders. They discounted long-term costs for short-term gains. Their ultimate goal was power at any cost. Those Serbs who thought that Milosevic would resign in 1993 or 1995, or even commit suicide, following a long family tradition, grossly misunderstood the man. The belief that Papandreou might realize his inability to govern, due to his failing health, and retire, was equally misplaced. He remained prime minister for two months while in the intensive care unit of an Athens hospital during his last days in office. This unrelenting pursuit of power at all costs surprised opponents and foreigners alike.

Milosevic's and Papandreou's rise and endurance in power should be attributed to a combination of objective conditions and their ability to make good use of them. Milosevic was the first politician in Yugoslavia to understand the implications of Tito's death and the first to perfect the post-Titoist style of nationalist populism. Andreas Papandreou took full advantage of the left-wing swing of Greek politics following the fall of the junta in 1974 and capitalized on the anti-American grievances and, after the Cypriot debacle, the traumatized pride of the Greeks.
Although coming from the left and, supposedly, representing left-wing parties and agendas, neither Milosevic nor Papandreou were ideologues. They proved supreme and fearless tacticians with one goal in mind: the pursuit of power. Given their long tenure in power and their many electoral victories, they were successful. In this goal, they have sacrificed every vision, strategy, long-term planning, and even 'national interest,' and they have zigzagged between seemingly contradictory positions, hoping for collective amnesia. Milosevic, the defender of the Serbs, who had promised that 'no one should beat you,' the warrior of the Greater Serbia, abandoned Krajina Serbs to their fate. Papandreou, the anti-European, anti-NATO, Third World, Third Road socialist, extended the lease of U.S. military bases in Greece, signed the Single European Act and voted full-heartedly for Maastricht.

Of course, Greece is not Serbia. Greece has come out of the crisis more mature, more wise and fully committed to democracy, the free market and European integration. The successor of Papandreou, Prime Minister Costas Simitis, epitomizes this change best. On the contrary, the condition of Serbia seems hopeless. No viable alternative to Milosevic exists. The second largest political force in the country is Vojislav Seselj's ultra-nationalist Radicals. The best and brightest Serbs have emigrated abroad. Privatization led to criminalization. And despite the contraction of the Serbian nation to old Yugoslavia's Serbia and Montenegro, further territorial reduction and turmoil cannot be ruled out with the open wounds of Kosovo, and possibly, Sandzak and Montenegro, unhealed.

Slowly emerging from the economic crisis of the 1980s and the Macedonian debacle of the early 1990s, Greece has gone through a redefinition of national interest. It is now understood that an important part of a country's power in the conditions of the late 20th century is in "pulling" rather than "pushing." "Pulling," or in Joseph Nye's words,
"soft power,"\textsuperscript{13} refers to the attraction of a country's economy, polity, society, culture and way of life. The hundreds of thousands of immigrants who have flooded to Greece since 1989 and transformed it from a labor-exporting to a labor-importing country, prove with their feet Greece's abundance in "soft power." Making Greece an even more attractive place to live and do business is the new leadership's priority. A further opening of the Greek political system to disadvantaged minorities and the structural transformation of the economy are top priorities and have become a vital national interest.

On the contrary, Serbia has a long way to go before reaching such a consensus. Reconstruction is impeded by the open national question of Kosovo. The Milosevic-led regime of cronyism and corruption and its disrespect for the rule of law is strongly resistant to change. But the most disheartening feature of Serbian politics is the absence of a credible liberal alternative. It is this absence that makes predictions for Serbia's future development very difficult.

Appendix: Biographies and Statistics

/. Slobodan Milosevic. President of Yugoslavia

Slobodan Milosevic was born in Pozarevac, Serbia, on August 20, 1941. He joined the League of Communists in 1959 and graduated from the University of Belgrade's School of Law in 1964. He is married to Dr. Mirjana Markovic, a Belgrade University professor of Marxism, and they have a daughter, Marija, and a son, Marko.

Milosevic began his business career as economic advisor to the mayor of Belgrade. He was mostly engaged in economic and banking activities until taking up politics. He was director general of Yugoslavia's major Technogas company for many years. After that, he became president of Beogradska Banka (Beobanka), Serbia's and Yugoslavia's leading bank. He has held key political posts in Belgrade and Serbia since he became a professional politician in 1984. In 1986 he was elected President of the League of Communists of Serbia and in 1989 President of Serbia. He was subsequently reelected in 1990 and in 1992. In December 1990, in the first free multi-party elections in Serbia following World War II Milosevic was elected President by 65% of the vote. He won the Serbian Presidency in the elections of December 1992 comfortably, although with a diminished majority. In 1997, constitutionally banned from seeking a third term, he got himself elected to the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Milosevic is the founder and president of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the party that succeeded the League of Communists in Serbia.
Milosevic would like to be remembered in Serbia as the man whose name is linked with the establishment of Serbia's constitutional and legal unity as well as the attainment of major state and national interests of Serbia and its people. However, his policies contributed to the destruction of Yugoslavia, the contraction of the Serbian nation, the economic and social impoverishment of Serbia, the establishment of an authoritarian ethnocracy instead of a genuine civic-minded democracy in new Yugoslavia, and the latter's international isolation and pariah status in the world. Yugoslavia is currently the only nation in Europe that is excluded, one way or another, from Euro-Atlantic integration.

Having built his spectacular political career on Serbs' grievances of mistreatment in Kosovo, he has failed to bring stability to the restless province. With his popularity much diminished, his resources depleted, his Montenegrin allies out of power, the Bosnian Serb leadership less obedient, Milosevic continues to defy all predictions and remain in full control of Serbian politics, partly thanks to the lack of a credible alternative in opposition. As an observer of Serbian politics has recently put it "Milosevic is like an elderly man who has immune deficiency; any of the problems he faces could prove fatal, but he could also linger and see his life slowly slip away."

2. Vuk Draskovic. President of the Serbian Renewal Movement

Vuk Draskovic was born in Serbia in 1946 and, like Milosevic, graduated from the Belgrade School of Law in 1968. He worked as a journalist for TANJUG, the Yugoslav state news agency. In 1981, Draskovic quit journalism and dedicated himself to the career of a writer. His best-seller, The Judge, was published soon after. He wrote a saga of the Serbs' genocide in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during World War II. The saga is comprised of four novels: The Knife, The Prayer, The Prayer II, The Russian Consul. In 1994, he published The Night of the General, a novel describing the last days of General Draza Mihailovic.

In 1990 Vuk Draskovic, together with Vojislav Seselj, founded the Serbian Renewal Movement, self-defined as "a national party of the democratic center." Today, it is a leading opposition party in Serbia advocating democratization and peace, according to the official party program. Draskovic was twice imprisoned by Milosevic's regime in 1991 and 1993.

For all his personal courage in standing up to Milosevic and his excellent rhetorical skills, Draskovic is, by most accounts, a mediocre writer and a bad politician. Since 1990 he has endorsed a number of contradictory positions supporting, for example, the Serbs* war effort and then opposing it. This lack of consistency has damaged his credibility and has helped Milosevic portray him as an amateur. His main basis of support is Southern Serbia where his adherence to the Mihailovic-royalist traditions of Serbia is
particulaiiy popular. This strange mixture of liberalism and old-fashioned royaiism that he preaches has damaged his message among Belgrade's liberal intelliengtia and youth. Finally, his own personal ambitions coupled with those of the other opposition leaders, has made it impossible to form a cohesive political alliance opposing Milosevic. All in all, Milosevic has been lucky to have someone like Draskovic as the main opposition leader since he has proved to be no match for the well-organized electoral machine of the socialists.

3. Voiislav Seselj. President of the Serbian Radical Party, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia

Vojislav Seselj was born in Sarajevo in 1954 to a family that had emigrated to that city from Herzegovina. His mother was illiterate and his father was a railway worker. As a boy, Seselj was an activist in Titoist youth organizations and became a member of the League of Communists in 1971. In 1976, he graduated from university, and only three years later defended his doctoral thesis at Sarajevo's law school, entitled "The Political Essence of Militarism and Fascism A Contribution to the Marxian Critique of Political Forms of Civic Democracy"

From 1981 to 1984, Seselj was one of the youngest docents at Sarajevo University. After becoming involved in dissident activity he lost his university job and moved to Belgrade where he made many friends in dissident circles. He was jailed for 22 months (1984-1986) for his writings. After imprisonment he returned to Belgrade as a
prominent victim. ?nrf resumed his anti-regime publishing activity. On a visit to North America in 1989, Seselj was awarded the title of Chetoik Vojvoda (Duke) by one of the oldest living Chetnik leaders. The title was later rescinded, but Seselj kept using the honorary rank, and often has been referred to as the "Red Duke." Seselj has remarked that "every one of his political attitudes, political perspectives, depends on his personal experience, his personal destiny, from one of his personal ordeals." (Intervju, No. 410, Belgrade, June 1997).

In early 1990, Seselj's small "Serbian Freethinkers Movement" joined with Vuk Draskovic to form the Serbian Movement of Renewal (SPO), but Seselj soon broke with Draskovic and in June 1990 launched the Serbian Chetnik movement. Seselj ran as an independent candidate in the 1990 presidential election. During the Yugoslav wars, Seselj led Chetnik paramilitary squads into Croatia and Bosnia, made a number of inflammatory comments of how best to kill a Croat or a Moslem and was accused of war crimes.

In 1991, Seselj formed the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) Like other opposition parties, the SRS has suffered from internal factionalism For example, in early 1994, part of the leadership and membership left the SRS and formed the Radical Party of Serbia, a pattern repeated in mid-1994, with the formation of the Serbian Radical Party "Nikola Pasic."

Despite these defections, Seselj has been successful in capitalizing on Serbs' dissatisfaction with both the Milosevic regime and the established opposition parties.
Milosevic and the SPS are accused of having "betrayed" Serbian national interests and of allowing Yugoslavia to become an isolated state with, a Third World economy. The democratic opposition politicians are discredited, owing to their failure to maintain a politically united organizational structure after the 1996/1997 protests, and their inability to develop a feasible program for Serbia's transformation. For many Serbs, charismatic and controversial Seselj remains a fearless and consistent advocate of their deepest concerns. After coming first in the second round of the first Serbian presidential elections in 1997, he formed a coalition government with the socialists on March 24, 1998. Seselj's Serbian Radical Party received IS of 36 posts and Seselj himself was appointed deputy prime minister.


Constantinos Karamanlis was born an Ottoman subject in the village of Proti, in the Serres district of present-day Greek Macedonia, on March 9, 1907. Originally he studied law in Athens and exercised his profession in the city of Serres. He entered politics in 1935, when he was elected member of parliament from Serres with the right-wing Popular Party. He was re-elected MP in 1936. During the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-41) and later, during the occupation by Germany's Nazi forces, he retired from politics. After the end of the war, he re-entered politics and was re-elected MP with the Popular Party in the elections of 1946 and 1950. In 1951, Karamanlis joined the "Greek Alert" party that had recently been created by retired General Alexander Papagos in order to end political fragmentation, provide a strong government, establish social peace and lift Greece out of poverty'.
Having held several ministerial posts between 1946 and 1952, Karamanlis distinguished himself for his term at the Ministry of Public Works in the Papagos government, elected in 1952. Making use of Marshall Plan aid, he built highways, dams and the rest of the basic physical infrastructure necessary to make economic growth possible.

In 1955, young, handsome and with a firm reputation as a doer, he was appointed Prime Minister by King Paul, to replace the dying Papagos and breathe some fresh air into Greek politics. He quickly moved to reorganize the right by establishing the National Radical Union that was placed under his full control. As the leader of the NJLU he won three elections in 1956, 1958 and 1961 and was the Prime Minister until November 1963. However, his reputation was seriously damaged by allegations of widespread fraud in the 1961 elections to ensure the defeat of the opposition. In the 1963 elections the N.R.U. lost to the Center Union under Georgios Papandreou (father of Andreas Papandreou), and Karamanlis resigned from the N.R.U.'s leadership and left for Paris where he lived until the political changeover in 1974.

He returned to Greece on July 24, 1974, and contributed significantly to the smooth restoration of democracy. In the elections of November 1974 his newly-formed party, New Democracy, came first with an astonishing 54% of the votes and in 1977 it came first again with 41%. He served as President of the Republic from May 1980 until May 1985 when he resigned after PASOK decided not to support his candidature for a new term. He was re-elected president in May 1990 and remained in the presidential seat until March 9th, 1995, the day of his 88th birthday. Until his death in April 1998, he lived in his house in the northern suburbs of Athens where most of his time was devoted to his archives.
Karamanlis is credited with the drafting of a modern, liberal, inclusive constitution in 1975 that established the most democratic, open and stable polity Greece has ever experienced since its independence in 1830, and with Greece's accession to the European Community in 1981. This was a diplomatic triumph, personally achieved against the objection of many Eurocrats in Brussels, five years ahead of Spain and Portugal, a crowning achievement for the quintessential Greek modernizer. With a political life that expands from the interwar period to the mid-1990s, Karamanlis has marked post-war Greece as no other political leader. For all his flaws, his heritage is linked with the country's efforts to escape its perennial poverty, isolation and socio-political unrest and take its rightful place at the top table of the European Union.

Karamanlis' second presidential term, however, was a failure. Contrary to his first term in the early 1980s, when he exerted a positive, moderating influence on the Socialist newcomers, by 1990 Karamanlis had grown too old and resigned himself to the very minimum of necessary appearances. His fragile health caused one more headache for the Conservatives since his potential loss would immediately have led to elections. In regard to Macedonia, Karamanlis, a proud Greek Macedonian himself, at times seemed to lose the pragmatism that had characterized him all his life, and turned sentimental and lamented the supposed "loss of Macedonia to the Skopjens." When Mitsotakis asked him to help in sorting things out, isolating Papandreou who refused to participate in new meetings of the council of political leaders in 1993, Karamanlis refused to enter the political frail and, possibly, overstep his limited authority, thus, threatening his carefully built reputation as an honest broker and 'father of the nation.' In this respect, he provided neither a service to his disillusioned nation nor a help to his fellow Conservatives as they were sinking into electoral defeat in 1993.
5. Constantinos Mitsotakis. Prime Minister of Greece between April 1990 and October 1993

Constantinos Mitsotakis was born in 1918 in Chania in Crete and is a grand-nephew of Eleftherios Venizelos, the great Greek liberal statesman of the first half of the century. He studied Law, Political and Economic Sciences at the University of Athens. Having fought the invading Italians in 1940, he then joined the resistance against the German occupiers. He was arrested and sentenced twice to death.

After the end of the war, he was elected MP for the Liberal Party and continued to be elected to the present day in every elections except the one of 1974. In 1961 he joined the newly-created Center Union party headed by George Papandreou and Sofoklis Venizelos, an alliance of centrists, formed to defeat the right and oust Karamanlis from power. After the center's electoral landslide in 1964, Mitsotakis became a senior cabinet member.

However, Mitsotakis suffered a serious political blunder when due to his personal antagonism with Andreas Papandreou, George's son, who had recently arrived in Greece after twenty years in the United States, he sided with the King and George Papandreou's opponents inside the center, to bring down the government. The dismissal of George Papandreou by the King on July 15, 1965, amounted to a royal coup for a majority of Greeks It destabilized Greek politics and facilitated the military to openly intervene and suspend the civil and political liberties of Greeks on April 21, 1967. Many Greeks thought of Mitsotakis as a traitor of the popular trust in the Papandreou government and a conspirator that brought it down to abort its reformist agenda. Mitsotakis never fully recovered from this episode.
In the first elections after the political changeover in 1974, Mhsotakis was a political outcast and failed to get elected to parliament. His ascendancy, however, was quick. In exactly ten years he managed to jump start his political career and win the leadership of the main opposition party in 1984. In 1977 he was elected to parliament on his own. In 1978 he joined KaramanliV New Democracy party and took over the very important Ministry of Coordination and later, that of Foreign Affairs, on the eve of Greece's accession to the European Community.

New Democracy lost power in 1981 to PASOK. Having lost one more election in 1984, the New Democracy parliamentary group decided to entrust the leadership of the party to Mitsotakis, a transplanted rather than an indigenous conservative. His centrist origin, liberal credentials, pro-market orientation and extraordinary dynamism revitalized the party, and led it to victory, first in the municipal elections of 1986, and then in the parliamentary elections of 1989. He was sworn in as Prime Minister in April 1990, but in September 1993 his government lost its slim majority in parliament when two supporters of his former Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras, defected. After the loss of the elections in October 1993, he resigned the party leadership and was named "honorary president" of the party but has remained politically active, aspiring to a future national role, or even the Presidency of the Republic.


Greece's Socialist Party (PASOK) leader Andreas Papandreou was born in Chios in 1919 and died on the 23rd of June 1996 in Athens after a prolonged illness. The Harvard-educated Papandreou had been Prime Minister of Greece for almost ten years, after winning general elections three times, the first in October 1981, then in June 1985
and, his latest term, in October 1993. In January of 1996, halfway into his third term, Mr. Papandreou resigned after having stayed in the hospital for two months for lung and kidney failure. He nevertheless remained a powerful force in the Socialist Party over which he presided until his death.

Mr. Papandreou was the son of late Prime Minister George Papandreou and Sophia Meneiko. A graduate of Athens University Law School, Andreas Papandreou was arrested in 1939 for his political activities during the Metaxa dictatorship and, after being released from prison, departed for the United States. In 1943, he earned his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University and, after becoming an American citizen, he served with the US Navy during World War II.

Having taught at a number of universities in the US, among which the University of California at Berkeley, Mr. Papandreou returned to Greece in 1959 where he headed an economic development research program. One year later he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors and General Director of the Athens Economic Research Center and Advisor to the Bank of Greece.

His first official involvement with politics came in 1964 when he was elected deputy for Achaia district to the Greek parliament with the Center Union Party. In the following two years he served as Minister to the Prime Minister's office and subsequently Alternate Minister of Coordination Mr Papandreou was arrested in April 1967 by the military junta only to be released eight months later and be sent to exile, first in Sweden and later in Canada. He lectured on Economic Science at Stockholm University (1968-1969) and at Toronto's York University (1969-1974). In February 1968 Mr. Papandreou founded the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) and struggled against the coup until the junta fell in July of 1974.
Andreas Papandreou returned to Greece in August 1974, when he founded the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). During that year's elections, the party received a mere 13.5% of the vote. Papandreou thought of quitting politics and returning to the United States. His nationalist and socialist rhetoric, however, quickly captured the hearts of many Greeks who were fed up with half a century of conservative rule. Three years later PASOK gathered 25%, thereby putting Papandreou in the spotlight as the country's main opposition party leader.

In the 1981 general elections, PASOK won a landslide victory, with Papandreou becoming Prime Minister, only to repeat his success in June 1985. He held on to the Premiership until the June 1989 elections, during which PASOK lost to the New Democracy party.

At the end of the 1980s, Greece was rocked by a series of scandals and Papandreou's health began to show signs of strain, having undergone open heart surgery in 1988. In July 1989 he married the Olympic Airways hostess Dimitra Liani, divorcing Margaret Papandreou, his American wife of 38 years with whom he had three sons and one daughter. Also the same year, Papandreou was indicted by Parliament in connection with the $200 million Bank of Crete embezzlement scandal. He was accused of helping the embezzlement by ordering state corporations to transfer their holdings to the Bank of Crete, where the interest was allegedly skimmed off to benefit the Socialists. He was cleared of all wrongdoing in January 1992.

Andreas Papandreou bounced back in October 1993 when he began his third four-year term as Prime Minister. While his charisma never eclipsed, his fragile health kept him from exercising the active political leadership role he once had been famous for. He was
hospitalized at Athens' Onasion Cardiosurgery Center on November 20, 1995, for lung and kidney failure, and returned to his home on March 21, 1996, where he died three months later.

The Serbs in 400 Words

The Serbs first came to the Balkans in the 6th century AD together with other southward-imigrating Slavic tribes. Because of Byzantine cultural influence they espoused Christian Orthodoxy when they converted to Christianity and the Cyrilic alphabet. A powerful Serbian kingdom flourished in the 14th century but was quickly destroyed by the advancing Ottomans. Serbs remained under Ottoman rule until the 19th century. Due to the contraction of the Ottoman empire and their northward imigration at the end of the 17th century, many Serbs became Habsburg subjects.

Confronted with the abuse of local Ottoman administrators, Serb peasants revolted in 1804 and in 1815. At the Congress of Vienna, a small province with Belgrade at its center was granted autonomy but remained under Ottoman sovereignty. Independence and further territorial expansion was gained at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Serbian designs on Bosnia brought the young kingdom into conflict with the Austro-Hungarian empire and eventually led to the First World War. In the meantime, Serbia won Kosovo and a large chunk of Macedonia from the defeated Ottomans in the Balkan war of 1912.

Serbia suffered tremendous losses during the First World War but emerged victorious in 1918. Although never enthusiastic about the Croat-inspired Yugoslav ideal for the unification of South Slavs, territorial and other interests made Serbia espouse Yugoslavism in Versailles in 1918. The first Yugoslavia was a centralized, unitary state dominated by Serbia to the frustration of Croat nationalists. The most extreme of them,
the infamous fascist Ustashes, took their revenge when Yugoslavia was partitioned by Hitler. Thousands of Serbs perished in the Independent State of Croatia. Serbian extremists, the Chetniks, retaliated and a bloody civil war eschewed out of which Tito's communists came victorious.

Yugoslavia was gradually reorganized into a federation and Serbia lost its previous privileged position and was turned into one of the six Yugoslav republics. Serbs came to resent the decentralization of power and were outraged when two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were granted autonomy by the 1974 constitution. Growing Albanian nationalism and secessionist demands in Kosovo were skillfully exploited by the new Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to mobilize Serbs in a program of recentralizing Serbia and Yugoslavia. When Croatia became independent, local Serbs, with the support of Belgrade, revolted but were defeated in 1995 and were forced out of Croatia. On the contrary, Bosnian Serbs were able to establish an ethnic mini-state after four years of war. Today, Serbia is confronted with an economic and social crisis while its ethnic problems remain unresolved, obstructing democratization and market reforms.

The Greeks in 400 Words

The Greeks are very proud of their ancient glories and classical heritage. Ancient Greeks produced major works in philosophy, science, literature, drama and art that defined Western civilization. The conquests of Alexander the Great created a unified world of Greek culture in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Roman Empire's Eastern half was progressively hellenized in what came to be known as the Byzantine empire. The modern Greek nation emerged in Byzantium's last centuries, as the empire contracted into its Greek-populated parts and was confronted with the advancing, ethnically and religiously alien, Turks.
Although Greeks enjoyed considerable privileges and some autonomy, Ottoman rule came to be strongly resented by Greek nationalists in the 18th century for the social, economic and intellectual stagnation that it produced. The Greek revolution in 1821 and the struggle for independence that followed were the products of the first national movement in the Ottoman world, attracting considerable support among European liberals and dominating the European scene for a whole decade.

A small independent kingdom of Greece was created in 1832. New territories were added in 1864, 1881 and 1912-1913 when Greece expanded into Macedonia and the Aegean. Having been allied with the victorious Entente, Greek forces were allowed to land in Anatolia in 1919. After three years of war, they were defeated in 1922 by Kemal's nationalists and were expelled together with 1.5 million Greeks from Western Asia Minor. The defeat of 1922 brought to an end the dream of a resurrected Greco-Byzantine empire with Constantinople as its center.

Greece fought the invading Italians bravely in 1940 and the Germans in 1941, but succumbed to their superior force. The occupation brought widespread deprivation to an already impoverished country and politically radicalized large parts of the population. A devastating civil war between communists and republicans delayed reconstruction, which was only initiated in 1950.

Greece experienced rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Rising social expectations and demands for political pluralization led to a military-led conservative backlash with the coup of 1967 that was brought down in 1974 after the colonels' failed attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece. After 1974, Greece established an open, inclusive, liberal democracy and acceded to the European Community. Despite the economic
stagnation of the 1980s, Greece is today the richest, most stable country in Southeastern Europe.
Statistics

/. Points of Tension and Instability in Southeastern Europe: Mapping the Balkan 'PowderKes'

UKRAI
NE

' Yugoslavia census of 1991  'Oau'orJSZ ' Macedonian census. June 1991 Sourct The Miliary
BtMnci 1335-IS3S. :Unoon Brasscv s 995i

Hr nuNcmu. ZONES OF TENSION

1 - Occupation of the norm of me Repuone of Cyprus ov me Tumsn Army
2 - Delimitation of me territorial waters ina air soace of me Aegean Sea
3 - installation of military forces an me Greet manos ov me Aegean
4 - Status of me Greet minority n istanow
5 - Status of me Turusn minority m
6 - Status of me Turtisn minority m
7 - Territorial disoute over northern Eoirus ana me natus ov me Greet minority

m Albania I - Tensions following me orociamanon ov moeoenoenca Ov me 'ormer Yugoslav
Reconciliation of Macedonia
9 - Oromanos of me
Kosovo Albanians
10 - War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ana unoientaoon of me geace agreement
     eiaaored m me Oaytoñ Accoras
11 - War in Croaoa ime Kraına and Eastern Slavoniai
12 - Hungarian minorities in Vonrodma
13 - Hungarian minority in Romania

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translated and adapted from color to DUCK and wrntei from
Le Monae Oiaiomaoaue. aossier'Mamere ae Voir* reoruary 29. 1996
2. Yugoslavia in 1990

S Philippe Rekacewicz. Reproduced with grateful acknowledgment permission translated and adapted from color to black and white from Le Monae Diplomataue. dossier 'Maniere de Voir.' February 29, 1996.
Illiberal/Authoritarian
5. Political Parties in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNVS</td>
<td>Bosnjak National Committee of Sandzak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democratic Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Socialists (Montenegro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSACG</td>
<td>Democratic League of the Albanians in Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSK</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUA</td>
<td>Democratic Union of Albanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>Citizen Alliance of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL</td>
<td>Yugoslav Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KV</td>
<td>Vojvodina Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCG</td>
<td>Liberal Alliance of Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSV</td>
<td>League of Social Democracy of Vojvodina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCG</td>
<td>People's Party of Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLK</td>
<td>Albanian Peoples¹ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPK</td>
<td>Parliamentary Party of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Albanian People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PShDK</td>
<td>Albanian Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSNP</td>
<td>Radical Party - Nikola Pasic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNPCG</td>
<td>Socialist National Party of Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Serbian Party of Renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSJ</td>
<td>Serbian Party of Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>Peasants' Party of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOMB</td>
<td>National Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URS</td>
<td>United Radical Party of Serbia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstaining &amp; Boycotting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph showing the percentage of votes received by the Socialist and Radical parties in various elections from 1989 to 1997.

- **Socialist Party**
  - 1989: 80.4%
  - 1990: 65.3%
  - 1992: 53.2%
  - 1997(1): 35.7%
  - 1997(2): 49.1%
  - 1997(3): 47.9%
  - 1997(4): 27.2%
- **Radical Party**
  - 1989: 43.7%
  - 1990: 59.2%

Legend:
- Socialists
- Radicals

Note: The Radical Party's vote percentage increased significantly after the SRS did not compete in the 1991 election. Seselj ran as an independent candidate in the 1997(4) election.
## X Opinion of Serbs and Albanians of Serbia Retxvdmmff Rights for Kosovo Albanians (October 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kosovo Albanians</th>
<th>Non-Albanian Citizens of Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Oppose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Language &amp; Secondary Classes</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Language</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Classes</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Cultural Organizations</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Control of Local Initiatives</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Representatives In Parliament</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Susan White and Dma Smeic. "Serbs and Kosovar Albanians Agree on Education Accord: Soil Far Apart on Region's Status," Opmmum Analysis .United States Inrbrmaan Agency, December 4, 1996. M-236-96/ Based on a USIA-commissioned survey in Kosovo and other parts of Serbia which interviewed 728 Kosovar Albanians 18 years of age and older; and 1147 non-Albanians, 18 years of age and older in Serbia (916 Serbs, 107 Yugoslavs, 31 Muslims, 16 Croats, 66 others, 12 no information).
9. The Demography of Serbia

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Number of persons</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Serbs</td>
<td>6182155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>1147466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>1441941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1303034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>33455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunians</td>
<td>9755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valachians</td>
<td>125596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>390468</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>148969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>215166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>110959</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>53093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>73207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>13890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>149368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>36876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Did not declare</td>
<td>7834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>themselves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared themselves</td>
<td>6348</td>
</tr>
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<td>Declared themselves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>43219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9313676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Estimates for communities Bujancvac and Freshfivo and AP Kosovo and Metohia (Census 1991)
10. The Economic Crisis of Serbia in the 1990s: The Collapse of the GDP
//. The Electoral Power of New Democracy and PASOK in Greek Elections (1974-1993)

\[ A/D: \text{Percentages in general elections 1974-1993} \]

PASOK: Percentages in general elections 1974-1993

PufaUc Deficit to GDP Ratio (DEFR). Greece. 1968-93.

GDP AVERAGE
AT CONSTANT PRICES OF 1985
Gbreece's Inflation and Growth Differential With the OECD

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Greeks' Perception of a Good Neighborhood

Wouldn't that be great?
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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST
TARGET (QA-3)

I.0 1.0 mm I2.

151

14.0

L.5 11.4 116

150mm

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